

Geist, Sprache und Handlung Mind, Language and Action

Abstracts

36. Internationales Wittgenstein Symposium
11. – 17. August 2013
Kirchberg am Wechsel

36th International Wittgenstein Symposium
August 11 – 17, 2013
Kirchberg am Wechsel

Stand des Abstracta-Hefts: 01.08.2013
Aktuelle Änderungen unter: http://www.alws.at/abstract_2013.pdf.



www.alws.at

Book of abstracts publication date: 01/08/2013
For updates see: http://www.alws.at/abstract_2013.pdf.

Distributors

Die Österreichische Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft
The Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society

Markt 63, A-2880 Kirchberg am Wechsel, Österreich / Austria

Herausgeber: Danièle Moyal-Sharrock, Volker A. Munz, Annalisa Coliva
Visuelle Gestaltung: Sascha Windholz
Druck: Eigner-Druck, 3040 Neulengbach

**WISSENSCHAFT · FORSCHUNG
NIEDERÖSTERREICH**



Gedruckt mit Unterstützung der Abteilung Wissenschaft und Forschung (K3)
des Amtes der NÖ Landesregierung

OF CONTEXT AND CONTENT: WITTGENSTEIN AND EMBEDDED EXTERNALISM

Brandon Absher

Buffalo, USA

In this essay, I develop an interpretation of Wittgenstein as an advocate of what I call "embedded externalism." Embedded externalism differs from other forms of externalism in that it treats linguistic practice as embedded within an encompassing environmental context and emphasizes that such practice is, not only interrelated with, but indeed intimately attuned to the encompassing environmental context within which it is situated (cf. Haugeland 1995). Though externalists have been right to criticize the Cartesian conception of the mind as a self-enclosed interiority, they have all too frequently remained wed to distorting traditional philosophical presuppositions. Among these I count the following: the privilege of theoretical cognition over practical-existential involvement and the privilege of the designative over the expressive dimensions of linguistic practice (cf. Taylor 1985). Because of this, however, externalists have generally missed the ways in which linguistic practice is intimately attuned to the world. By contrast, I will argue in this essay that Wittgenstein presents a compelling alternative to other externalist theories in which precisely the intimacy between language and world is insisted upon.

A CRITICAL NOTE ON THE NEW MYTHOLOGY OF THE ORDINARY

Marilena Andronico

Ferrara, Italy

Following Stanley Cavell's reading of Wittgenstein's writings, there is nowadays a widespread tendency to emphasize the mythical tone of Wittgenstein's philosophical work and to identify it with what is taken to be the rediscovery and acceptance of "the ordinary". In this paper I criticize such a tendency and try to show that it rests on a misunderstanding concerning the idea that philosophical activity requires a transformation of the philosopher's life.

THE MISSING LANGUAGE – WITTGENSTEINIAN COMMENTARY ON ALTHUSSER'S CRITIQUE OF IDEOLOGY

Lukasz Andrzejewski

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The first part of this paper presents an overview of Althusser's programme of the critique of ideology, which brings into focus what I see as a very significant shortcoming related to the absence of the problem of language in psychoanalytical and structuralist perspectives. The second part is devoted to the analysis of Wittgenstein's critique of the metaphysical entanglement of language (including everyday language), as well as inspirations that Wittgenstein drew from Freud's psychoanalysis. The third part provides a contextual comparison of both concepts and points to the need and possibilities of applying Wittgenstein's ideas to programmes of the critique of ideology inspired by Althusser's project.

SPRACHE DES WISSENS? ERKENNTNISTHEORETISCHE IMPLIKATIONEN DES PERFORMATIVEN SPRECHAKTES

Lisa Appiano

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Das Konzept der performativen Dimension der Sprache steht in den Geistes- und Kulturwissenschaften vor allem für die Subversion des wahrheitskonditionalen Bandes zwischen Denken und Sein. John L. Austin, der „Entdecker“ der performativen Äußerungen, avancierte mit seinem handlungsorientierten Sprachverständnis zum prominenten Kritiker jenes philosophischen Ideals, das die Sprache – sofern sie von allem metaphysischen Ballast befreit wäre – ein Instrument des Wissens sein könnte. Wie steht die performative Sprechhandlung zu diesem angestrebten Wissens-Desiderat? Welche erkenntnistheoretischen Implikationen weist das performative Paradigma auf? Welche Konsequenzen hinsichtlich der Frage nach der Erkenntnis einer gegenständlichen Welt, folgen aus der Annahme, dass die Sprache die Tat-Sachen der Welt hervorbringt? Der Vortrag wird diesen Fragen entlang der Lektüre zwischen Austin und Jacques Derrida nachgehen, um zu zeigen, dass das performative Sprachverständnis vom Anspruch der Sprache auf Wissen (als Entsprechungsverhältnis zwischen Äußerung und Sachverhalt) nicht ausgenommen werden kann.

DIE ÄUßERUNG EINER ERINNERUNG ALS INTUITIVE ERKLÄRUNG EINER GEGENWÄRTIGEN ABSICHT – GANZ NACH WITTGENSTEIN

Ulrich Arnswald

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Erinnerung ist für Wittgenstein ein komplexer Vorgang, der mit einer Vielzahl von Schwierigkeiten verbunden ist. Dies gilt besonders für seine Überlegungen zur Erinnerung einer Absicht – ein in der Wittgenstein-Literatur bis dato vernachlässigter Aspekt, obwohl er in diversen Manuskripten des Nachlasses hervorsteht. Nach Wittgenstein erlaubt uns der Erinnerungsvorgang nicht, uns eine vermeintliche Absicht „vor Augen zu führen“, dennoch verwenden wir den Begriff, um mittels einer Erinnerungsbeschreibung eine vergangene Absicht zu äußern. – Nur was bringen wir damit zum Ausdruck?

Da die Worte sich weder auf Tatsachen beziehen noch mit diesen korrespondieren, kommt es zur paradoxen Situation, dass jemand sich des Inhalts einer Absicht zu erinnern meint, nicht aber der einstigen Worte. Dies wirft im Umkehrschluss die Frage auf, was unter diesen Umständen die Artikulation der Erinnerung einer Absicht überhaupt zum Ausdruck bringen soll und kann.

A MACHINE AS SYMBOLIZING ITS ACTION

Alberto Arruda

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In the following essay I will attempt at an analysis of the dictum, "A machine as symbolizing its action" (PI, §193). I will first argue that this idea is introduced, with an important qualification, in the course of a discussion about certain meta-philosophical difficulties: the postulation of certain explicative expressions for which no use model can be presented (§191). The qualification introduced should make clear the difference between the deliberate postulation of expressions as placeholders for an argument and the construction of an argument that does not in fact ex-

plain the actual phenomena, but proceeds, via insufficient attempts, at the elaboration of an abstraction (§192). Finally, I shall argue that these remarks constitute an argument in the philosophy of mind that intends to expose the notion of a process as insufficient for explaining how the grasp of a rule is effectively to constitute a practice.

“SELF-MOVERS”. INTENTIONALITY AND THE NATURE OF LIVING BEINGS

Valérie Aucouturier

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Drawing on Anscombe's rehabilitation of an Aristotelian philosophy of action, I shall revisit the notion of intentionality. From the Cartesian perspective in action theory the problem of intentionality is that of understanding how the immaterial mind interacts with the material body and produces voluntary action. On the contrary, from an Aristotelian perspective the movements of living bodies, though somehow dependent on their “mechanical” structure, cannot be explained in the same manner as those of inanimate matter. No activities of the soul could only be contingently related to activities of the body. Here the results of 20th century philosophy of language and the Aristotelian view strikingly converge: intentionality isn't an intimate and privately accessible state of the mind, but rather an essential feature of the activity of any living creature. This raises an interesting question: if intentionality doesn't discriminate human action from other living creature's action, what does?

ON WITTGENSTEIN'S LATER CRITICISMS OF HIS EARLIER SELF

Conrad Baetzel

Bonn, Germany

My aim in this paper is to contribute to the ongoing debate about Wittgenstein's later criticisms of his earlier self. I argue for the view that it is possible to explain his later criticisms while simultaneously denying that early Wittgenstein's aim was to establish a theory. I suggest that Wittgenstein is criticizing how he missed to see that his aim to dispense from the problems of philosophy in essence without any metaphysical or theoretical presuppositions had been infected by undetected prejudices embedded in his construal of a single method of analysis. I discuss two examples of his later criticisms that should bring to light that his aim, when he means to confess the “grave mistakes” of his earlier self, is to lay bare how he unwittingly refrained to give up from demanding that things *must* be such-and-such. These demands, Wittgenstein claims, are unfounded, should be systematically revealed, and dissolved thereafter.

TRAINING AND TRANSFORMATION

David Bakhurst

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In *Mind and World*, John McDowell concludes that human beings “are born mere animals, and they are transformed into thinkers and intentional agents”, principally by their initiation into language. Such “transformational views” of human development usually embrace a model of learning by initiation that represents language acquisition as a movement from a non-rationally secured conformity with correct practice, through increasing understanding of correct practice, to a state of rational mastery of correct practice. As such, they tend to represent initiate learning as beginning with something like what Wittgenstein calls

“training” (parallel ideas are found in Vygotsky). This paper considers the cogency of this picture of learning and development. I argue that although the idea of training (as developed, say, by Meredith Williams) can be defended from the usual objections, it is susceptible to criticisms brought recently by Sebastian Rödl, who argues persuasively that it is unfaithful to the reality of infancy and the nature of child-parent interaction. Rödl's criticisms (directed at my work as well as McDowell's) draw attention to the pre-linguistic child's motivation to be “one of us”, to find mutual recognition as one of a kind. A being whose life activity manifests this form of consciousness, he maintains, is not an object of training, but a subject of education. I argue that Rödl's insights are consistent with Michael Tomasello's empirical work on language acquisition and development. As such they undermine the transformational view and the attendant concept of training, but they nevertheless make possible a strongly social theory of mind that thinkers drawn to the transformational view should find attractive.

BACK TO THE ROUGH GROUND AND INTO THE HURLY BURLY

Louise Barrett

Lethbridge, Canada

By virtue of their close relationship to humans, we often look to our fellow primates, the monkeys and apes, for clues about the origins and evolutionary significance of many of our own social behaviours, and the cognitive mechanisms that underpin them. On the face of it, this is perfectly sensible. When considering the results of these efforts, however, it becomes apparent that such comparisons often represent an uncritical acceptance of a particular philosophical perspective, and often have very little to do with evolution at all. As a result, they do an injustice to both sides, failing to recognise the distinctive nature of non-human cognition, on the one hand, and promoting a somewhat misleading view of our own cognitive abilities on the other. This perspective has leaked into the study of other species, leaving them washed with an anthropocentric tinge. Here, I attempt to illustrate how a different philosophical outlook will allow us to remain true to Darwin's vision of evolutionary continuity without merely constructing other species in our own image.

ENACTIVISM IN LATE WITTGENSTEIN

Marius Bartmann

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The knowing-how and knowing-that dichotomy still marks the dividing line separating traditional and enactivist approaches. Both concepts, which appear to exclude one another, determine the respective accounts of how best to understand human cognition. I will pursue two objectives in my paper. First, I will apply the rule-following problem formulated by Wittgenstein in the *Philosophical Investigations* to the aforementioned distinction in order to show that knowing-how can neither be reduced to nor based on knowing-that. Second, and consequently, I want to explain the relationship between these concepts in such a way that avoids simply settling the question as to what is based on what in favor of either one of them. Rather, I will replace the static picture of asymmetrical grounding with a dynamic understanding of interdependence that permits us to see how both domains are interrelated.

THE GROUNDLESSNESS OF OUR BELIEVING: A CAVELLIAN READING OF *ON CERTAINTY*

Chantal Bax

Amsterdam / Nijmegen, The Netherlands

Stanley Cavell is one of the most thought-provoking interpreters of the later Wittgenstein. He has however always refrained from commenting on *On Certainty*, Wittgenstein's very last collection of remarks – in spite of the fact that a number of the topics Cavell is most interested in (like scepticism, community and rationality) receive more systematic attention in *On Certainty* than in any other of Wittgenstein's writings. This may seem due to the fact several of the remarks in *On Certainty* appear to contradict the reading of Wittgenstein that Cavell has developed. For does it not precisely deny that there can be such a thing as what Cavell calls 'the truth of skepticism'? And does it not recommend complacency and conformity rather than Cavellian self-examination and cultural criticism? In my paper, I will argue that these answers need not be answered in the affirmative by showing that a Cavellian reading can be given of *On Certainty* as well.

"... (THE TRACTATUS TOO IS BORING.) IT IS EVEN MISTAKEN". THE GRAMMATICAL ERROR OF CORA DIAMOND

Luciano Bazzocchi

Siena, Italy

In her central contribute to *The New Wittgenstein*, Cora Diamond never quotes the decimal numbers of Wittgenstein's propositions nor seems aware of their use. Of course, without decimals the *Tractatus* "becomes an incomprehensible mess" (Wittgenstein). The *Tractatus* is a hierarchical text and cannot be read as if it were an Indian file of 526 distinct elements. As one can demonstrate looking at *Tractatus* manuscript, following Wittgenstein a further decimal level is equivalent to a level of *parentheses*. And if you rub out all the parentheses or the punctuation of a text, what remains is only an incomprehensible jumble. Especially, propositions 6.54 and 7 don't belong to the same context: there are two closed parentheses between the former and the latter. They cannot constitute any "frame" at all, because their juxtaposition contradicts the only frame Wittgenstein claims he was care of: "The propositions 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 are the cardinal propositions, etc."

ON THE WAY TO THE LATER WITTGENSTEIN: ACQUIRING LANGUAGE AS A LIFE-FORM

Ondrej Beran

Prague / Pilsen, Czech Republic

In this contribution, I would like to use Wittgenstein's remarks from his "middle" period concerning the question of language acquisition and of the pre-linguistic, to show that the implicit historicity and contingency of this account of language anticipates his later, mature philosophy.

WITTGENSTEIN, CHESS & MEMORY

Eduardo Bermúdez Barrera, Raimundo Abello, Henry González, David L. Dahmen, Rene J. Campis C.

Barranquilla, Colombia

Bermudez 2006 outlined the role of the chess metaphor in Wittgenstein to explain his thinking about language. The applicability of this metaphor means that the solutions offered by neuroscience to explain mental process, and memory in particular, had simply not been developed during his time. It required a revolution centered on PDP in order for any explanation to be able to address the central questions raised by Wittgenstein. This paper outlines how recent research of chess memory corresponds with the emergent theories based on PDP, and confirms the precision of Wittgenstein's questions in order to arrive at what is only now taking form as neuropsychological theory.

THE BOUNDS OF AUTHENTICITY OF VISUAL MEMORY

Sven Bernecker

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Abstract: It has long been recognized that memory is not a literal reproduction of the past but instead a constructive process. To say that memory is a constructive process is to say that the encoded content may differ from the retrieved content. At the same time it is assumed that one can only remember what is the case. According to the factivity constraint, the memory content must accord with the objective reality. According to the authenticity constraint, the memory content must reflect the subject's original perception of reality, regardless of whether the original perception was veridical. This paper addresses the question of how the constructive nature of visual memory can be reconciled with the authenticity constraint on memory. In what respect and to what extent may the content of a visual memory differ from the original perceptual state and still adequately reflect the subject's original perception? The proposed criterion of similarity of diachronic mental images is committed to descriptivism about mental imagery.

WAS WITTGENSTEIN A CULTURAL RELATIVIST?

Anat Biletzki

Tel Aviv, Israel

It is easy, almost facile, to label Wittgenstein a cultural relativist: "I want to say: an education quite different from ours might also be the foundation for quite different concepts. For here life would run on differently" (*Zettel*, Blackwell, 1967, 387-8). This article purports to make the task a mite more difficult. Identifying a three pronged trajectory – the one introducing language-games and forms of life, another recognizing the social/communal character of these, and the third insisting on the particular rather than the general – that has moved so many readers of Wittgenstein to see him as a cultural relativist, we distinguish between a relativistic *mood* and the Wittgensteinian context which disparages such an easy cultural relativism. Four readers of Wittgenstein – Peter Winch, Ernest Gellner, Stanley Cavell and Clifford Geertz – are brought to bear on this issue and used to elaborate a more intricate, more nuanced view of Wittgenstein. We can then recognize the temptation to group him under cultural relativism but suggest that Geertz's idea of anti-anti-relativism might serve us better, and more fruitfully explain the universalist – albeit pluralistic - intuition that is exposed in Wittgenstein's attitude.

SOME REMARKS ON HOLOCAUST DENIAL IN THE LIGHTS OF ON CERTAINTY

János Kristóf Bodnár

Debrecen, Hungary

The aim of this paper is to recontextualize and examine a contemporary social phenomenon, the Holocaust denial, in the lights of Wittgenstein's thoughts. I cite several paragraphs from *On Certainty* on the (seemingly) incommensurable clashes of world-pictures, and on the relation between universalism and relativism as the starting point of my investigation, which tries to present a possible socio-critical application and interpretation of the late-Wittgenstein's concepts.

PERCEPTION IN ENACTIVISM AND EXTENDED MIND: FROM INTERNAL TO EXTERNAL PERSPECTIVE

Sebastian Bodzak

Świdnik, Poland

In my article, I will discuss the concept of perception as presented by enactivism and the approach of extended mind. Although both these theories fall under the same general category of embodiment, they tend to formulate their particular claims rather differently. I will argue here that a turn towards enactivism or radical embodied cognitive science is more valid than an attempt to synthesize neurosciences (or functionalism) with embodiment.

THE "PRAGMATIC MAXIM" IN WITTGENSTEIN'S ON CERTAINTY

Anna Boncompagni

Florence, Italy

The pragmatic character of Ludwig Wittgenstein's *On Certainty* is often underlined in literature. What is still missing, however, is a more direct comparison with the pragmatist tradition. This paper focuses on a striking similarity between Wittgenstein and Charles S. Peirce, namely, their respective way of connecting knowledge meaning and practical consequences. In the pragmatist tradition, this connection is known as "the pragmatic maxim". Many remarks in *On Certainty* are surprisingly in tune with the maxim. I propose an analysis of this attunement as a contribution to the characterization of the so-called "Third Wittgenstein".

TWO TYPES OF RATIONAL AGENCY IN REASONING

Cristina Borgoni

Graz, Austria

This work aims at exploring the type of agency that we exercise when we reason. I will differentiate between two types of agency that correspond to two levels of rational reasoning. First, I will examine non-critical reasoning. I will argue that non-critical reasoning is correctly understood as being an action – the individual is the one who reasons – even though such an action does not require the individual's control or awareness. Second, I will examine critical reasoning. I will argue that the type of agency exercised at this level is marked by our power to implement the results of our own evaluation in the object of evaluation. In critical reasoning, controlling one's own reasoning and the reasoning itself are part of the same action, which requires the individual's control and awareness of the action.

MCDOWELL ON WITTGENSTEIN ON UNDERSTANDING

Stefan Brandt

Erlangen-Nürnberg, Germany

McDowell argues that because, according to Wittgenstein, self-attributions of understanding shouldn't be explained by reference to conscious experiences, there isn't a need to give an account of the nature of states of understanding. I argue that, to the contrary, Wittgenstein's account of the nature of understanding is his reason for denying that self-attributions of understanding can be explained in this way.

GEDÄCHTNIS

Hans Burkhardt

München, Deutschland

In diesem Beitrag wird die dreifache Unterscheidung Seelenteilen, die Aristoteles eingeführt hat, für systematische Betrachtungen verwendet. Diese drei Seelen, nämlich die vegetative, die sensitive und die rationale Seele, verfügen jeweils über eine eigene Art von Gedächtnis. Für die sensitive oder die Tierseele und die rationale oder die Menschenseele ist dies immer schon bekannt gewesen. Neu ist die Erkenntnis der modernen Medizin, dass es auch im Bereich des Vegetativen ein Gedächtnis gibt, das vor allem bei der Entwicklung von Antikörpern eine Rolle spielt, die ein wichtiger Teil des Immun- oder Schutzsystems unseres Körpers sind. Es gibt Gedächtniszellen und damit auf einer unteren Stufe der Granularität bereits ein Gedächtnis. Die Folge davon ist, dass es auch im Bereich der *anima vegetativa* eine Vergangenheit gibt und folglich auch eine Gegenwart und Zukunft und damit eine vertikale Zeitstruktur, die nicht bewusst ist, also nichts mit Bewusstsein zu tun hat, wie anderen Formen von Gedächtnis im Bereich des Sensitiven und des Rationalen.

MEMORY AND REINCARNATION

Mikel Burley

Leeds, UK

According to reincarnation researchers, thousands of people, typically children, claim to remember previous lives. What are philosophers to make of these claims? Some of those influenced by the later Wittgenstein have been dismissive, asserting that the very idea of remembering previous lives is conceptually confused. In the absence of due attention to the contexts of utterance, such dismissals seem premature. But when the context, the form of life, is a culture different from one's own, how is a grammatical investigation to proceed? This paper engages in critical dialogue with ideas from several philosophers, notably Locke, Ayer, Hacker, and the reincarnation-advocate Robert Almeder. It recommends not conflating talk of reincarnation with that of personal identity, highlights the importance of recognizing when we may not know what to say about a given phenomenon, and proposes that a key challenge for Wittgensteinian philosophy is to develop cross-cultural methods of grammatical inquiry.

AMODAL COMPLETION, PICTURES AND VISUAL IMAGERY

Clotilde Calabi

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When we look at an object that is partially behind another object, we do not have a perceptual experience of the object as continuing behind its occluder unless we are aware, in some sense, of the occluded parts. Vision theo-


rists claim that information about these parts is provided by an amodal completion mechanism, which produces in us a sense of the presence of the occluded parts. This sense of presence is part of our experience of the object as continuing behind its occluder. These parts are perceptually present, despite their not being visually present.

The experience of objects as continuing behind their occluders raises two questions. First, what is the amodal completion mechanism? Second, what kind of experience do we have of the occluded parts? In the following I shall be concerned with the answers provided by the visual imagery theory, according to which information about the occluded parts is the product of a low level, vision specific, neural mechanism that takes place in the early vision processing areas of the brain. This mechanism provides a representation of the occluded parts and, as a result, the observer enjoys a quasi-sensory or quasi-perceptual conscious experience that is phenomenally similar to seeing those parts.

This theory has been recently defended by Bence Nanay, who argues that that visual imagery is both necessary and sufficient for the experience of objects as continuing behind their occluders. Briscoe (2010) has provided one argument against visual imagery as a *necessary* condition for experiencing objects continuing behind their occluders, while admitting that visual imagery may be a *sufficient* condition.

Petterson (2011) has recently argued that visual imagery is necessary for depicted occlusions. According to him, in looking at a picture that depicts an object partially hidden by another object, we imagine visually the occluded parts, and our imagining is triggered by our seeing the visible parts. For example, in looking at Magritte's *The Son of a Man*, which depicts a man facing the viewer, and an apple hides parts of his face, we imagine visually the occluded parts of the face. As a result, these parts are pictorially perceptually present.

Walton made a similar point in *Mimesis as Make-Belief*:



Malevich, Suprematist Painting

“we ‘see’ in the upper part of the canvas, a diagonally positioned rectangular shape in front of a horizontal green line (or elongated rectangle), and that in turn in front of a large black trapezoid oriented on the opposite diagonal. This is how we see the painting, not how it is. The yellow, green and black are all on (virtually) the same plane; there are not one but two horizontal green shapes, separated by a corner of the yellow rectangle; and the black is not a trapezoid but a complex shape surrounding an assortment of rectangular areas. To see the painting this way is in part to imagine (non-deliberately) a yellow rectangle in front of an elongated green one, and so on. And this is how the painting is supposed to be seen; imagining the yellow in front of the green *is prescribed by virtue of actual features of the canvas*. ... We are to *imagine* of the actual rectangu-

lar part on the canvas that it is in front of the green and so on” (Walton, 1990, pp. 56-57, my emphasis).

This paper is structured as follows: in sect. 1, after criticizing Briscoe's argument, I present another argument against visual imagery as a necessary condition for the experience of face-to-face occlusion. In section 2, I argue that visual imagery is *not sufficient* either. In section 3 I argue that the same is for depicted occlusions, that is, for seeing in a picture an object that is partially hidden by another object: visual imagery of the occluded part is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition.

PERCEPTUAL CONTENT: PHENOMENAL AND INTENTIONAL

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It is generally held that perceptual states have both phenomenal and intentional features. Though they are inextricably linked in each perceptual state, qualitative states, according to a dominant model of perception, form an important part of the causal link in the production of perceptual beliefs about the world. The model has two inbuilt assumptions: a) qualitative features of a perceptual state can arise without any intentional features; b) awareness of a qualitative state or a qualitative belief is distinct from a qualitative state itself. I argue that none of these assumptions are tenable, and that no perceptual state can arise without the features of awareness, phenomenality and intentionality.

TWO POSSIBLE WITTGENSTEINIAN NOTIONS OF ‘DESCRIPTIVE ETHICAL THEORY’?

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Wittgenstein was a stark critic of normative ethical theory. This critique does however seem to leave open the possibility that we – still in a Wittgensteinian vane – could develop what we might call a form of ‘descriptive ethical theory’. The project here is to explore two different versions of such a ‘descriptive’ approach in moral philosophy, inspired by two different interpretations of Wittgenstein's concept of grammar – represented by Peter Hacker and Gordon Baker respectively – and concluding, that the second version must be seen both as more in line with Wittgenstein's philosophy and as leaving any notion of ethical ‘theory’ behind.

DIRECT SMART PERCEPTION

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This paper argues, against the representationalist views, that pre-reflective perception is not only direct but also smart. Indeed, recent studies (Onishi & Baillargeon 2005, Surian et al. 2007, Baillargeon et al. 2010) demonstrated false belief understanding in young children through completely nonverbal measures such as violation of expectation (VOE)* looking paradigm and showed that children younger than 3 years of age, who consistently fail the standard verbal false-belief task, can anticipate others' actions based on their attributed false beliefs. This gave rise to the so-called “Developmental Paradox” (DP): if preverbal human infants have the capacity to respond to others' false beliefs from at least 15 months, why should they be unable to verbally express their capacity to recog-

nize false beliefs until they are 4-years old, a full 33 months later? The DP teaches us that visual perception plays a crucial role in processing the implicit false-belief condition as opposed to the explicit/verbal-report condition. But if the main job of the mind is the manipulation of representations, then why precisely does the manipulation of further representations make 3-year old children appear less clever than 13-month olds? Why is perception, in some cases, “smarter” than explicit and verbalized thinking? Here I propose a Direct View of perception offers an elegant nonrepresentationalist solution to the DP.

* The VOE task tests whether children look longer when agents act in a manner that is inconsistent with their false beliefs and relies on the basic assumption that when an individual's expectations are violated, she is surprised and thus she looks longer at an unexpected event rather than at an expected event.

EARLY AND LATER WITTGENSTEIN ON ORDINARY LANGUAGE

James Conant

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The paper compares and contrasts the conceptions of ordinary language in play in the *Tractatus* and the *Investigations* respectively.

ON CERTAINTY AND SUBJECTIVITY IN TASTE

Inés Crespo

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A trend in philosophy of language and semantics considers adjectives like *tasty*, and evaluative judgements like “This cake is *tasty*” or “I find this cake *tasty*”, to be subjective, where subjectivity is construed along largely Cartesian lines. We sketch a non-Cartesian view of how subjectivity is involved in the meaning of *tasty* and of evaluative judgements by relating them to Wittgenstein's discussions of avowals and certainties.

SELF-GOVERNED AGENTS. A RYLEAN APPROACH

Boleslaw Czarnecki

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Human agents are self-governed agents: they control and organise their action in conformity to certain contextually relevant rules. In their recent attempts to characterise human agency Bratman and Korsgaard have sought to incorporate propositionally formulated norms of conduct into the feature of self-governance. Both these attempts fail to meet the intuitive requirements of agential autonomy and efficiency.

A promising alternative to these views may be drawn from Gilbert Ryle's conception of intelligent action. With the Rylean approach, when appraising performances as done intelligently or unintelligently, we find organisation and control directly in what agents do in various contexts. Instead of being grounded in the propositional formulations thought to play a role in reflective endorsement, both attributes of self-governance become dispositionally embedded within agents through training. The proposal meets the requirements of autonomy and efficiency and can also accommodate reflective endorsement as hinging on a generic higher-order intellectual disposition.

ABBILDUNG UND SPRACHLICHER IDEALISMUS IM TRACTATUS

Stefanie Dach

Pilsen, Tschechische Republik

Obwohl die Bildtheorie ein zentrales Element des *Tractatus* darstellt, ist ihre Auslegung stark umstritten. In meinem Beitrag stelle ich eine mögliche Interpretation durch Wilfrid Sellars vor, der zufolge wir die Bildtheorie sprachidealistisch lesen können. Auf dieser Grundlage beleuchte ich Ansätze, die den *Tractatus* anti-metaphysisch auslegen, besonders die Interpretation Marie McGinns. In meinen Augen gelingt es einem solchen Ansatz nicht in allen Punkten, den *Tractatus* konsequent anti-metaphysisch zu interpretieren, dadurch könnte er einer sprachidealistischen Lesart sehr nahe kommen. Als Ausweg bietet sich an, ihn in eine breitere, auch empirische Aspekte umfassende Repräsentationstheorie einzubetten.

WITTGENSTEIN ON MEANING. FROM THE IDEA ON THE MIND TO THE ACTIONS OF THE WORDS

Moira De Iaco

Lecce, Italy

Since the Thirties Wittgenstein has worked to deconstruct the pneumatic idea of the meaning conceived as product of the thought. We will analyze the two discussed theories that Wittgenstein argues, the meaning as use and the meaning as explanation of meaning, observing connections and continuity between them.

PHILOSOPHY AS THERAPY. THE MISLEADING EFFECT OF A SIMILE

Benjamin De Mesel

Leuven, Belgium

Wittgenstein's comparison of philosophical methods to therapies has been interpreted in highly different ways. I argue that many of these ways are misguided. I explicitly identify the illness, the patient, the therapist and the ideal of health in Wittgenstein's therapeutic methods and answer four closely related questions concerning them: Are philosophers literally ill? Are the patients and therapists philosophers? Are Wittgenstein's philosophical therapies psychological? Does the ideal of health consist in the end of philosophy? The paper shows that, in order to understand the comparison of philosophical methods to therapies, it is important not to extend it beyond its own limits. The comparison has had a misleading effect, because properties of therapies have been illegitimately projected onto Wittgenstein's philosophical methods.

SOME REMARKS ON THE RESOLUTE READING OF THE TRACTATUS

Piotr Dehnel

Wroclaw, Poland

In my paper I address Peter M.S. Hacker's argument against the so-called resolute reading proposed by Cora Diamond and James Conant. The argument is that in “Some Remarks on Logical Form” Wittgenstein reasserts some of the concepts from the *Tractatus* as the articulation of his earnest stance. That is why the *Tractatus* must not be read as plain nonsense. My paper argues for the therapeutic interpretation of the *Tractatus*.

WITTGENSTEIN, ANSCOMBE, AND WHAT CAN ONLY BE TRUE

Cora Diamond

Charlottesville, VA, USA

My talk concerns something that Anscombe took to be one of the main flaws in the *Tractatus*, that it excludes propositions that can only be true, apart from tautologies and mathematical propositions. My talk is an investigation of what the distance is, exactly, between Wittgenstein and Anscombe on this issue, taking into account Wittgenstein's early views and their later development.

MISLEADING PARALLELS. WITTGENSTEIN, ANALOGY, AND PHILOSOPHICAL PROBLEMS

Alexandra Dias Fortes

Lisbon, Portugal

According to Wittgenstein, there are misunderstandings that emerge due to certain analogies in the forms of our language. Misleading parallels that are not recognized as such, are felt as problems by philosophers who are predisposed not to look at the actual use of our words.

Although "expressions constructed on analogical patterns" play an important role in human thought, they might also produce false appearances. In the hope of seeing how to overcome the confusions thus originated, I propose a brief overview of some of Wittgenstein's remarks that deal with this complex facet of analogies, similes, and a certain tendency for symmetry, characteristic of philosophical investigation when explanations are sought after that serve as a counterpart to what is open to view in our language games (for instance, the inclination to see the inner as what can complement the outer in a symmetric composition).

THE FRAMEWORK OF PERCEPTION

Jérôme Dokic

Paris, France

On a traditional epistemological picture, there can be only two kinds of explanations of the falsity of an ordinary perceptual judgment. The first kind of explanation is that the underlying perceptual experience itself is illusory and the subject has been misled in accepting its content as true. The second kind of explanation locates the problem at the level of erroneous background beliefs involved in the formation of the subject's judgment as further premises themselves in need of justification. The problem with the traditional picture is that the dichotomy between perceptual illusions and cognitive errors is not exhaustive. Ordinary perceptual knowledge also rests on "hinge propositions" (Wittgenstein 1969) or "primitive certainties" (Mulligan 2006), namely propositions that are taken for granted or presupposed in the formation of the perceptual judgement without being independently justified by background beliefs. Some of these propositions might be *false* without there being perceptual illusions or cognitive errors properly speaking. In this talk, I enquire into the nature of hinge propositions involved in ordinary perceptual knowledge, and suggest that the framework of perception is best thought in the context of an austere (vs liberal) theory of perceptual content.

„TENNIS OHNE BALL“: WITTGENSTEINS ARGUMENTATION GEGEN BEHAVIORISMUS UND MENTALISMUS

Tomáš Došek

Olomouc, Tschechische Republik

Der Artikel beschäftigt sich mit Wittgensteins Bezug zu Behaviorismus auf der Basis der Zurückweisung einer privaten Sprache. Seine Kritik an Mentalismus im Kontext von Privatsprachenproblem zeigt starke behavioristische Züge. Ich werde dafür argumentieren, dass dies jedoch nicht als eine hinreichende Bedingung für behavioristische Deutung von Wittgensteins Spätdenken gelesen werden kann. Mehr noch, ich möchte zeigen, dass Wittgensteins Position zu Behaviorismus dieselben argumentativen Züge aufweist, wie Kritik an Mentalismus und Introspektion. Als Schilderung von Wittgensteins Argumentation gegen Behaviorismus wird das Gedankenexperiment „Tennis ohne Ball“ interpretiert. Das Experiment wendet sich zwar primär gegen die Auffassung vom „inneren Sprechen“, ich werde jedoch zeigen, dass es ebenso plausibel für die Argumentation gegen Behaviorismus gedeutet werden kann. An diesem Beispiel möchte ich die Gemeinsamkeiten der Kritik an Mentalismus und Behaviorismus beleuchten.

MEANINGLESS BELIEFS IN WITTGENSTEIN'S "PHILOSOPHY OF PSYCHOLOGY – A FRAGMENT"

Matthew R. Dougherty

Blacksburg, VA, USA

In Section iv of his "Philosophy of Psychology—A Fragment" Wittgenstein seems to tell us that we do not believe that people have souls. This paper considers how we should understand his claim. It does so by applying the idea from throughout the Investigations that meaning is use. The conclusion reached is that Wittgenstein should be understood as claiming that statements of belief about the soul will only make sense in particular contexts, the lesson of which is that beliefs in general are not guaranteed to be ascribable across contexts and, so, do not fit our standard picture of them.

THE FACE-VALUE THEORY AND THE CONTENT OF PROPOSITIONAL ATTITUDES

Dušan Dožudić

Zagreb, Croatia

Propositional attitudes are commonly treated as relations between agents and propositions and propositional attitude reports as stating precisely such relations. This is the basis of what Schiffer calls 'the face-value theory' of propositional attitude reports. A number of philosophers argued that such theory, as it stands, is untenable, or plainly false. Accordingly, they proposed various moderate or radical departures from it. In what follows I will discuss two such moderate departure, and argue that they do not avoid the very problem that their proponents took as the initial reason for departing from the face-value theory.

TWO TYPES OF BIOSEMANTIC REPRESENTATION

Christian Ebeling

Hamburg, Germany

Biosemantics as proposed by Ruth Millikan is explaining mental representations and meaning in the context of their evolutionary function. While the teleosemantic account

provides a general framework for basic forms of mental representations it has methodological problems with complex representations like beliefs. This paper is proposing a solution through differentiating two distinct levels of function-ascription. While showing the methodological differences in ontogenetic and phylogenetic function-ascription a corresponding dyadic conception of representation is proposed respectively.

FACING UP TO THE YET HARDER PROBLEM

Harald Henri Edelbauer

Vienna, Austria

If we suppose that there are neural correlates of all our experiences of an outer world; if we further assume the ontological coincidence of the represented brain with the representing brain: Then we get entangled in almost unresolvable contradictions. (The "brain-world-problem".) The way out of this confusion leads to a new view concerning 'brain states' and their ontological status: They turn out to be observer-dependent on the fine grained scale; depending on whether or not my own brain is brought into focus. The fundamental first-person-uncertainty of someone's own 'neuronal correlates' are based upon the undecidable ambiguity concerning the distinction between 'presentation' and 'representation'.

WITTGENSTEIN, EINSTEIN AND LEIBNIZ: HÄRTE DES LOGISCHEN ZWANGS AND UNENDLICHE MÖGLICHKEIT. SOME REMARKS ARISING FROM THE PIVOTAL WITTGENSTEIN FRAGMENT 178E

Susan Edwards-McKie

Cambridge, UK

Wittgenstein's unrelenting criticism of Cantor, Euler, and Gödel falls within a larger strategy to disarm a philosophy of mathematics which relies on completed infinite sets. Because transfinite numbers are seen to resolve the Zeno paradoxes, creating "a paradise from which we shall not be expelled", according to Hilbert, Wittgenstein's mathematics began to be seen as backward looking, particularly in the period of Turing's work on the Entscheidungsproblem and computable numbers. However, Wittgenstein offered consistent criticism and alternative approaches to paradoxes of the infinitely large and small, placing him within an Einsteinian position of general relativity and a post-Leibnizian position of infinite plenitude.

His sophisticated critique, developed within a type of constructivist mathematics of potential infinity, is explored. It is argued that Wittgenstein's philosophy of mathematics, cosmology and philosophy of culture are interconnected. Fragment 178e, combined with the correction of a Von Wright error, is used to explore these arguments, from both mathematical and PU *Nachlass* exegesis perspectives.

LANGUAGE ACQUISITION, AND THE FORMATION OF EMOTIONS

Eva-Maria Engelen

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The aim of this paper is to demonstrate that language acquisition does have a great influence not only on the development of thinking and the constitution of cognitive representations, but also on the development of phenomenal feeling. Phenomenally felt emotions are intersubjectively constituted by language and get an empirical acces-

sible content through language acquisition. The realm of the inner has therefore preconditions in social settings. This is shown by applying the triangulation model for language acquisition by Donald Davidson to emotions, as well as by applying the model of joint attention by Michael Tomasello to emotions.

LLI AS REFLECTED IN WITTGENSTEIN'S PHILOSOPHY

Rachel Even

Oranit, Israel

From the biographical information on Wittgenstein the impression may be gained that he possessed the trait of low screening ability for sensory input. When such sensory oversensitivity appears in combination with a high processing level, it manifests in an extraordinary ability to discern details, differences and the complete picture while constructing a highly ramified network of connections between them all. This trait is known as low latent inhibition (LLI) and it makes life difficult for those who have it. This paper deals with the connection between this trait in Wittgenstein and his philosophy. In Wittgenstein's case, we shall see how the trait is disclosed in a form of organization that repeats itself in various domains in his life. The structural element of the way in which Wittgenstein grasps the world due to the LLI trait is reflected in his philosophical terms, especially in "seeing aspects" and "family resemblance," as also in his style of writing and philosophizing.

SOME OBSERVATIONS ON DEVELOPMENTS TOWARDS THE SEMANTIC WEB FOR WITTGENSTEIN SCHOLARSHIP

Rune J. Falch, Christian Erbacher, and Alois Pichler

Bergen, Norway

The nature of Wittgenstein's *Nachlass* makes it perhaps particularly well-suited for the development of *digital* tools enabling scholars to *navigate* (browse, search, reference) a vast collection of material "criss-cross in every direction" in an informed and efficient manner. (The *Bergen Electronic Edition* of the *Nachlass* is an example of such a tool.) The advantage of an *online* digital platform is being able to do so on different hardware and software systems when- and wherever. And an advantage of *Open Access*, *Open Source* solutions is that these resources are available for free and the underlying code and datasets open to scrutiny by all (see e.g. Wittgenstein Source and the Agora platform). A valuable addition to current technology will be *lemmatized* searching, enabling search for different forms of terms across both the English and German. Moreover, the development of *semantically* driven tools promises opportunities, yet presents challenges.

FOOLING THE FREGE-GEACH PROBLEM FOR EXPRESSIVISM?

Federico L. G. Faroldi and Guglielmo Feis

Pavia and Milan, Italy

This paper proposes two ways out of the Frege-Geach problem. After the challenges of Pettit and Jackson (1998), the more refined arguments against Expressivism are grouped under the umbrella term Frege-Geach problem. The Frege-Geach problem is an objection to theories (Expressivism included) holding that normative sentences are not truth-apt.

We put forward *two* strategies to avoid the problem: one negative, one positive.

First and negatively, the Frege-Geachers are entrapped in a categorial mistake. Logical relations concern propositions, not things. Even if it might be acceptable for Frege-Geachers to speak metonymically of things (beliefs) as truth-apt referring to their content (propositions), this is unacceptable if speaking of other non-propositional mental states (those that Expressivists take to be the source of the normative).

Second and positively, we can try to develop an Expressivist theory of law making that can face the Frege-Geach according to which external negation is explained by means of rejection.

THE EXTENDED MIND THESIS AND MECHANISTIC EXPLANATIONS

Peter Fazekas

Budapest, Hungary

The Extended Mind Thesis (EMT) is traditionally formulated against the bedrock of functionalism, and ongoing debates are typically bogged down with questions concerning the exact relationship between EMT and different versions of functionalism. In this paper, I offer a novel ally for EMT: the new mechanistic approach to explanation. I argue that the mechanistic framework provides useful resources not just to disambiguate EMT, and to show which objections fail to pose a serious challenge, but also to answer some of the deeper problems that stem from the functionalist roots of EMT.

THE COGNITIVE FUNCTIONS OF INNER SPEECH

August Fenk

Klagenfurt, Austria

This paper compares Peirce's and Wittgenstein's view of "thinking in words" and "talking to oneself" and relates their positions to contemporary debates on the *cognitive conception of language*. For further clarifications of functions and functioning of inner speech recourse is taken to mechanisms operating verbal working-memory. Main arguments concern the preparatory role of inner speech with respect to a wide spectrum of possible demands of future communication and as a continual adjustment of programming devices to implicit linguistic/statistical knowledge.

IS THERE A ROLE FOR THE HISTORICAL A PRIORI IN WITTGENSTEIN'S LATE PHILOSOPHY?

James M. Fielding

Paris, France

In this paper I investigate whether – and if so, *where* – a notion like that of the historical a priori may be situated in Wittgenstein's thought. I begin by surveying Husserl's account of the historical a priori, and proceed to draw a number of parallels to similar ideas that can be found throughout Wittgenstein's philosophy, pre- and post-1929. Though it has been noted that clarifying Wittgenstein's ambiguous relationship to history, and particularly to the historical dimension of language, is a difficult task, I argue that a number of key Wittgensteinian notions are influenced by his attempt to grapple with just this issue. It is shown that Wittgenstein – like Husserl – returned later in life to affirm that which he had consciously sought to obscure in his earlier work: the role of history and the historical dimension of language. I conclude by suggesting that,

although there has been a recently renewed interest in the connections between Wittgenstein's work and phenomenology, this final phase of both thinkers' works remains an unexplored and potentially rich point of comparison.

ON THINKING – EVALUATING THE ROLE OF OUR EXPRESSIONS

Nara Miranda de Figueiredo

São Paulo, Brazil

This essay is an attempt to approach briefly the question: Is thinking an activity? Using this question I hope to show that in addition to grammatical description [PI 124] we should evaluate the role of our expressions. For this task I point some comparisons between considering 'thinking' as an activity or as an ability with the aim of showing the role of these considerations and the need of evaluating the role of our statements.

LANGUAGE GAMES AND DISCURSIVE PRACTICES

Anastasia Fomenko

Barnaul, Russian Federation

This article is devoted to comparison of language games and discursive practices. What do we know about language games and discursive practices in conjunction with each other but not separately? What is the difference between them? What are their similarities? As far as possible the author has tried to answer these questions and make clear distinctions between Wittgenstein's language games and Foucault's discursive practices. The comparison is made by categories such as "play", "rules" and "subject".

MAKING UP THE RULES AS WE GO ALONG: THE PRACTICABILITY APPROACH

Florian Franken

Munich, Germany

There has been a lengthy discussion about Wittgenstein's insights into what it is to follow a rule. In contrast, very little has been said about how Wittgenstein might have conceived of the fact that from time to time we make up new rules which are then integrated into existing social practices. In this paper I will argue first that the difference between established rules and new rules consists in the fact that established rules may be described with reference to the existing social practices, whereas new rules are prescriptive and have to be conceived of as the result of a demand for their future integration into the system of established rules. In the second part, I shall formulate two necessary conditions which have to be fulfilled in order to integrate prescriptive rules into the established system of rules. I will summarize both conditions under the term 'Practicability Approach'.

UNIVERSAL GRAMMAR VS. THE COGNITIVE APPROACH TO LANGUAGE ACQUISITION – A SURVEY OF PROBLEMS

Aleksandra Waleria Frej

Lublin, Polska

The main goal of this article is to compare and contrast two approaches to language acquisition, namely, Noam Chomsky's Universal Grammar paradigm and that of the cognitive view of language proposed by, among others,

Ronald Langacker and George Lakoff. The generativist approach in the Chomskyan sense is doubted by cognitivists, since it postulates the issues of modularity of language and the primacy of rules as the main principles governing language. Language acquisition from the perspective of the generative model of grammar can be, thus, defined as a top-bottom deductive phenomenon. Instead, the cognitive approach to language acquisition, emphasizing the basic assumptions of Cognitive Grammar, views this process as a bottom-top, inductive model. By referring to Tomasello's (2003) research on the topic, I will refer to Wittgenstein's conception of *meaning as use*.

In the paper, I shall explore the main differences between these two approaches and point to several specific considerations within the two views, by juxtaposing them directly and trying to offer a critical commentary.

SENSORY PHENOMENOLOGY AND THE CONTENT INDETERMINACY PROBLEM

Martina Fürst

Graz / Rutgers, Austria / USA

Naturalist-externalist accounts of intentionality face the problem of content indeterminacy; i.e. the problem that a tracking-relation between environmental conditions and mental states does not secure that, for example, my belief is about rabbits instead of undetached rabbit parts. Defenders of phenomenal intentionality claim that their accounts are not vulnerable to the content indeterminacy threat since phenomenology secures determinate mental content. The phenomenal aspect of conscious states that is supposed to do the work can be spelled out as *sensory phenomenology* (for example, visual, auditory etc. imagery) or as *cognitive phenomenology*. I argue that sensory phenomenology alone cannot ground determinate mental content. Proponents of phenomenal intentionality who want to secure determinate content have two possible ways to go: either they supplement sensory phenomenology by cognitive elements such as inner-focusing, *taking* or functional characterizations, or they subscribe to the thesis of a distinctive and individuating *cognitive* phenomenology.

SEEING WITHOUT AN I: REVISITING IMMUNITY TO ERROR THROUGH MISIDENTIFICATION

Shaun Gallagher

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Recent discussions of immunity to error through misidentification (IEM) have suggested a number of possible exceptions to a principle meant to apply without exception to specific ways of referring to, or experiencing oneself. In this paper I explore various cases where IEM seems to fail, beginning with cases that seemingly involve failures in self-specific bodily experience—that is, cases in which one misidentifies one's own body-as-subject. Although many of these cases lend support to the idea that IEM should be considered merely a *de facto* (contingent, rather than absolute or *de jure*) aspect of everyday experience, I'll argue that there is a certain aspect to these experiences that remains immune to error through misidentification. The core feature that remains intact in all of these experiences is first-person perspective. I'll then consider a case of abnormal visual experience, presented as an exception to this solution and to IEM.

IS THERE A WITTGENSTEINIAN COMMUNICATIVE ACTION?

Isabel G. Gamero

Madrid, Spain

In this paper I want to trace the Wittgensteinian influence in Habermas' work, especially in his definition of a universal and normative concept of communication, which ultimately leads into a common form of life. Secondly, I will try to understand whether Habermas' interpretation of Wittgenstein is accurate and which are the consequences of this universal (although Wittgensteinian) proposal. Finally, I will refer to some authors who criticize this Habermasian view.

HUMAN AGENTS AS POWERFUL PARTICULARS

Georg Gasser

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In this paper I defend a realist account of agent causal powers, that is, the claim that agent causal powers are attributable directly and irreducibly to the agent herself. In section A I outline O'Connor's account of agent causation, which serves as my point of reference. In section B I outline a general argument against agent causation which lurks behind a wide-spread understanding of the metaphysics of causal powers. In section C I amend O'Connor's account of agent causation and defend it against well-known objections.

'MEANING IS USE' AND WITTGENSTEIN'S TREATMENT OF PHILOSOPHICAL PROBLEMS

Stefan Gieseewetter

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What is the relation between later Wittgenstein's method of dissolving philosophical problems by reminding us of how we would actually *use* words, and his famous statement that "meaning is *use*" in *Investigations* §43? Many answers to this question have drawn on Wittgenstein's criticism of the "atmosphere" conception of meaning in §117. It has been claimed that since this criticism obviously stands in a direct relation to this method, and it is places such as §43 which play a main role in debunking this conception, Wittgenstein's statement that "meaning is use" stands in an equally direct relation to this method. What I intend to show is that this seemingly straightforward answer fails to accommodate one thing: that §43 is itself a reminder of how we would actually *use* a word. I will show how acknowledging this forces us to rethink the relation between "meaning is use" and this method of Wittgenstein's.

NEITHER MINIMALISM OR CONTEXTUALISM: FORM OF LIFE AND GRAMMAR IN THE *BLUE BOOK*

Ana Maria Giraldo Giraldo

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The thesis that I defend in this paper is that Wittgenstein's considerations about the meaning show the futility of the current distinction between minimalism and contextualism, between what is said and what is meant.

For this purpose: (1) I make an introduction to contemporary debates about the meaning. Specifically, I present the passage from the semantics and pragmatics to minimalism

and contextualism, (2) I expose the main thesis of minimalism and contextualism, (3) I present the position of the *Tractatus*, as example of a minimalist conception of meaning and the position of Grice, as example of a contextualist, and (4) I show, from Wittgenstein's thoughts in the *Blue Book*, the belief in the sign inert as the foundation of the confusion that generated endless debates about the meaning in this philosophical tradition.

PROPOSITIONAL ATTITUDES, INTENTIONAL CONTENTS AND OTHER REPRESENTATIONALIST MYTHS

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My presentation critically examines the way in which central aspects of intentionality are conceived by the current representationalist mainstream in the philosophy of mind and language. According to an orthodoxy going back to Russell and currently epitomized by Fodor's representational theory of mind, intentional verbs signify a relation between a subject and a (propositional) 'content', a complex entity which has concepts as components. Against this orthodoxy I shall argue for the following claims: First, many intentional constructions do not take the form 'V-ing that p ', and cannot be reduced to anything 'that-ish'. Secondly, even that-ish intentional states like believing or desiring that p are not uniformly attitudes towards propositions. Thirdly, what we think—the 'contents' of our thinking—are not complex entities with concepts as components. As a result, thinking should not even be regarded as a *bona fide* relation or attitude. It is a modification of a subject having to do with the latter's abilities, not a relation between a subject and a content—conceptual or non-conceptual. By the same token, a proposition or content is simply a sayable or thinkable, and hence a logical construction, proximally from the noun-clauses we use, notably in ascribing intentional states to others (third-person case), ultimately from the sentences we use to express our beliefs (first-person case) and from the way we characterize and explain our own actions and those of others (both first-person and third-person case). In the course of pursuing this line of reasoning, I shall also discuss important questions concerning intentionality, some of which have not received the attention they deserve: Can intentionality be regarded as the distinguishing feature of the mental? Is it fruitful to tie intentionality to 'intentional in-existence'? In what sense do intentional verbs signify states? To what extent are *intentional* constructions *intensional*? In what respects are noun-clauses genuinely referring expressions? Should we adopt a 'bottom-up' or a 'top-down' approach to intentionality?

WITTGENSTEIN'S MOST IMPORTANT CONTRIBUTION TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF LOGIC

Laurence Goldstein

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Exhausted after completing *Principia Mathematica* with Whitehead, Russell invited Wittgenstein to rewrite the opening chapters of that work for its second edition. As his friend David Pinsent remarked, this invitation was a great feather in Wittgenstein's cap; he was, after all, fairly new to the subject of logic, and was being asked to correct the greatest work in the field to have appeared in the 20th Century. Yet Wittgenstein did not accept the commission. Why was that? Could it just be that he found the *Principia* project 'dull and useless' as he later described it? No; there was a deeper reason: he thought the book so wrong

that a new edition would be 'futile'. Russell and Whitehead sought to derive all the truths of mathematics from some primitive self-evident truths of logic together with a modicum of set theory. Wittgenstein holds that there are no essentially primitive proposition (6.127); he castigates both Russell and Frege for their appeal to self-evidence (5.4731, 6.1271) and he denies that both logical propositions (tautologies and contradictions) and mathematical propositions are propositions at all (5.143, 6.2); he contends that they are senseless (*sinnlos*) (4.461) and express no thought (6.21). It would be correct to say, then, that Wittgenstein regards the *Principia* project as totally misconceived. Logic, he argues, is not a description of general truths, not a body of doctrine (6.13). The fact that symbols that have a subject matter can combine to produce tautologies that do not contain the decisive point (6.124) about the conditions necessary to talk sense about the world, and recapitulates his early claim that logic is the basis not, to be sure, of mathematics, but of philosophy (and here he is not, of course, talking about the 'old' conception of logic (6.125).

Adrian Moore, cocksure, claims that '[t]he author of the *Tractatus*, in a clear and unproblematic sense, held that the propositions of logic are true', despite being aware that many distinguished commentators, including Brian McGuinness and Juliet Floyd, think the contrary. Moore cites the 4.46s as clearly settling the issue. But matters are not straightforward. At 4.461 (repeated at 6.11) Wittgenstein maintains that tautologies and contradictions lack sense and say nothing (5.43). Surely if they say nothing, they say nothing true, and nothing false. They present no information. Wittgenstein points out that I know nothing about the weather when I know that it is either raining or not raining – an example that he repeats in the *Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics*. And he says, in later work, that it is because written tautologies look similar to genuine sentences that we make the mistake of saying that they are true. There appears to be a real tension in the *Tractatus* between support for the view that tautologies are true, and support for the view that they are not truth-valued. This is not a trivial verbal dispute; what is at issue are two competing conceptions of logic.

The matter can, I believe, be resolved if we attend to what Wittgenstein says, especially in the 6.1s about the office of logical propositions. Their role is not to say or describe anything – in fact they are dispensable (6.122) – but to *show* the formal properties of genuine propositions and the inferential relations between them. Nowadays, nobody (to my knowledge) agrees with Wittgenstein that logical propositions represent the scaffolding of the world (6.124), and exploring that aspect of Wittgenstein's theory is for *Tractatus* nerds only. But his investigation of the 'unique status' (6.112) of the propositions of logic, and his conclusion that they are not propositions and not truth-valued is Wittgenstein's most important contribution to the philosophy of logic and is highly relevant to modern discussion, for it leads directly to his later conception of mathematical 'propositions' as rules, and to a promising option in the foundations of mathematics.

WITTGENSTEIN ON EPISTEMIC AGENCY

Modesto M. Gómez Alonso

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The aims of this paper are: (i) to show that in *On Certainty* Wittgenstein attempts to meet the challenge posed by the sceptic to our right to believe hinge-propositions, that is, that he is not opposed to the epistemologist's quest for autonomy and for certainty; (ii) to analyse the transcendental argument advanced by Wittgenstein, an argument whose goal is to demonstrate that a reason to doubt is

never able to discredit our certainty; (iii) to make a distinction between two kinds of certainty: moral and metaphysical certainty, showing that they are not two grades of assent.

PERCEPTUAL ILLUSIONS, MISPERCEPTIONS, AND THE EMPIRICAL STRATEGY

Hajo Greif

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This contribution is concerned with the question of how perceptual illusions and misperceptions are related. Two assumptions shall be vindicated: Firstly, they might be rather distinct affairs. Secondly, they may not necessarily be maladaptive. A theory in cognitive psychology that provides an account that partly captures this twofold intuition is discussed in some detail: the “Empirical Strategy” (as proposed by Purves et al.). The normative qualities of one’s perceptual relation to an object are determined by the actual match or mismatch between the information provided by the environment and one’s dispositions to act upon that information. A history of successful behaviours towards the kind of object under a given set of environmental conditions will take precedence over getting the measurable physical properties right. The latter might even be systematically misrendered in perception.

MEANING IS NOT USE: AN ILLUSTRATION OF/FROM WITTGENSTEIN’S EXHIBITION OF ARGUMENTS IN HIS PHILOSOPHICAL ALBUM FOR THERAPEUTIC PURPOSES

Sebastian Grève

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I argue that arguments like the ones in *PI* §§40-43 (“meaning is use”), *PI* §§201-202 (“rule-following is a practice”)—even though they may come in the forceful form of *reductio ad absurdum*, and indeed have convinced entire schools of (analytic) philosophers—play a role in Wittgenstein’s therapeutic investigations only insofar as they help specifying the sense of what ‘we are “tempted to say”’ (*PI* §254). It is in this way that Wittgenstein’s specific use of arguments forms part of his ‘philosophical *treatment*’ (*PI* §255) as arranged in a series of instructing examples in the *Philosophical Investigations* (cf. *PI* §133).

Discussing the example of “meaning is use”, I intend to illustrate how Wittgenstein can be understood as truthfully sticking to his announced principles of non-dogmatic, therapeutic philosophising, thus using arguments in a way as to merely *exhibit* rather than to assert them.

“THE PLAY OF EXPRESSION”: UNDERSTANDING ONTOGENETIC RITUALISATION

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The ethological concept of ontogenetic ritualisation describes the capacity of organisms to shape one another’s behaviour in repeated instances of a social interaction until even the very initial part of the behaviour carries salience and significance. I argue that the deployment of this important concept is distorted by unwarranted philosophical assumptions. I offer an alternative way of framing its use - in Wittgensteinian and Enactivist terms - and suggest that,

thus framed, the concept better serves the aims of ethological science.

WITTGENSTEIN ON MAHLER

Eran Guter

Yezreel Valley, Israel

In this paper I explain Wittgenstein’s ambivalent remarks on the music of Gustav Mahler in their proper musico-philosophical context. I argue that these remarks are connected to Wittgenstein’s hybrid conception of musical decline and to his tripartite scheme of modern music. I also argue that Mahler’s conundrum was indicative of Wittgenstein’s grappling with his own predicament as a philosopher, and that this gives concrete sense to Wittgenstein’s admission that music was so important to him that without it he was sure to be misunderstood.

WITTGENSTEIN RE-READING

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Our reasons for re-reading can be philosophically instructive. If we were to see word-meaning as fixed (as we will see, what Wittgenstein called “the dream of the straight highway”), the purpose of re-reading would be invariably simple: it would be to remind ourselves of what we forgot. But memory comes into re-reading in ways far more complex, and ways far more interesting, than this simple picture would suggest: both the context of the re-reading, and the relevant experience of the re-reader, inflect (and as we shall see, indeed give nuanced content to) word-meaning - even with a word as seemingly simple as a proper name. A consideration of these issues helps clarify some of the connections between aspect-perception and word-meaning, and it brings into sharp focus what Cavell has called “our relations to our words”. It was Hume who said that at twenty years of age we may prefer Ovid, at forty, perhaps Horace, and at fifty, probably Tacitus. Why? Does Wittgenstein’s liberated conception of word-meaning provide insight into what may be in play here?

SOME CONCEPTUAL CHARACTERISTICS OF ASPECT-BLINDNESS

Nicole Hausen

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In his work from the 1940s, Wittgenstein discusses at length the topic of seeing aspects, such as seeing the famous duck-rabbit figure as a picture-rabbit or as a picture-duck. It is in this context that he introduces aspect-blindness. The present paper provides a detailed conceptual (that is, grammatical) rendering of Wittgenstein’s notion of aspect-blindness. The precise structure is as follows: Drawing on Wittgenstein’s remarks, three fundamental features of aspect-blindness are presented and are then explicated in a grammatical framework. Next, it is shown that seeing ‘aspects’ for an aspect-blind person is, conceptually, like ordinary perception. Wittgenstein’s comment that aspect-blindness is *akin* to lack of a ‘musical ear’ is subsequently interpreted in light of this analysis. Finally, it is argued that on this account of aspect-blindness, even pre-linguistic children can be aspect-blind.

A WITTGENSTEINIAN CRITIQUE OF ENACTIVISM'S NATURAL NORMS

Manuel Heras-Escribano and Manuel de Pinedo

Granada, Spain

In this paper we want to challenge the notion of natural normativity associated with enactivism. We will start by introducing enactivism and the double definition of 'norm' that it provides: (1) a goal-directed action based on an individual interpretation is sufficient to define a normative sphere and (2) a norm is a successful biological function. Then we will criticize both definitions: (1) leads to the rule-following paradox presented by Wittgenstein in his *Philosophical Investigations*; against (2) we will claim that using the pairs of concepts 'right / wrong' and 'success / failure' as equivalent is a conceptual error on the part of enactivism.

"HE EVEN FEIGNS THE PAIN OF PAIN HE FEELS IN FACT": WITTGENSTEIN AND PESSOA ON OTHER'S MINDS AND PAIN

Inês Hipólito

Lisbon, Portugal

On this paper, I'll assess Wittgenstein's remarks on "other's minds" and "pain". How do I assess others' minds behaviour? In order to clarify Wittgenstein's considerations of pain, more perspicuously, the idea of a rule that can be understood only by a person is unintelligible, I'll consider the poem by Fernando Pessoa orthonymously "Autopsychography".

Athwart the poem, in which we behold all layers of pain, videlicet, a cry that is shown by pain in a "pretence" that ends up, inadvertently, overcoming the shackles of solipsism, I'll state (i) that something about nothing can be said is meaningless at best and ontologically equivalent to nothing at worst; (ii) that what we observe in others is not "simple body movements" as if they were hidden behind the mind, they are, rather, expressions that breathe into, thereupon, the possibility of pretend cannot be a ground for scepticism about other's minds.

THE LOGICAL INFERENCES IN EDMUND GETTIER'S COUNTEREXAMPLES TO THE STANDARD ANALYSIS OF KNOWLEDGE AND HUMAN ACTION

Helmut Hofbauer

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This paper argues against the view that the Gettier problem deals with the problem of human knowledge by showing that there do not appear any human actions in the Gettier counterexamples against the standard analysis of knowledge. Therefore, the persons in Gettier's counterexamples cannot be human beings either. This task is achieved by the analysis of the logical inferences in Edmund Gettier's original paper from 1963. As a consequence of this insight, the question should be posed about what problem epistemologists are actually talking when discussing the so called 'Gettier problem'. As I was socialized in philosophy as a phenomenologist, this paper should be understood as an attempt in philosophical 'inter-cultural communication'.

IMPERFECTIVITY AND "PARADOX"

Jennifer Hornsby

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I shall talk about the so-called Imperfective Paradox. One can think of 'Imperfective Paradox' as the name of a question. How should we understand such a sentence as (1) (for example), given that we have to acknowledge that (1) can have been true even although (2) was never true?

(1) Mary was crossing the street

(2) Mary crossed the street

My answer will be that we need to recognize process (not only events) in the temporal world. And I shall suggest that this has implications in philosophy of action, and indeed for our view of causality in the macroworld more generally.

„JEDE VARIABLE IST DAS ZEICHEN EINES FORMALEN BEGRIFFES.“ ÜBER DIE FUNKTION DER SAGEN-ZEIGEN UNTERSCHIEDUNG IN WITTGENSTEINS AUFFASSUNG VON VARIABLE

Susanne Huber

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In meinem Beitrag will ich darlegen, wie Wittgensteins Bemerkungen zum Unterschied von Sagen und Zeigen mit seiner Auffassung von Variablen in der *logisch-philosophischen Abhandlung* zusammenhängen. Im Zentrum meiner Überlegungen steht die Passage 4.12–4.128. Dort führt Wittgenstein zunächst die Unterscheidung von Sagen und Zeigen ein, wobei er das, was sich zeigt, mit der logischen Form einer Sache (eines Gegenstandes, einer Tatsache, eines Satzes, der Wirklichkeit) identifiziert (4.121–4.123). Dann überführt er die Rede von logischer Form zunächst in die Rede von formalen Eigenschaften (vgl. 4.122) und schließlich in diejenige von formalen Begriffen (vgl. 4.126). Formale Begriffe werden durch Variablen bezeichnet (4.126, 4.127f.). Wittgenstein scheint mit der Sagen-Zeigen-Unterscheidung die Auffassung, dass Variablen formale Begriffe bezeichnen, vorzubereiten. Das Ziel dieses Beitrages besteht im Nachweise, dass dieser Eindruck richtig ist. Die Sagen-Zeigen-Unterscheidung beleuchtet den Begriff der logischen Form, den Wittgenstein schon im Abschnitt zur Bildtheorie eingeführt hat, auf eine Weise neu, dass es möglich wird, ihn mit dem Konzept der Variable zu verknüpfen und so zu klären. Um diese These zu begründen soll im Folgenden zuerst dargelegt werden, welches Problem die Unterscheidung von Sagen und Zeigen motiviert. Dann soll aufgezeigt werden, dass Wittgenstein in der *Abhandlung* eine Auffassung von Variablen präsentiert, die auf diese Problematik antwortet.

DAVIDSON V ANSCOMBE

John Hyman

Oxford, UK

Recent work on dispositions offers a new solution to the long-running dispute about whether explanations of intentional action are causal explanations. The dispute seemed intractable because of a lack of percipience about dispositions and a commitment to Humean orthodoxies about causation on both sides.

THE INNER LIGHT OF TACIT RULES

Michal Ivan

Prague, Czech Republic

Wittgenstein famously said that in the end we follow rules blindly. Some philosophers interpret Wittgenstein's thoughts about rules as containing the idea of tacit rules. The article tries to analyze what a tacit rule can and can not be. It is suggested that tacit rules are created by the philosophers in a process of logical construction, rather than observed. Then a critique of tacit rules, inspired by the work of Nigel Pleasants, is offered. The main points of the critique derive from the absence of rule-related practices that could be connected with tacit rules.

EXTERNALISM OF CONTENT AND THE PRAGMATIC POINT OF MEANING TALK

Matthias Kiesselbach

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While most readers of Putnam's Twin Earth thought experiments find themselves in initial agreement with his semantic intuitions, this agreement is less stable than it seems at first. It is not difficult, for instance, to get oneself to see XYZ as within the extension of our word 'water'. This paper explains this instability with the — only rarely studied — pragmatics of meaning talk. Once we appreciate the *calibrational* nature of meaning talk, it is no longer mysterious that simply imagining oneself to be in linguistic contact with people with initially foreign linguistic dispositions (intuitions) has the effect of unsettling our own linguistic dispositions (intuitions). This is also true with respect to our intuitions about the content of intentional mental states. What emerges is a novel way of reconciling internalist and externalist intuitions in the theory of content and meaning.

CONSCIOUSNESS DETHRONED? QUESTIONS OF UNCONSCIOUS THOUGHT, UNCONSCIOUS DECISION MAKING, AND THE LIKE

Peter P. Kirschenmann

Amsterdam, The Netherlands

Many processes we are not conscious of influence us. Modern psychologists have begun to study the unconscious in much broader manner than Freud. In particular, they conducted experimental studies of decision making, on the basis of which Dijksterhuis concluded that in complex decision "unconscious thought" outperforms conscious thought. This and other results led him to propagate the dethronement of consciousness. Especially on the basis of the studies of decision, Dijksterhuis and Nordgren formulated their unconscious-thought theory.

I shall present one example of a decision-making experiment and a summary of that unconscious-thought theory. I shall critically discuss a number of their aspects and conclusions drawn, also referring to analyses of other authors. I conclude that consciousness still is very much in control.

CALLING TO MIND: WITTGENSTEIN'S PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATION PI90.

Herma Klijnstra

Rotterdam, The Netherlands

An expedition in search for enlightening similarities between the concepts expressed by Brentano, early Husserl, Twardowski and Wittgenstein's PI 90. Wittgenstein claims

that our investigation is directed not towards phenomena, but rather as one might say towards the possibilities of phenomena. We call to mind the kinds of statement that we make about phenomena. Can we understand Wittgenstein's use of "calling to mind" in the context of the concept of intentional inexistence in descriptive psychology, logic and philosophy in late 19th century Viennese circles around Brentano, Twardowski and Husserl? What are the relations to the empirical world and how is the other person involved when we talk about the possibilities of phenomena?

ON ENVATMENT, EXPERIENCE AND EPISTEMOLOGY

Jonathan Knowles

Trondheim, Norway

This paper is about the relationship between anti-sceptical arguments that reflect on the (alleged) possibility that we might be a brain in a vat, and different conceptions of perceptual experience. I argue that while the former fail in their remit as anti-sceptical, their significance can instead be understood in terms of a conception of experience on which sceptical issues do not arise.

RETHINKING 'RULE FOLLOWING' AND FORMS OF AGENCY: "ETHICAL EXPERTISE" AND "TECHNOLOGIES OF HUMILITY" IN SCIENCE POLICY PROCESSES

Stephanie Koerner

Manchester, UK

This paper's broad aim is to explore the usefulness of insights drawn from Wittgenstein's conception of 'rule following' for developing fresh means to balance the immense but unpredictable potential of science and technology with appreciating that not everything that can be done should be done. To this aim, it examines the bearing that Hubert and Stuart Dreyfus' approach to Wittgenstein's insights of "rule following" and "ethical expertise" has upon Shiela Jasanoff's (2003: 240) arguments for "technologies of humility" (rather than "hubris") in addressing questions in science policy processes, which confront "every human enterprise that intends to alter society: what is the purpose; who will be hurt; who benefits; And how can we know?"

COMPUTATION VS. EMBODIED COGNITION

Zsuzsanna Kondor

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In this paper I will investigate whether the extended mind hypothesis and the enactive approach share a common theoretical ground. Although the idea of embodied cognition appears to be a common foundation, I suggest this is only apparently the case. I propose that the notion of embodiment, as the enactive approach construes it, provides an adequate framework within which different aspects of cognition (from primordial physical engagement to highly abstract reasoning) can be considered in a coherent continuity.

In my argument, I will first highlight the incompatibility of the extended mind hypothesis and the notion of embodiment, then I will outline how the notion of embodiment helps create a comprehensive notion of cognition, and finally I will relate it to the issue of the explanatory gap as it hangs together with the role language plays in reasoning.

IDENTIFYING BODILY STATES

Ilmari Kortelainen

Tampere, Finland

It is a common assumption in philosophy that: The human who is trying to understand her inner beliefs needs a standard for knowing whether her assumption of her mental state is correct or incorrect. The underlying assumption in my study is that the question of embodiment is crucial to the theory of 'scientific introspection', since many mental states find anchor in human's body (Ricoeur 1992, 319).

I ponder the question: What could be the philosophical basis for the body-introspection or interoception? Firstly, I will introduce the general idea of how many different ways the introspection of bodily states can be understood. Secondly, I come to the philosophical remarks that could be drawn from interoception, that is, bodily introspection.

IS TRUTH A CONDITION FOR KNOWLEDGE? DEMYTHOLOGIZING EPISTEMOLOGICAL THOUGHT

Kyriakos N. Kotsoglou

Freiburg i.Br., Germany

In this paper, I argue that inherent in the structure of the Gettier-examples there is an asymmetry. I suggest that we have been Gettierized because we evaluate the epistemic responsibility of an epistemic agent by employing double standards. This is a result of our hinge-proposition, according to which knowledge presupposes truth. In real life though, we do not have knowledge because we have justified beliefs that are true; on the contrary, we maintain propositions that are taken to be true because we or someone else has provided good reasons, in order to make a knowledge claim. The theoretical diagnosis of this presupposition seems to dissolve the Gettier-problem.

WHAT'S WRONG WITH WITTGENSTEIN? AN ANSWER FROM THE SOVIET PERSPECTIVE

Iurii Kozik

Kyiv, Ukraine

I address the problem of Wittgenstein unpopularity in recent analytical tradition by examining the hostility toward his philosophy shown by researches from Soviet Union. I explore the criticism of Wittgenstein's philosophy put in the frame of Marxist-Leninist methodology that the Soviet scholars shared. While having completely different, ideologically biased, background the Soviet researches expressed roughly similar dissatisfaction by the view on philosophy of the *Philosophical Investigations* with their contemporaries from the analytical tradition. In addition, the slight overview of the history of perception of Wittgenstein in Soviet Union and its peculiarities is provided.

WITTGENSTEINS PRIVATSPRACHENKRITIK – VERKAPPTER BEHAVIORISMUS?

Sebastian Krebs

Bamberg, Deutschland

Das Privatsprachenargument steht im Zentrum von Wittgensteins Betrachtungen zum Leib-Seele-Problem. Verschiedene Strömungen innerhalb der Leib-Seele-Debatte haben Wittgensteins Privatsprachenargument in der Vergangenheit für sich vereinnahmt, insbesondere der naturalistische Behaviorismus. Jedoch kann Wittgenstein kaum als Behaviorist bezeichnet werden, wie er an mehreren

Stellen explizit betont; in PU 308 liefert er zudem ein stichhaltiges Argument gegen den Behaviorismus und jede sonstige naturalistische Spielform innerhalb der Leib-Seele-Debatte. In dem vorliegenden Aufsatz argumentiere ich dafür, Empfindungen bei Wittgenstein lediglich als ‚grammatische Fiktion‘ zu verstehen, während eine philosophische Erklärung zugunsten einer Beschreibung zurückzutreten hat. Zutreffend hat Lütterfelds 1995 Wittgensteins Position als ‚Durcheinanderbeziehung‘ zwischen dem mentalen und dem physikalischen Sprachspiel bezeichnet – während der Nutzen der traditionellen Leib-Seele-Debatte in der Sprachpraxis durchaus vernachlässigbar ist.

KNOW-HOW I: WITTGENSTEIN AND PRACTICAL CERTAINTY

Kristijan Krkač, Josip Lukin, Damir Mladić

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In this paper, the authors examine the common-sense concept of know-how (first part) and Wittgenstein's concept of practical certainty (second part). They then compare these two concepts and identify some similarities and differences (third part). The most important similarity is that Wittgenstein's concept of practical certainty is a type of know-how, while among dissimilarities the most important is his concept is a kind of primordial know-how almost as "something animal." This analysis supports the Framework reading of *On Certainty*.

HOW ORDINARY IS THE LANGUAGE OF LOVE?

Camilla Kronqvist

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My paper takes its cue from a passage in Iris Murdoch's "The Idea of Perfection" where she questions the possibility of turning to ordinary language to come to know a value concept in depth. She presses us to see that "if morality is essentially connected with change and progress, we cannot be as democratic about it as some philosophers would like to think." The "meaning of all necessary moral words" is something we may have to learn, which involves a "movement of understanding [...] towards increasing privacy, in the direction of the ideal limit and not back towards genesis in the rulings of an impersonal public language." (*Existentialists and Mystics*, Penguin Books, 1999, p. 322)

These ideas, I argue, pose serious question to anyone who, after Wittgenstein, tries to describe our moral psychology, by recourse to everyday ways of speaking. It also points to a tension in our speaking about morality, and psychology, that one will, almost inevitably, come to acknowledge if one takes it upon oneself to attend to our ordinary ways of speaking about morally significant matters. In my paper I attend to the concept of "love" as one "necessary moral word" to bring out this tension more clearly and show how it is also present in Wittgenstein's scattered remarks about love.

It belongs, as it were, to the 'language of love', the understanding of which that we, after Rush Rhees, can say is internal to understanding love, that we do not merely ask whether it is the case, is it true, *that* someone loves. We may also ask whether a person *truly* loves, or *is true* in her love, and in that manner as Wittgenstein says "test love for its *inner* character" (RPP1, §115). If it does not pass the test, we may even be reluctant to call it love. These ways of speaking the language of love introduces an inherently normative element in our conversations about love.

In my paper I discuss what implications this has for the ordinary language philosopher who attempts to describe the language of love with the aim of leaving "everything as it is". In particular, I ask to what extent these normative features extend to the investigation of the meaning of the language of love itself, since a philosopher setting out to describe the language of love will have to be able to discern what is a significant or deep use of the word by contrast to a superficial, banal or trivial one. This requires her, not only to describe how a word *is* used, but to personally take a stand on how the word *should be* used as a speaker of that language. In so far as her understanding is an expression of a personal stance, I suggest that her ways of describing the language may also be revealing of a personal failure to find meaning in certain aspects of it.

CREATIVE ASPECTS OF THE FORM OF LIFE. SOME REMARKS ON PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS § 244

Fortunato Emiliano La Licat

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Wittgenstein's late philosophy addresses the subject of connection between the psychic life of the individual and social context, represented by language games which are played within a form of life. Sensations and passions are part of the psychic life of the individual; far from being hidden psychological objects of a private Cartesian, they are inseparable from their social redefinition. In fact, they become visible in the context of the game. Wittgenstein argues that there is a transformation of subjective psychic life by learning language games. The psychic life of the individual is then re-organized by learning a socially defined praxis. In my view this transformation is a creative process which is socially developed within the form of life.

TO MEAN IS TO ACT LINGUISTICALLY

Anna Laktionova

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Linguistic expressions are relevant only in the process of their realization. So their value consists in particular realization of our ability to utter something. And this value is the only instance of their significance. Mostly meanings are just titles. Meaning as a philosophical category is redundant. Linguistic expression is significant in every realization of it by a speaker. We mean in the process of particular speech realization of a linguistic expression. Speech is performative. Philosophy of language is philosophy of action. Our words mean, but do not have meaning. Meaning is a linguistic, speech acting.

WHEN PICTURE AND APPLICATION CLASH: THE PARADOX OF OBSERVATION

Dorit Lemberger

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In his *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*, Wittgenstein distinguished among three linguistic possibilities: that which can be verbalized; that which can be shown; and that which must remain silent. By contrast, in the *Philosophical Investigations* he examined clashing states of consciousness which cannot be decisively categorized as enabling verbalization. Such mental contents cause tension which challenges attempts to understand and formulate it in everyday language being part of the "struggle against the bewitchment of our understanding by the resources of our language" (Wittgenstein 2009, &109). Wittgenstein indi-

cates a clash between picture and use; image and sense-impression; unity of body/soul and linguistic practices based on their separation. The discussion will trace the formulations of these tensions and Wittgenstein's suggestions for resolving them so as to enable mental content that is compatible with the external criteria of everyday language.

UNARTICULATED CONSTITUENTS AND LANGUAGE GAMES

Frank Liedtke

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In recent theories of language use, a distinction is made between the meaning of an uttered sentence, the semantics, and the enriched meaning of its utterance, the pragmatics. The latter is supposed to be systematically underdetermined by the former. One strategy to bridge the gap between the semantic and the pragmatic side of the utterance is to assume unarticulated constituents which are understood by the addressee. I argue that this strategy is problematic because the choice of the correct unarticulated constituent is underdetermined itself. A proposal is made for capturing the relation between the semantic and the pragmatic side of the utterance by means of the notion of a pragmatic template. It is understood as a holistic structure of context elements which are assumed by addressees in order to enrich semantically underdetermined utterances.

WITTGENSTEIN UND DIE "LECTURES AND CONVERSATIONS" BEZÜGLICH FREUD

Ulrich Lobis

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Wittgenstein und Freud zählen zu den bedeutendsten Denkern Wiens ihrer Epoche. Im Folgenden sollen ihre Beziehung und auch Wittgensteins teilweise wechselnde Positionen gegenüber der Lehre Freuds beleuchtet werden.

wREcTtgenstein

Victor Loughlin

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REC or Radical Enactive (or Embodied) Cognition (Hutto and Myin, 2013) aims to show that lots of what Hutto and Myin call "sophisticated doings" (ibid, pxiv), such as reaching, grasping, visual perception, are possible without the positing of informational content. However, they also allow that for some types of behaviour, the positing of informational content is possible and in some cases necessary. Crucially, they link contentful behaviour to linguistic behaviour. This raises the following question: how does non-contentful behaviour give rise to, or make possible, contentful behaviour? I am going to refer to this as the "cognitive gap". Later Wittgenstein claims that there is indeterminacy in our use of psychological concepts. I shall argue that this indeterminacy ensures that there are some linguistic behaviours about which it is indeterminate if those behaviours are or are not evidence of contentful thinking. I will claim that these behaviours demonstrate that the distinction between non-contentful and contentful behaviour can break down and this suggests that it is not always clear what is meant by the cognitive gap. Hence, if REC is understood from a Wittgensteinian perspective - a

wRECTtgenstein - then it can potentially discharge the apparent debt it owes to close the cognitive gap.

VERTICAL RELATIONS OF LANGUAGE-GAMES

Jakub Mácha

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The aim of this paper is to look at Wittgenstein's use of language-games as objects of comparison. I shall use several examples to demonstrate that it is reasonable to understand language-games in the smallest possible units. In particular, I will focus on a language-game of training a rule vertically related to a language-game of applying of this rule. It is important to keep these language-games apart in order to avoid misunderstandings originating from the fact that one and the same sentence may have different meanings in these language-games. Such a sentence may be an admissible "move" in the former language-game whereas it may be an expression of a rule in the latter one.

CONCEPTS. TOO HEAVY A BURDEN

Diego Marconi

Turin, Italy

Even disregarding the vagaries of ordinary usage, the word 'concept' has served many different purposes in recent philosophy. Some philosophical theories of concepts (such as Prinz 2002) have turned many of them into requirements an adequate theory of concepts should meet. I shall try to show that some among the alleged requirements for a theory of concepts are incompatible, i.e. that no plausibly characterized class of entities can simultaneously satisfy the conditions that are implicit in such requirements. We may need (at least) two different notions, a cognitive notion and a metaphysical notion of concept.

SKIZZE EINER NEOEXPRESSIVISTISCHEN WERTTHEORIE

Johann Christian Marek

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Unter Rekurs auf Wittgensteins Feststellung, dass der Gebrauch psychologischer Verben unter gewissen Umständen expressiv und nicht deskriptiv zu deuten ist, werden auch Werturteile expressiv gedeutet. Werturteile zum Unterschied von Urteilen über Werte sind demnach keine Beschreibungen von Werten, sondern drücken eine zumeist intersubjektive Werthaltung in verbal-propositionaler Form ohne unmittelbaren Wahrheitsanspruch aus. Es sind nicht objektive Werte, die unsere Werthaltungen determinieren, sondern die Werthaltungen selbst, die die Welt als werthalt bestimmen. Werturteile funktionieren in dieser Hinsicht nicht wie Beschreibungen, sondern wie Befehle. Mit einem Befehl wird kein direkter Wahrheitsanspruch erhoben, obwohl ein propositionaler Gehalt zum Ausdruck gebracht wird. Und wie bei Befehlen kann man auch bei Werturteilen sich fragen, ob der propositionale Gehalt zutreffend ist bzw. inwieweit die Sprechhandlung geglückt ist. Werte sind u.a. subjektiv, weil sie subjekt-abhängige Gegenstände sind: Zu ihrer Konstituierung und Aufrechterhaltung bedarf es der wertenden Stellungnahme (Werthaltung) von *Subjekten* bzw. *Gruppen von Subjekten*, wobei die wertende Stellungnahme eine Aktualisierung von Gefühlen, Absichten und Ansichten ist.

GRAMMATIK UND ERINNERUNG. PU 127 IM KONTEXT

Sandra Markewitz

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Entgegen einer ersten Intuition bezieht sich der Abschnitt 127 der *Philosophischen Untersuchungen* nicht nur auf individuelle Erinnerungen, die der Philosoph argumentativ nutzbar macht, sondern auf diese individuellen Erinnerungen, insofern sie an den kollektiven Sprachverwendungsweisen einer Sozialität teilhaben. Im Lichte dieser Partizipation wird klar, welche Rolle PU 127 im Kontext der Abschnitte 120-133 zukommt. Die Sicht auf Sprachspiele als Vergleichsobjekte (PU 130) stellt den Rahmen dar, in dem die Sprache in einem Wechselspiel fortlaufender Modifikationen, nicht einem eindeutig zuschreibbaren autoritativen Akt eines sprachlichen Akteurs, neuen Gebrauchsweisen, die neue Erinnerungen an Sprachverwendungsweisen in die Sprache hineintragen, geöffnet werden kann.

SIND KOPFSCHMERZ, DIE BEDEUTUNG DES WORTES „KOPFSCHMERZ“ UND ERKENNTNIS EIGENES KOPFSCHMERZES PRIVAT?

Joelma Marques de Carvalho

Fortaleza, Brasilien

Das Ziel dieses Textes ist eine Erklärung Wittgensteins Hauptgedanken über psychologische Begriffe wie „Kopfschmerz“ in seinen *Philosophischen Untersuchungen*. Dabei wird betrachtet, inwiefern der Kopfschmerz selbst, die Bedeutung dieses Wortes und die Erkenntnis der Empfindung eines Kopfschmerzes tatsächlich privat sein können. Nach Wittgenstein kann nur der Kopfschmerz ontologisch privat sein. Die Bedeutung des Wortes „Kopfschmerz“ und die Erkenntnis eines eigenen Kopfschmerzes sind jedoch nicht privat. Diese Überlegungen über psychische Ausdrücke scheinen uns folgende Vorteile zu bringen: (1) Er bietet uns eine entmystifizierte Erklärung psychischer Begriffe an. (2) Da die Bedeutungen psychischer Begriffe nicht privat sind und es keinen privilegierten epistemischen Zugang auf unsere psychischen Zustände gibt, muss das „Ich“ nicht skeptisch darüber sein, ob die anderen auch einen Kopfschmerz wie das „Ich“ empfinden kann. (3) Allerdings mündet diese Position nicht in einem Solipsismus, denn nicht nur die eigenen Empfindungen sind wirklich, sondern auch die Empfindungen der anderen.

BLUMENBERG READS WITTGENSTEIN: THE LIMITS OF SENSE RECONSIDERED.

Élise Marrou

Paris, France

My aim in this paper is to offer a close and attentive interpretation of the *Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics*, BGM, I, 45. I will first try to show that these remarks play an important role in Wittgenstein's response to Frege's *Grundgesetze der Arithmetik*. The allegory of the woodsellers which Wittgenstein develops in the *Lectures of the Foundations of Mathematics* (XX, XXI) has been the subject of many scholarly interpretations, and especially in the framework of the resolute readings. But the link between the allegory and these remarks has not yet been explained. I shall defend that they teach us a deep lesson about the limits of sense. In the second part of my talk, I will draw all the consequences of this first step to show how they can contribute to reinforce Putnam's interpreta-

tion of *On Certainty*, which he develops in his "Rethinking Mathematical Necessity". To conclude, I will confront my reading with Blumenberg's meditation on the parable of the fly-bottle ("Im Fliegenglas", *Höhlenausgänge*, p.752-792).

A MACHINE AS A SYMBOL. PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS # 193=194: A CLOSE READING

Michael J.S. Martens

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In this paper I will deal with remarks # 193-94 of the *Philosophical Investigations* on a machine as a symbol. I will make first a distinction that is inspired by Hans Vaihinger (1852-1933) given in his book "*The Philosophy of As If*". He distinguishes between; A) thought processes. B) Creative processes. C) Symbolic fictions, or between functional-functions, applications and fictional-symbolic-functions. In PI # 193 I will mainly deal with the symbolic-fictions which directly correspond to the; "as if". The "as if" I will connect with our way we talk about a machine by our picture-symbols. In PI # 194 there is a clash between the machine as a picture-symbol and a machine as a model to which modal-modes are attached but still operate by picture-symbols while the modal-modes are logical functions. The use of possible movements by pictures and in daily life both in terms of the modal-modes is the main part of my interpretation of PI # 194. I take it that Wittgenstein had in PI # 193 the picture theory of the 'Tractatus' in mind while in PI # 194 his language game method.

WITTGENSTEIN'S CONCEPTION OF SPACE AND THE MODERNIST TRANSFORMATION OF GEOMETRY VIA DUALITY

Yoshihiro Maruyama

Oxford, UK

Wittgenstein's disagreement with the set-theoretical view of mathematics led him to the idea that space is not an extensional collection of points, but the intensional realisation of a law. Brouwer's theory of the continuum is arguably based upon the point-free conception of space qua law; this would exhibit yet another case of Brouwer's influence on Wittgenstein's philosophy (in particular of space). I consider the conception of space qua law to represent epistemology of space, and the conception of space qua points to represent ontology of space. From this perspective, modern geometry, such as Topos Theory, Algebraic and Non-Commutative Geometry, and Formal Topology, some of which are conceptual ramifications of Brouwer's intuitionism, yields rich instances of duality between epistemology and ontology of space. Links with Brentano, Husserl, Whitehead, Cassirer, Granger, Lawvere, and Japanese philosophers are briefly touched upon as well.

MÉNAGE À TROIS: SAYING, SHOWING, ACTING

Anat Matar

Tel Aviv, Israel

I revisit, in this lecture, a couple of stations on the way towards overcoming the problems ensuing from the sharp distinction between 'saying' and 'showing' – the "cardinal problem of philosophy", according to Wittgenstein. This dichotomy has been, rightly, closely linked to our understanding of such fundamental notions as 'simple' and 'immediate', the 'limits of language' and the 'metaphysical

subject'; more generally, it has been read as influential on our conception of the language and method of philosophy. While Wittgenstein's *Tractatus* presented a sophisticated approach towards all these issues, it was the later addition of the notion of 'acting' to the 'saying'/'showing' dualism that seemed to overcome the naïve picture governing former stages, including that of the *Tractatus*.

The inter-dependence among these three terms has also been emphasized by several French philosophers in the second half of the twentieth century. Borrowing from them, I argue against the usual connection made by many Wittgenstein scholars between this '*ménage à trois*' and some kind of neutral, innocent common-sense. Even scholars emphasizing the ethical dimension embedded in Wittgenstein's appeal to practical knowledge tend to adhere to content-less ethics. But what we learn from Derrida, Lyotard and Rancière, among others, is that the rootedness of language – and thus mind – in action must be thought of in terms of the political as well.

ZUR ENTMYTHISIERUNG DER BEDEUTUNG VON VERNEINUNGEN IN WITTGENSTEINS PHILOSOPHISCHEN UNTERSUCHUNGEN

Ingolf Max

Leipzig, Deutschland

In den *Philosophischen Untersuchungen* (PU) konzentrieren sich Wittgensteins Ausführungen zu Verneinungen vor allem auf die Paragraphen 547 bis 557 und eine zugeordnete Bemerkung auf S. 447. Er thematisiert dort die "Verneinung, einen Mythos des »Bedeutens« zu erfinden." Verneinungen charakterisieren wir durch *Reduktionsregeln*, d.h. Regeln ihrer *syntaktischen* und *kontextabhängigen* Verwendung. Es wird davon ausgegangen, dass diese unorthodoxen Formalisierungen geeignete Werkzeuge darstellen, um sowohl auf zu therapierende philosophische Fragestellungen als auch auf Wittgensteins eigene Argumente ein neues Licht zu werfen. Die Berechtigung dieser Vorgehensweise speist sich aus Wittgensteins Akzeptanz der Konstrastierung eines idealisierten Gebrauchs mit dem tatsächlichen Gebrauch im Kontext der Philosophiekritik (Lichtenberg). Es werden mit Bezug auf Wittgensteins Verneinungen "X" und "Y" zwei – durch verschiedene, aber dennoch verwandte Reduktionsregeln charakterisierte – Negationen "–" und "–" eingeführt. Vor dem Hintergrund der Spezifika dieser Negationen erfolgt die Beleuchtung der Ausführungen in den PU und verschiedener Gebrauchsweisen von Verneinungen in der normalen Sprache.

WAS SICH ÜBERHAUPT SAGEN LÄRT, LÄRT SICH KLAR SAGEN – ES FRAGT SICH NUR, IN WELCHER SPRACHE

Annelore Mayer

Baden, Österreich

Ziel fremdsprachlichen Unterrichtes muss es sein, dass sich auch in dieser etwas „klar sagen lässt“. Ein zu schaffendes Vertrauensverhältnis mit kulturellen Gegebenheiten der Zielsprache, das soweit geht, dass Alltagshandlungen sprachlich verständnisvoll gelöst werden können, ist dafür eine der ersten Voraussetzungen. Im Verlauf des Eindringens in die Fremdkultur wird einer lernenden Person auch klar, welche Defizite die Ausgangssprache und die Zielsprache haben – etwa durch Tabuisierungen. Ein Lernerfolg lässt sich dann letztlich auch daran feststellen, wie eine lernende Person im gegebenen Falle die Fremdsprache dazu benützt, um etwas „klar zu sagen“.

APHORISMUS, FRAGMENT UND OPUS PROGREDIENS. EIN KULTURHISTORISCH- VERGLEICHENDER VERSUCH ÜBER DIE FORM IM ŒUVRE WITTGENSTEINS

Johannes Leopold Mayer

Baden, Österreich

Die Form sucht ihr Wesen an Inhalten. Diese geben der Formwerdung ihr spezifisches Gepräge. Die Vielbedeutbarkeit Ein- und Dasselben oder Ein- und Dasselbe als Formenvielfalt hat in der österreichischen Kulturgeschichte eine Tradition mit reichlicher Hinterlassenschaft. Wittgenstein, dessen Kulturbegreifen ja österreichisch geprägt ist, kann mit seinem Werk, der Art und Weise seiner Ausarbeitung verständnisbildend einigen großen Emanationen dieser vielfachbedeutsamen Kulturprägtheit zur Seite gestellt werden.

ACTING SUB SPECIE BONI

Erasmus Mayr

Oxford, UK

On a traditional view of human agency, intentional actions are performed *sub specie boni*: The agent, in acting intentionally, must see some good in what he is doing. The major challenge to this view arises from cases where, *prima facie*, the agent acts fully intentionally, but, out of perversity or depression, either acts precisely because his action is bad or doesn't care about whether it has some good feature or not. I will argue that, even for these cases, there are crucial features of intentional agency that we can make best sense of by accepting the *sub specie boni* view, while it remains unclear whether critics of this view can account for these features at all.

SKEPTICAL DOUBTING AND MINDFUL SELF- REFLECTION

Guido Melchior

Graz / Rutgers, Austria / USA

The skeptic argues that we cannot have any external world knowledge because we cannot know that we are not brains in a vat. The intuitive appeal of this skeptical argument is essentially based on the comprehensibility of the process of skeptical doubting, where we focus our attention on our experiences and experience-based beliefs and raise questions about the sources of these experiences. I propose that skeptical doubting is an instance of a mental attitude that contemporary psychology characterizes as mindfulness. I suggest that mindful self-reflection is not a single phenomenon but rather a cluster of related phenomena that are characterized by an epistemic gap of one kind or the other. I conclude that the persuasiveness of the skeptical argument is based on undergoing the mental process of mindful self-reflection. The undesired skeptical results are gained by overemphasizing the epistemic force of this mental attitude.

THE SENSE OF COMMITMENT IN JOINT ACTION

John Michael

Copenhagen, Denmark

The paper aims to establish the theoretical need for a minimal analogue of the concept of commitment, and to develop the notion of a sense of commitment as such a minimal analogue. The paper focuses on commitments within the context of joint action, i.e. within a context that is

both fundamental and paradigmatic for human sociality in general. The paper aims to articulate the functions that commitments fulfill, and thus also the functions that a minimal analogue of commitment should be able to fulfill, as well as the demands that can be placed upon such a minimal analogue. In developing the notion of a sense of commitment as a minimal analogue, the paper focuses on emotions and action-related cues as constitutive components of the sense of commitment.

COULD THERE BE A LOGICAL ALIEN? THE AUSTERE READING OF WITTGENSTEIN AND THE NATURE OF LOGICAL TRUTHS

Sofia Miguens

Porto, Portugal

Far from being a mere hermeneutic option, which some wittgensteinians regard as resulting in no more than a sterile debate on types of nonsense (Hacker 2003), the so-called austere reading of Wittgenstein has philosophically fundamental issues at its core. My example here is the relation between the nature of logical truths and the nature of philosophy itself. I start by spelling out James Conant's reasons for presenting Wittgenstein's Tractarian views (which are the reference for the austere reading) in the context of a historical clash between psychologism and anti-psychologism (Conant 1991), and end by analysing how the Fregean figure of a logical alien (Frege 1893/1903) embodies the proposals of the austere reading regarding logical truths, philosophical method, and our condition as thinkers.

PRE-EXISTED PATTERNS OF LANGUAGE AND (MORAL) ACTIONS

Seyed Mohammad Hossein Mir Mohammadi

Kiev, Ukraine

Non-realism is a new approach for finishing the ongoing debate between realism and anti-realism. Non-realism, based on the well-known terms of "seeing" and "seeing as" presented by L. Wittgenstein, argues that the word "real" has been used in a wrong structure in the mentioned debate. As the language creates its own reality, hold non-realists, there are no pre-existed patterns to be discovered or rejected by a realist or anti-realist respectively. In this paper, I argue that it is possible to defend both Wittgensteinian heritage and pre-existed patterns of language.

'THIS HERE' OR THE PRESUPPOSITIONS OF UNDERSTANDING OSTENSIVE DEFINITION - ON PARAGRAPH 32 OF WITTGENSTEIN'S PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS

Gabriele M. Mras

Vienna, Austria

J.A. Fodor's views from *Psychological Explanations* ever since seem to be a paradigm of an Augustinian picture of language: For words to mean anything at all, there has to be something that is responsible for connecting the conventional signs with what they 'stand for'. It is in virtue of standing in relation to these entities that we are capable to learn language at all.

From a Wittgensteinian point of view, any claim that appeals to entities, of whatsoever kind, as that what enables us to understand what is meant by the words we use is misguided.

I want to bring out how much even Fodor's extravagant *Language of Thought* hypothesis starts from assumptions that are hardly deniable. This is mirrored in the fact that the argument commonly used to criticize Fodor is, surprisingly enough, used by Fodor himself. In *Concepts*, for example, Fodor even draws upon Wittgenstein's remarks concerning the presuppositions of understanding an ostensive definition in order to defend his view, which is, explicitly, opposed to any "Wittgensteinian picture of language acquisition". My talk will be about Fodor's usage of what is an argument *against* accounting for language acquisition by means of representations for the very opposite conclusion.

Following Fodor's ultimately unsuccessful efforts to prove the assumption of representation as necessary, if language learning is possible at all, will, I maintain, show even clearer the significance of what Wittgenstein says in paragraph 32 of the PI in respect to the point of view from which learning language is not describable.

FROM EXTENDED TO EXTENSIVE MEMORY

Erik Myin

Antwerp, Belgium

According to the Extended Mind Thesis, the mind can extend so as to include parts of the environment, such as notes in a notebook. Internalists about the mind, according to whom the mind remains confined to the brain or body, have forcefully criticized the thesis. I will offer a quite different critique of the Extended Mind: not that it departs too much from internalism, but on the contrary, that it stays too closely bound to internalism. Referring to memory, it will be argued that memory is only extendable, if a questionable internalist picture of memory is assumed as default. An alternative, capacity-based, picture of memory is proposed which breaks more radically with internalism, and the idea of memory and mind as Extensive rather than as Extended, is proposed.

THE ONTOLOGICAL BASIS FOR THE EXTENDED MIND THESIS

Yasuo Nakayama

Osaka, Japan

The extended mind thesis (EMT) was firstly stated in Clark and Chalmers (1998). Since then, philosophers have been holding intensive discussions on this topic. EMT is formulated as a denial of the computational and representational theories of mind that have been the dominant view of the philosophy of mind and artificial intelligence (Wilson and Foglia 2011). Against this traditional view, EMT states that the local mechanisms of mind are not all in the head (Clark 2008: xxviii). In other words, EMT states that the mind is not closed in the brain but extended to the body and the world. In this paper, at first, I point out the ontological obscurity of EMT. Then, I clarify EMT by interpreting the *extended mind* as *mind of an extended agent*. Thereby, I use a four-dimensional framework and define extended agents as four-dimensional objects.

AUGUSTINE'S TOO SIMPLE LANGUAGE-GAME

Helle Nyvold

Bergen, Norway

This paper examines language-games as containing the Augustinian picture of language in Brown Book. I focus on the notion of completeness regarding these games and explore two different ways of conceiving completeness:

one is seeing it as belonging to the individual language-games, the other is seeing language-games as a monolithic method. Completeness is a feature of the Augustinian games, but Wittgenstein gives no indication that all games are to fit together.

RELIGION ALS PRAXIS DES NEGIERENS

Thomas Oehl

München, Deutschland

In einer Reflexion über den religiösen Glauben behauptet Wittgenstein, die *Praxis* verleihe den Worten ihren Sinn. Um zu verstehen, was damit gemeint ist, müssen wir die der Religion eigentümliche *Grammatik* beschreiben. Meine These lautet: Die *Grammatik* der Religion besteht aus (mindestens) zwei Regeln des Negierens: (I) Eine Regel des *Negierens des gewöhnlichen Fragens*, und (II) eine Regel des *Negierens jeder gewöhnlichen Bewertung von Lebenserfahrungen*. Daraus lässt sich zeigen, weshalb Worte in der Religion auf *Praxis* angewiesen sind, d.h. die Negation tatsächlich *gemacht*, und nicht etwa nur gedacht oder festgestellt werden kann.

MAINSTAYS FOR A TRANSLATION THEORY ON WITTGENSTEIN'S LINE

Paulo Oliveira

Campinas, Brazil

Since it is a language phenomenon, translation should be understood in a way coherent with the concept of language underlying our theories or philosophy. Nonetheless, much of what is written or said about translation questions its bare "possibility" – as if there could be a practice based on the impossible. I shall argue for a change in approach based on Wittgenstein's notion of meaning as actual use in language.

HINGE PROPOSITIONS

Agata Orłowicz

Wellington, New Zealand

In *On Certainty* Wittgenstein provides us with reasons to reject global scepticism. One of his main arguments relies on the notion of so called "hinge propositions". The aim of this paper is to provide an interpretation of Wittgenstein's argument to the conclusion that hinge propositions are indubitable. Particular attention is paid to the problem of whether we should think about hinge propositions as truth apt or not.

HEARING IT RAIN – MILLIKAN ON LANGUAGE LEARNING

Naomi C. Osorio-Kupferblum

Vienna, Austria

In her 'Spracherwerb'(2012) Ruth Millikan gives a compelling account of language acquisition based on our ability to track objects. I argue that, and how, it is undermined by her insistence on equating understanding language utterances and sense perception, point to idealist hazards, and plead against propositionality and for imagism in order to safeguard the account's important potential for giving a comprehensive explication of meaning.

WITTGENSTEIN'S CANE AND OTHER MEMORABLE THINGS. THE ANIMATING POWER OF MEMORABILIA

Bernt Österman

Helsinki, Finland

Michael Jackson's glove, Elvis Presley's Bible, John Lennon's tooth, and the slice of bread Prince Charles left on his plate the day he married Diana, are examples of memorabilia recently sold in auctions. But *what* are these objects, and why do people want to own them, or see them? Starting from a case study involving the Austrian writer Stefan Zweig's *room of devotion*, described in his autobiography *The World of Yesterday*, I will argue that the value of memorabilia is related to their *animating power*, or the way in which they serve to bring their subjects to our minds. As my primary examples of memorabilia I will use the memorabilia preserved at the von Wright and Wittgenstein Archives of the University of Helsinki (WWA) – von Wright's typewriter, Wittgenstein's cane, and Wittgenstein's handkerchief.

THE SUBJECT/OBJECT USE OF "I" DISTINCTION

Eylem Özaltun

Cambridge, MA, USA

Traditional interpretations have mistaken Wittgenstein's remarks on the use of "I" for some kind of non-cognitivism. It is often held that Wittgenstein thinks I-sentences function like primitive, natural expressions of the subject's mental states, and they do not express propositions about the subject. I will challenge this reading and argue that the point of the use of "I" discussion is to show that we do not have an epistemic relation to our mental lives, and these passages must be read as part of his general attack on the traditional metaphysics that tries to model the mental on the physical.

COMMITMENTS IN JOINT ACTION

Elisabeth Pacherie

Paris, France

There are important divergences among philosophers on the nature and role of the commitments present in joint action. Some hold that joint commitments, together with the mutual obligations and entitlements they entail, are constitutive of shared intentions and engage a *sui generis* form of social normativity. Others maintain that while mutual obligations and entitlements are very common in joint action, they are not essential to joint action. In this talk, I shall approach these issues by considering the function of commitments in joint action. Success in achieving a joint goal rests on the coordination of co-agents' intentions and actions and successful coordination itself depends on the predictability of one's co-agents' decisions, intentions, and actions. I shall argue that the chief role of commitments in joint action is to make oneself more predictable to one's partners. One corollary of this would be that commitments are only necessary to the extent that predictability cannot be achieved by other means. Another corollary is that commitments in joint action have an essentially social dimension since their function is to make oneself predictable to *others*.

WITTGENSTEIN AND MODERN PSYCHOANALYTIC THEORY OF THINKING

Irina Panteleeva

Moscow, Russia

The author argues that there is an essential similarity of Wittgenstein's thought and the ideas of contemporary psychoanalysis. The most essential similarity is seen with the Kleinian school of psychoanalysis in the light of its theory of thinking that postulates that an infant, in order to form its thinking apparatus properly, needs its mother's ability to receive and process into an expressible form too frightening feelings of her infant. Attention is drawn to the hypothesis that there is a profound concurrence of their research interests and scientific and personal aspirations that goes far beyond multiple similarities in background and style. The conclusion is made that Wittgenstein's speaking about himself as a follower of Freud could refer to the fact that Wittgenstein not only deeply understood Freud's ideas, but also developed them in a direction coinciding with the essential lines of psychoanalysis advancement.

MAGNITUDES: METAPHYSICS, MEANING, AND MIND

Christopher Peacocke

New York, NY, USA

I address four questions, concerned variously with metaphysics, the philosophy of science, and the philosophy of mind:

- (1) How should we conceive of magnitudes as elements of reality, if they are?
- (2) What are the consequences of a correct answer to (1) for the nature scientific laws involving magnitudes?
- (3) What are the consequences of a correct answer to (1) for a theory of the mental representation of magnitudes in thought and in perception?

I will argue that the resources developed in answering questions (1) and (2) allow us to explain features of perception and its content that are otherwise unexplained.

WITTGENSTEIN'S ANTIREDUCTIONISM

Luigi Perissinotto

Venice, Italy

The aim of this paper is to highlight the profoundly [strongly, deeply] antireductionist inspiration of Wittgenstein's philosophical method, as it manifests itself—to give but one example—in the few, but intense pages of his lessons on aesthetics where he wonders how one could free himself from the enormous attraction that explanations of the form "this is really only this" or "this is *really* this" hold for us (*Lectures on Aesthetics*, p. 24 and p. 27), and from our constant tendency "to reduce things to other things." (For example, "excited by finding that it's sometimes concomitance, we wish to say it's all *really* concomitance" (p. 7, note 3)).

What I intend to show, in other words, is that Wittgenstein's antireductionist orientation [spirit, standpoint] not only explains his critical attitude towards scientifically-minded philosophy, but also helps make sense of many aspects of his philosophical method, in particular his attack on dogmatism in philosophy. More specifically, the aim of my contribution is twofold. First, I will consider whether, and to what extent, Wittgenstein's reductionism is a positively supported view rather than a background assumption critically employed. Second, I will examine whether Wittgenstein has always stuck to his antireductionist stance; in

this regard, I will investigate some of his appeals to practice and action that seem to be in conflict with his self-professed antireductionism.

ACTING ON ONE'S OWN: A RESPONSE TO ELEONORE STUMP'S CRITIQUE OF THE FLICKER OF FREEDOM

James Petrik

Athens, OH, USA

Eleonore Stump challenges "Flicker of Freedom" defenses of the Principle of Alternate Possibilities by noting that a) such defenses are committed to holding that doing an action on one's own is an action in its own right and b) that this commitment has a counterintuitive consequence. This paper challenges Stump's critique of Flicker Strategies on the grounds that she has mischaracterized the nature of the alternative possibilities involved in Flicker of Freedom defenses and that once the alternative possibilities are correctly characterized, the alleged counterintuitive consequence disappears.

A LIST OF CORRESPONDENCES BETWEEN WITTGENSTEIN TS-310 AND MS-115_{II}

Alois Pichler and Deirdre Smith

Bergen, Norway

The paper describes and includes a list which correlates remarks in the Wittgenstein *Nachlass* Ts-310 and its German translation / revision in the second part of Ms-115. It sketches some of the list's application areas and presents as one case the Wittgenstein Archives' ontology work. It also gives an introduction into the reference system ("sigla") of the Wittgenstein Archives' edition *Wittgenstein Source* and its URL convention.

VOM PROTTRACTATUS ZUM TRACTATUS

Martin Pilch

Wien, Österreich

Für den Übergang von *Prototractatus* zum *Tractatus* im Frühjahr bzw. Sommer 1918 wird ein Vorschlag unterbreitet, der davon ausgeht, daß Wittgenstein in ähnlicher Weise wie später beim Übergang von TS 208 zu TS 209 ein Typoskript diktiert und dieses dann zur Revision des Texts in Streifen geschnitten und neu angeordnet hat. Damit konnte die Rekonstruktion einer Übergangsfassung erarbeitet werden, die die Umordnung der Sätze aus dem *Pototractatus* und die Einfügung der aus dem Überarbeitungsteil von MS 104 bekannten Sätze sowie den Übergang von PT-Nummern zu TLP-Nummern als einheitlichen Revisionsprozeß nachvollziehen erlaubt.

THE GOVERNMENT, THE SCIENTISTS AND THE SOULLESS TRIBE: A COMPARISON BETWEEN WITTGENSTEIN AND FOUCAULT

Sabine Plaud

Strasbourg, France

In a passage from his *Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology* (I, 96), Wittgenstein introduces a curious reflection on the imaginary case of a group of persons (a "tribe") regarded as "soulless" by "the government and the scientists", i.e. by the holders of the political and scientific power. Beyond the methodological interest of this thought-experiment, I wish to examine what fundamental considerations on the nature of subjectivity may be drawn from it,

by focusing in particular on the influence of established power on the perception one may have of other people's subjectivity and the very relevance of a negating someone's interiority. As I will try to show, it is in fact contradictory, even from a Wittgensteinian point of view, to speak of the forms of life or grammatical uses of a group of people claimed to be automats, since the very assignation of a form of life to such people requires to acknowledge that they act and speak, not according to mechanical rules, but according to flexible uses.

These considerations will lead me to a comparison with some ideas developed by Michel Foucault. As a matter of fact, the claim of a possible influence of political and scientific (or medical) power on our conception of subjectivity is the core of quite a number of Foucault's texts. In addition, Foucault often points out how such an influence fits into a disciplinary strategy, meant to legitimate the (genuine or moral) enslavement of other people. Lastly, it appears that in Foucault's opinion, the most strategic way to attain full-blooded domination on others is not to aim at their transformation into automats, but to *acknowledge* the subjectivity of other people, and to enroll it in a set of rules that seem to be flexible, but are actually all the more constraining that they have this appearance of flexibility. I will therefore examine this analogy between Wittgenstein and Foucault on the idea of an impossible reduction of other people to a condition of automats. I will start by an analysis of Wittgenstein's texts on these issues, and I will then proceed to a comparison with Foucault's insights.

ON THE INTEGRATION OF MIND, BODY, AND LANGUAGE

Donald V. Poochigian

Grand Forks, ND, USA

Dominating Twentieth Century thought, positivism presupposes ontological incompatibility of mind and body. Resolution of presumed incompatibility abandons mind and preserves body. Constant body inconstantly appearing as whole and parts, however, renders body derivative, not primitive. As derivative, body presupposes conscious mind as constitutive.

Initiating with primitive elements, consciousness proceeds by analogical extension of element to element within a stream of thought. Language replicates the continuous and discontinuous transmutational character of consciousness, neither consciousness nor language being governed by a priori syntax. Evinced is analogy, the extension of or contraction from one element to another, this characterizing both thought and language. Mirroring consciousness, language is the material expression of thought, integrating mind and body.

LOGICAL SPACE AND PHASE-SPACE

John Preston

Reading, UK

Given its importance in the *Tractatus*, and its influence beyond that book, the existing scholarly literature features remarkably few accounts of Wittgenstein's notion of *logical space*. One prominent such account, originally suggested by Stephen Toulmin and then elaborated upon in Allan Janik & Toulmin's book *Wittgenstein's Vienna*, ties that notion to the notion of *phase-space* in the scientific work of Ludwig Boltzmann and Heinrich Hertz. I cast doubt upon Toulmin's attempt to link these notions, and bring into question whether logical space could possibly be a kind of phase-space.

PHENOMENAL CONCEPTS AND WITTGENSTEIN'S PRIVATE LANGUAGE ARGUMENT

Martina Prinz, François-Igor Pris

Berlin, Germany

David Papineau argued that phenomenal concepts are inconsistent with Wittgenstein's private language argument, and that the problem is with Wittgenstein's argument. Against Papineau, we argue that phenomenal concepts are consistent with Wittgenstein's private language argument. Inconsistency can appear when either Wittgenstein's argument or phenomenal concepts are incorrectly or restrictively understood.

THE PASSIVE ASPECT OF SELF-KNOWLEDGE

Ursula Renz

Klagenfurt, Austria

In recent debates, several authors have suggested to conceive of self-knowledge in terms of self-constitution. In developing this idea, most accounts rely on two presumptions, one concerning the relation between the knowing subject and the mental states in question, and one concerning the importance of self-knowledge for human agency. In his *Authority and Estrangement*, for instance, Richard Moran famously contends that self-knowledge of one's own attitudes is not merely an empirical matter, but involves a constitutive aspect. Recently this approach has been defended by Matthew Boyle, pointing out the parallels with Kant's account. Following the guidelines of Kant, Boyle suggests to distinguish between two kinds of self-knowledge, corresponding roughly with the two kinds of self-knowledge we find in Kant, i.e. self-knowledge through „inner sense“ on the one hand, and self-knowledge through „pure apperception“ on the other. In my talk, I would like to discuss this suggestion by confronting it with another view of what a Kantian approach to self-knowledge would look like.

TO “MAKE UP THE RULES AS WE GO ALONG” – AESTHETIC LANGUAGE GAMES AND THE ARBITRARINESS OF GRAMMAR IN WITTGENSTEIN'S THOUGHT

Nuno Ribeiro

São Carlos, Brazil

This paper intends to clarify the relation between the construction of aesthetic language games and the notion of arbitrariness of grammar in the context of the several testimonies concerning Wittgenstein's aesthetic thought. Throughout the several classical sources for the study of the Wittgensteinian aesthetics, such as the *Lectures on Aesthetics* and G. E. Moore's "Wittgenstein's Lectures in 1930-33", one finds several clues to understand the connection between the aesthetic problems and the notion of language games, which are the consequence of Wittgenstein's criticism of the essentialism and psychologism in art. Thus, bearing in mind Wittgenstein's anti-essentialism and anti-psychologism, it will be clarified how Wittgenstein conceives the construction of aesthetic language games not only in the level of the speech about aesthetics, but also in the level of the construction of the work of art.

ZUM LERNEN EINER SPRACHE UND ZUM LEHREN VON SPRACHE

Štefan Riegelnik

Zürich, Schweiz

In meinem Beitrag möchte ich Gemeinsamkeiten und Unterschiede zwischen dem Lernen einer fremden Sprache und dem Lehren einer ersten Sprache aufzeigen. Ich werde mich dabei hauptsächlich auf Überlegungen Donald Davidsons beziehen. Damit sollen auch einige Besonderheiten in seiner umfangreichen Theorie natürlicher Sprachen betont werden.

CRYPTOGRAPHICAL REMARKS. WITTGENSTEIN'S PREFERENCE FOR SEEMINGLY CAPRICIOUS RULES

Ulrike Ritter

Mering, Germany

In their seminal commentary on § 87 - 133 Baker and Hacker (2004) classify these paragraphs as revision of the TLP and sketch of the new philosophical method of Wittgenstein's later philosophy. They claim a criticism of the sublime as the pivotal point, where the way of looking at philosophical subjects had to be turned around completely. These concepts shouldn't any longer be the normative anchors of a philosophical system, but subjects of an analysis of their sense. Further the paragraphs focus on contradictions. Wittgenstein neglects the 'quod libet' that is usually emphasized concerning contradictions. He shows how a contradiction can signal a wrong vision of what has been meant (Wittgenstein 1999, §100) and how it may work as sign with a new meaning. In published and private notes he accepts and obviously likes principally unlimited and unusual signs and rules, that differ like any cryptographic sign or rule from the daily ones just in the grade of accessibility at first glance.

REMARKS ON THE GENESIS OF §89-§133 IN WITTGENSTEIN'S PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS

Josef G. F. Rothhaupt

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Abstract: The sections §89-§133 are the center of Wittgenstein's conception of philosophy in the so-called final version of the *Philosophical Investigations*. Detailed philological and philosophical studies of the genesis of the *Philosophical Investigations* generally and the genesis of the sections §89-§133 especially bring to light deeper insights not only into the structure of this careful composed, but unfinished, book Wittgenstein's and the conception of philosophy in it, but also into the context in which this book has to be situated in Wittgenstein's oeuvre seen as a whole - namely: in Ludwig Josef Johann Wittgenstein's "Nachlaß". Particularly extensive and competent research on the transfer from the so-called early version of the *Philosophical Investigations*, on the important reworking of this early version, and on the transfer of this reworked early version into the so-called intermediate version of the *Philosophical Investigations* sheds new light on Wittgenstein's conception of philosophy and shows that this conception can be and has to be seen in a more comprehensive, and because of that in a more adequate, manner.

SAYING AND SHOWING: EARLY WITTGENSTEIN AND RABINDRANATH TAGORE

Priyambada Sarkar

Shimla, India

It is a well known fact that Wittgenstein while resenting to the questions asked by the members of Vienna circle, often turned his back on them and read the poems of Rabindranath Tagore .A few Wittgenstein scholars like Ray Monk (1990), Garth Hallet(1992) Rudolf Haller : 2003) have mentioned Wittgenstein's fascination for Tagore's poems, and his special liking for some of Tagore's symbolic plays like 'The king of the dark Chamber.. But so far no one has explored the reasons for Wittgenstein's interest in Tagore's writings and it has not also been given the attention it deserves. What I hope to claim in this paper is that more sense can be made of Early Wittgenstein's distinction between saying and showing in the Tractatus, if we juxtapose them with thoughts of Rabindranath Tagore in these matters.

WITTGENSTEIN ON LANGUAGE ACQUISITION

Kunimasa Sato

Narashino-shi, Japan

When teaching a first language, parents or educators often point to things, uttering words so that children can learn to use words properly. From the so-called "transition period" to the late period, Wittgenstein considers the subject of ostensive gestures, such as pointing. The purpose of this paper is to clarify the characteristics and the problem of teaching with ostensive gestures in line with Wittgenstein's considerations, and to clarify how Wittgenstein deals with this problem.

BEWUSSTSEIN UND SUBJEKT BEI WITTGENSTEINS WERK PHILOSOPHISCHE UNTERSUCHUNGEN

Fernando Scherer

Freiburg, Deutschland

Auf den ersten Blick könnte man sagen, dass das, was die Identität als ein Subjekt, als ein Ich ausmacht, das eigene Bewusstsein ist; dies formuliert zum Beispiel John Locke in seiner Philosophie. In der Geschichte der Philosophie findet man die Konzeption des Bewusstseins als Möglichkeit eines Selbstbezugs beziehungsweise die Konzeption des Subjekts, welches als Subjekt charakterisiert wird durch das Bewusstsein, oder mit anderen Worten: Ein Subjekt wäre als ein solches identifizierbar, wenn es sich selbst erfahren könnte und über seine Handlungen entscheiden könnte. Doch bei Wittgenstein sieht es anders aus. Er untersucht das Problem der Identität des Ichs anhand der Verwendung des Wortes Ich, also aus der Sprachebene heraus, und kritisiert in den philosophischen Untersuchungen die Konzeption des Ichs als Bewusstsein.

In meinem Paper werde ich mich mit Wittgensteins Kritik an der Konzeption des Ichs als Bewusstsein befassen, in diesem Kontext soll auch das Problem der persönlichen Identität thematisiert werden.

DIE THESE VON DER RELATIVITÄT SEKUNDÄRER QUALITÄTEN, AM BEISPIEL DER FARBEN UND DER TÖNE

Arvid Schiller

Halle/Saale, Deutschland

Eine wichtige klassische Stütze des Dispositionalismus in der Debatte um die primären und sekundären Qualitäten ist der Relativismus in Bezug auf die sekundären Qualitäten, die These also, dass die als sekundäre Qualitäten eingestuften Eigenschaften relativ auf mögliche Wahrnehmende und Wahrnehmungssituationen sind. In meinem Beitrag will ich zeigen, dass das Standardargument zugunsten dieser These verfehlt ist, wodurch der Dispositionalismus an Plausibilität verliert. Ich nutze für meine Argumentation als Beispiele die Farben und die Töne.

MATHEMATIK UND EMPIRIE BEIM SPÄTEN WITTGENSTEIN

Anne-Katrin Schlegel

Zürich, Schweiz

In den späten Nachlassbemerkungen (etwa 1937-1944) betont Wittgenstein wiederholt die Relevanz der Gegebenheiten der Welt, der Erfahrung und der Bewährung für die Mathematik. Dies ist in den letzten Jahren auf verschiedene Weise als Abkehr oder zumindest Relativierung der These, mathematische Sätze seien grammatische Sätze und damit der Empirie gegenüber autonom, gelesen worden. Ich werde zunächst argumentieren, dass der Empirie zwar eine pragmatische Relevanz für die Entwicklung von Mathematik zukommt, die Gültigkeit mathematischer Regeln und mithin ihre Unumstößlichkeit davon aber völlig unabhängig bleibt (contra Weiberg 2008). Dann werde ich untersuchen, wie weit diese pragmatische Rolle reicht. Dabei werde ich zeigen, dass es nicht nur einen Einfluss der Empirie auf die Entwicklung der Mathematik gibt, sondern die Mathematik auch ihrerseits unsere (wissenschaftlichen) Beschreibungen der Empirie beeinflusst und dass die Tätigkeit des Mathematikers eine echt kreative Tätigkeit ist, die folglich durch empirische Gegebenheiten zwar motiviert aber nicht vorgegeben wird (contra Steiner 2009).

GEDÄCHTNIS UND ERINNERUNG ALS BEDINGUNGEN PERSONALER IDENTITÄT? ÜBERLEGUNGEN AM BEISPIEL VON DEMENZBETROFFENEN

Martina Schmidhuber

Salzburg, Österreich

Von John Locke ausgehend wird als Konstitutivum von personaler Identität häufig Gedächtnis bzw. Erinnerungsvermögen genannt. Betrachtet man aber personale Identität unter diesem Aspekt, wäre Demenzbetroffenen zum einen der Personstatus abzuerkennen und zum anderen auch ihre Identität. Im folgenden Beitrag wird dafür argumentiert, Gedächtnis nicht als notwendige Bedingung für personale Identität aufzufassen, weil das Gedächtnis auch bei kognitiv gesunden Menschen nicht immer in idealer Weise funktioniert. Es wird abschließend eine andere Möglichkeit vorgeschlagen, personale Identität zu verstehen.

ARE SUPEREROGATORY ACTS GROUNDED IN MORAL HINGES?

Robert Schmidle

Washington, USA

This paper seeks to answer the question; are supererogatory acts grounded in moral hinges? In answering this question I first set out what I mean by supererogatory acts and then propose an account of Wittgenstein's hinges, specifically an interpretation of moral hinges. I define supererogatory acts as those acts that go beyond the call of duty, literally and figuratively. I understand the concept of a *hinge* in accordance with what I take to have been Wittgenstein's intention in introducing this word to describe a particular kind of 'action-proposition' unity.

Throughout this paper I seek the limits of contextualization in understanding moral practices, suggesting that the answer to the question posed above is yes; supererogatory acts are grounded in moral hinges.

WARUM ALLE MIT PHILOSOPHISCHEN THESEN EINVERSTANDEN WÄREN - VERSUCH EINER INTERPRETATION VON PU 128

Alfred Schmidt

Wien, Österreich

§ 128 der *Philosophischen Untersuchungen* gehört zu den rätselhaftesten Bemerkungen dieses Werkes. Es scheint eine auf den ersten Blick vollkommen unbegründete und kontra-faktische Feststellung zu sein. Es wird eine konsistente Interpretation für PU 128 im Kontext von Wittgensteins Spätwerk gegeben, die nicht von ihrer grotesken Falschheit (Savigny) ausgeht, sondern im Gegenteil darin ein zentrales Merkmal von Wittgensteins philosophischer Methode sieht. .

Zwei plausible Lesarten von PU 128 werden gegenübergestellt:

- (1) Eine negative Lesart versteht PU 128 als generelle Zurückweisung der Möglichkeit philosophischer Thesen. Das entspricht z.B. Baker/Hackers Kommentar zu PU 128: „*The possibility of any theses in philosophy is now rejected.*“ (Baker/ Hacker 2009, S.271). In der Philosophie werden – nach Wittgenstein – keine Thesen aufgestellt, weil der Philosoph nichts behauptet, sondern nur sprachlich bedingte Verwirrungen beseitigt.
- (2) Dem gegenüber steht eine positive, wörtliche Interpretation von PU 128, die schlicht besagt: wenn man Thesen in der Philosophie aufstellen würde, wären diese so trivial und selbstverständlich, dass es immer einen Konsens über sie gäbe. Philosophie kann nur das beschreiben, was wir ohnehin schon alle wissen, was offen vor uns liegt, nämlich die Verwendungsregeln unserer Wörter (Grammatik).

Beide Lesarten stimmen aber näher betrachtet überein. Wittgenstein distanziert sich von einer „dogmatischen“ Art des Philosophierens und bestimmt ab etwa 1931 die Klärung der Grammatik als ihre eigentliche Aufgabe. Wittgenstein Begriff „Grammatik“ wird steht dabei in einem engen Verhältnis zur Analogie zwischen Sprache und Schachspiel, die Wittgenstein ab 1930 sehr häufig heranzieht.

ORNAMENT IN MATHEMATICS

Franz Schörkhuber

Vienna, Austria

The subject of my talk is a peculiar resemblance between what Wittgenstein says about some (logico-) mathematical calculi and Adolf Loos' critique of fancywork in modern architecture. The aim is to point out that Wittgenstein's critique of foundational approaches in mathematics might be better understood when seen in the light of his aesthetic commitments. This is not to say that his criticism is merely an outflow of an aesthetic uneasiness. On the contrary, he provides a long chain of solid arguments, showing that the feigned foundation is neither needed nor securer than what's said to be founded. But I want to show that his critique stems from an aesthetic aversion against a *fashion* of mathematics that provides useless and idling calculi. That is to say: his *motive* for criticising those foundational approaches is an aesthetic one.

REASONS FOR ACTIONS AND REASONS FOR BELIEFS

Gunnar Schumann

Hagen, Germany

Both beliefs and actions are things we can and sometimes are being asked to give reasons for. It seems promising to investigate both kinds of reasons and to get clearer about how reasons for actions and reasons for beliefs are interrelated. I will therefore compare some aspects of both kinds of reasons. Reasons for actions may be given sometimes by teleological explanation, sometimes by redescription. In the first part of my talk I want to show, that both these forms of reasons can not be given for belief, mainly for a conceptual reason: beliefs cannot be had *in order to* achieve some logically independent aim. In the second part of my talk I want to show that, despite the differences, both kinds of reasons are similar in a very important respect: both provide answers of the right kind to the question "Why should one do / believe this?", i.e. they are normative in character. A general account of how the normative "force" of reasons for actions and reasons for beliefs comes about is given.

WAISMANN'S CRITICISM OF THE CAUSAL INTERPRETATION OF LANGUAGE

Radek Schuster

Pilsen, Czech Republic

The paper focuses on the conception of language as a mechanism of causally connected signs that seems to be the grounds for current research in the field of speech technologies. The aim is to expound the criticism of this conception which was previously propounded by Wittgenstein and Waismann in the middle of the thirties, i.e. in the period of collaboration between the two on the project *Logik, Sprache, Philosophie*. Although the originator of the criticism is probably Wittgenstein, Waismann's exposition, which presents it in a lucid and systematic way, is followed. The causal interpretation of language is presented as misleading because of the confusion of the cause with the reason, the description of causal nexus with the justification stating the rules for our action, etc. At the end of paper the idealistic foundations of this criticism are considered.

SOUNDS AS PHENOMENAL AND (INTER)SUBJECTIVE OBJECTS: AN ANTHROPOLOGICAL ARGUMENT

Malik Sharif

Graz, Austria

Roger Scruton has proposed the most prominent non-physicalist ontology of sounds. I agree with Scruton that an ontology of sounds has to account for their phenomenal character, but I also see shortcomings in his theory. Discussing these problems, I propose an alternative ontology of sounds as phenomenal and (inter)subjective objects.

FAMILY RESEMBLANCE AND VALUE THEORY

Daniel Sharp

Washington, DC, USA

In the *Lecture on Ethics*, Wittgenstein expresses a pessimistic attitude about the prospects of constructing a philosophical account of moral value. His conclusion—talk of ‘absolute value’ is nonsense—has been widely interpreted. Yet, despite the attention paid to Wittgenstein’s early remarks on ethics, his later skepticism of philosophical attempts to define the good has, in David Stern’s words, “attracted relatively little attention” (Stern 2013). This paper attempts to reconstruct the thought behind Wittgenstein’s observation that ethical concepts like ‘the good’ ‘have a family of meanings’ (*Philosophical Investigations* §77), and assess its implications for the prospects of constructing a philosophical theory of value. I’ll suggest that a certain type of value theory is rendered problematic by Wittgenstein’s critique.

FORMULATION OF THE GRAMMAR OF SENSATIONS

Ken Shigeta

Osaka, Japan

I think that two different kinds of significant insight can be extracted from the considerations on sensation in *Philosophical Investigations* (PI), independently from exegetical legitimacy. The first is a positive one in terms of which a basic grammar of sensations can be determined. The second is a negative one, which provides the ground for criticizing a certain notion of private sensation, which is supposed to be given as a matter of course. Obviously the argument is closely related with the so-called private language argument. These two insights, I think, complementarily help us to understand distinctive features of sensation.

In this paper I will concentrate on the former and attempt to provide a framework of the grammar as a set of definite theses, related to the thesis that ‘sensations are private’ is a grammatical proposition (PI248). Based on the framework, I will show that the familiar arguments of the inverted spectrum and (phenomenal) zombie (cf., Chalmers, 1996) are fundamentally nonsensical and, therefore, inconceivable. However, this misunderstanding is thought to be placed at the opposite end of the other misunderstanding, which the private language argument attempts to criticize.

THE TRACTARIAN COLLAPSE: ON CONTRADICTIONS, CONTRARITIES, ABSURDITIES AND MUTILATED TRUTH TABLES

Marcos Silva

Fortaleza, Brazil

My aim here is to investigate the collapse and abandonment of the *Tractatus* held as a project to develop the attractive picture of a logic completely combinatorial, syntactical and neutral. There is in this project an unsolvable tension between this image of a neutral logic and the demand that it must be used to completely analyze the facts in the world. There are more logical connections than the tractarian logic, with its tautologies, contradictions and truth-functionality, can express. The notation though there to show the essence of language let us judge absurdities. It collapses *Sinnlosigkeit* with *Unsinnigkeit* in some contexts. The truth table notation has not enough sensitivity to difference contrarities from contradictions. I hold it as the core of the Color Exclusion Problem. Logic could not at last take care of itself.

A PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATION OF THE CONCEPT OF MEMORY AND THE POSSIBILITY OF “COLLECTIVE MEMORY”

Michal Sládeček

Belgrade, Serbia

Although numerous philosophers, anthropologists, neurobiologists etc. still regard collective memory as a highly contested concept, advocating its avoidance, it is possible from Wittgenstein’s remarks to reconstruct reasons justifying validity of discourse on collective, i.e. social and cultural memories. He exemplifies multiple purposes and uses of the concept of memory, as well as inseparability of mental processes of recalling from external stimuli. As the founder of social memory research, Halbwachs anticipated certain of Wittgenstein’s standpoints. According to Halbwachs, memory is an ability which should be analyzed in the context of recall, not through examination of an individual’s mental pictures or neurophysiological stances. His analysis was focused mainly on the social dimensions of memory, whereas Wittgenstein’s remarks dealt with general conceptual problems. However, both of them rejected concept of memory as encoded inner representations and considered the objects and actions of recalling as parts of memory.

LANGUAGE GAMES IN TS-310: A HEURISTIC METHOD FOR PHILOSOPHIZING

Deirdre C. P. Smith

Bergen, Norway

In this paper I will provide a sketch for Wittgenstein’s use of language games in the first part of Ts-310, Brown Book. I will show that his achievement in Ts-310 is one of method, one in which language games are used heuristically. By lying before us and discussing fictive cases, which progressively come to resemble real cases, he teaches the reader how to “go on”. In this way he establishes a method for considering our language on its own terms, not philosophy’s, and thus provides the philosopher with a tool for considering language anew. This can in turn help the philosopher resist essentialism and other philosophical dogmas.

„UND DEN WAHNSINN SOLLST DU NICHT FLIEHEN!“

WITTGENSTEINS LEIDEN DES GEISTES

Ilse Somavilla

Innsbruck, Österreich

Wittgenstein befasste sich häufig mit dem Wahnsinn – dies in persönlicher wie auch philosophischer Hinsicht. Während er diesen in existentieller Verzweiflung als „strengsten Richter“ darüber, ob sein Leben recht oder unrecht sei, also als eine Art ethische Instanz betrachtete, sah er die philosophische Methode als eine Methode des Wahnsinns, die darin bestünde, diesen wieder zu heilen. Die Situation in der Nähe des Wahnsinns – ob im persönlichen Leben oder im Philosophieren – war mit Wittgensteins „Leiden des Geistes“ verbunden, die vielfach ethisch und religiös begründet waren.

HOW CAN SYMBOLISM BE A LIFE-ACTIVITY?

Antonia Soulez

Paris, France

In my paper, my contention will be to unfold presuppositions, shared by some linguistic views (Humboldt and Cassirer after him) and philosophy of language (Wittgenstein), that make possible to articulate expression of signs (or symbolism) with life or a life-activity (as opposed to a mechanistic conception of « symbolism »).

The musical model of such an articulation will contribute to make explicit the meaning of such an activity, understood through the « movement » of musical forms (here the strong influence of Eduard Hanslick. Only movement can make form and matter communicate and perhaps create « formal content » (G. Granger for whom « formal content » is what mathematics deal with, in analogy with music).

« Life of Forms » will then give us an argument in favour of a conception according to which philosophy is an aesthetic activity of understanding comparable to art.

We also hope to show how the anthropological dimension of such an activity is not absent, for Wittgenstein, from artistic situations.

CRYING AND LEARNING TO SPEAK

Paul Standish

London, UK

Behavioural neurologist Michael Trimble's *Why Humans Like to Cry* has, since its publication in November 2012, gained considerable media attention. The book starts from the following important and interesting feature of human beings: that we are the only animals to cry for emotional reasons. Trimble leads the reader into an original and somewhat dizzying story that combines very readable explanation of the neurobiology with an account of the place of tragedy in human life. He takes crying to be the precursor to speech, in both evolutionary and developmental terms. Trimble neglects, however, to consider sufficiently the “aboutness” of crying and, specifically, the ways in which crying behaviour is shaped according to standards of appropriateness. The present paper seeks to understand the relation between the learning that refines and focuses our crying behaviour and what it is to learn to speak. It does this, first, by considering dominant models of language learning and exposing them to a Wittgensteinian critique. It develops this in the light of remarks by Rush Rhees to the effect that accounts of language acquisition that focus on correct usage—on knowing how to follow a rule—may obscure what is most important in learning to speak: that is, learning what it is to have some-

thing to say. Trimble's failure to give due attention to the intentional nature of emotion means that his account of crying misses the fascinating ways in which our mature crying behaviour exposes registers of truthfulness about the world. For all the attention he gives to our experience of tragedy and of the arts, his book does not begin to articulate the ways in which our emotional crying, and a *fortiori* our having something to say, are developed.

NATURALIZED PHENOMENALISM AND THE TALK OF IMPRESSIONS

Sofia Inês Stein

Porto Alegre, Brazil

In this paper I intend to show that Russell's called neutral monism in the philosophy of mind isn't, as presented in *The Analysis of Mind* (1921), a metaphysical reductionism that establish sense-data as a kind of indefinite entities that are the basis of mental and physical world. On the contrary, sense-data are established as a necessary link between physical and mental discourse because of the lack of a scientific link between these two discourses, but scientific discourse is presupposed to be the fundamental discourse in a philosophy of mind. It is just because of the limitations of scientific theories that philosophical analysis must intervene and establish sense-data as the link between what is called a physical fact and what is called mental fact.

THE “MIDDLE WITTGENSTEIN” REVISITED

David Stern

Iowa City, IA, USA

In 1929, Wittgenstein returned to Cambridge and philosophical writing, criticising his own earlier work and turning his focus to how language is used in ordinary life. These years were a time of transition between his early and his later work, and are of great interest for anyone who wants to understand the development of his thought. Wittgenstein's writings and lectures during the first half of the 1930s play a crucial role in any interpretation of the relationship between the *Tractatus* and the *Philosophical Investigations*. The manuscripts from 1929 record his first steps away from the *Tractatus*; by the end of 1936, he had written an early version of the *Philosophical Investigations*.

In “The “Middle Wittgenstein””, written for a Wittgenstein centennial conference held in 1989, I outlined an interpretation of the development of Wittgenstein's work that concentrated on this “middle period”. In that paper, I concentrated on a number of crucial passages in which he decisively changed his conception of the nature of mind and language, moving away from Tractarian logical atomism, through the logical holism of the late 1920s and early 1930s, and from there to his later practical holism.

In recent years, the changes and continuities in Wittgenstein's philosophy during the first half of the 1930s have attracted increasing attention. In this paper, I return to the question of the development of Wittgenstein's thought during this period. I look at the origins of the rule-following considerations, and the relationship between Wittgenstein's way of writing and his philosophical methods.

REMEMBERING AS PUBLIC PRACTICE: WITTGENSTEIN, MEMORY, AND SOCIALLY DISTRIBUTED COGNITION

John Sutton

Sydney, Australia

Wittgenstein's subtle remarks on memory are often interpreted as profoundly incompatible with cognitive science. I offer a more moderate and constructive reading, based both on alternative perspectives on key texts and on a distinctive account of the recent history of the sciences of memory. The talk examines the impact on our view of remembering of the idea that mental processes are both embodied and extended. It then focusses in particular on socially distributed remembering: methods and approaches from philosophy, psychology, and anthropology are integrated in studies of memory practices across diverse forms of life in which we coordinate disparate resources. I suggest that the right lessons to draw from Wittgenstein do not require a rigid separation of the sciences of mind from culturally-embedded common sense psychology.

SHARED EXTENDED MINDS: TOWARDS A SOCIO-INTEGRATIONIST ACCOUNT

Thomas Szanto

Dublin, Ireland

The last years have witnessed the emergence of a new, 'third-wave' current within the thriving extended mind and distributed cognition debate. It aims to socially extend the bounds of cognition, involving not only extra-organismic technological props (notebooks, etc.) but, moreover, other individuals, groups and social institutions (cf. Cash 2013; De Jaegher 2013; Gallagher 2013). Drawing on an ingenious proposal in social ontology (Pettit 2003), here, I shall propose a novel social-integrationist model for shared extended minds, which not only is immune against typical objections but also allows, in contrast to standard approaches, to drive home the insights from 'first-' (parity-type) and 'second-wave' (integrationist) construals of the extended mind thesis.

"GRAMMAR" IN THE BROWN BOOK

Sarah Anna Szeltner

Bergen / Kassel, Norway / Germany

Even though the notion of grammar is abundant in Wittgenstein's writings, it is neither spread evenly across the *Nachlass* nor used consistently by Wittgenstein. The aim of this paper is to provide an overview of Wittgenstein's use of the word "grammar" in both the *Brown Book* (Ts-310) and Wittgenstein's revision and translation of the *Brown Book* into German (Ms-115).

RULE-FOLLOWING, INTELLECTUALISM, AND LOGICAL REASONING: ON THE IMPORTANCE OF A TYPE-DISTINCTION BETWEEN PERFORMANCES AND 'PROPOSITIONAL' KNOWLEDGE OF THE NORMS THEY ENSHRINE

Julia Tanney

Canterbury, UK

Logic, Frege tells us, answers the question, 'How must I think to reach the goal truth?'—though only at "The most general level of what holds for all areas of thought". (1897: 139) The 'general' here is standardly read, literally, as placing laws of logic among the most general thoughts—made general by quantifying away from any particular content. Early Wittgenstein, as James Conant tells us, took issue with one particular bit of Frege's conception: the idea that logic is a science (an idea Conant's Wittgenstein took Frege to share with his psychologist opponents). (Conant 1991: 141) For Investigations Wittgenstein, I will argue, this change in Frege's conception amounted to a mere tweak. Both Frege and his Tractarian self "predicat[ed] of the thing what lies in the method of representing it." Thus Frege's view of concepts and objects; thus, too, the Tractatus conception of logical form. This talk will expand on what not reading 'the method of representing' into the thing represented might mean.

THE IRREDUCIBLE MENTAL ASPECT OF RULES

Philip Thonemann

London, UK

Wittgenstein's proposal for how we should use 'rule', based on community behaviour patterns, with mental stuff excluded, is well known to make a putative 'Private Language' senseless. But if we investigate whether the word 'rule' is actually used in this way in the language which is its original home, we find that it is not: Ordinary use routinely incorporates mental stuff. Therefore, far from bringing words back from their metaphysical to their everyday use, describing their use, and leaving everything as it is – his own principles - he is inspecting the everyday use, considering it unsatisfactory, and offering philosophical arguments for a specific, controversial, reform. But his arguments are unconvincing. Following his own guiding principles more consistently than he does, we conclude that a return to Ordinary use, incorporating irreducible, sui generis, mental stuff, provides our best view of rules – and sanctions private languages.

ENACTING CONJOINT AGENCY IN HETEROGENEOUS CONSTELLATIONS

Sabine Thürmel

Munich, Germany

Novel varieties of interplay between humans, robots and software agents are on the rise. It is demonstrated that the enactment of conjoint agency in these heterogeneous constellations is well past its embryonic stage. Humans have developed from naturally born cyborgs to adaptive, co-dependent sociotechnical agents. Computer-based artifacts are no longer mere tools but may be capable of individual and conjoint action, too. The coordination dynamics of interacting humans and nonhumans, and the co-regulation of their coupling is depicted and described as a specific form of socio-cognitive interaction. The resulting enactive account shows that social interaction is not bound to biological individuals.

REWRITING THE SCRIPT WHILE THE ACT IS IN PLAY. ON JUDITH BUTLER'S CONCEPT OF PERFORMATIVE AGENCY

Carina Tiefenbacher

Vienna, Austria

According to Martha Nussbaum, Judith Butler fails to offer a convincing notion of agency and therefore “collaborates with evil”. She presents nothing but a handful of severely constrained agents that try to change society by the means of the repetition of the given. Like actors with a bad script, they have no other choice but to go on stage where they find their freedom in a slightly odd presentation of their bad lines.

I will show that Butler's concept of performative agency is not just a sad depiction of trapped agents that are doomed to repetition. I elaborate how Butler refuses to work with the notion of universal identity categories and instead pleads for the radical opening of these categories.

OSTENSIVE TEACHING AND THE SHOPPING SCENE

Ioana Timperi

Bucharest, Romania

In this paper I argue that the shopping scene in §1 of the P.I. is meant to show that even though Augustine could have learned through ostensive teaching some uses of “five red apples”, he could not have learned solely through ostensive teaching the particular uses of these words which are depicted in the shopping scene.

COMMUNICATION BEFORE LANGUAGE

Michael Tomasello

Leipzig, Germany

In most of linguistics and psychology, the study of human communication begins with language and resorts to pragmatics only to solve “special problems” like deictics and pronouns. But if we look at the communication of young children before they have acquired any language - in the form of pointing and iconic gestures - we see that humans begin with complex and species-unique skills of pragmatics and only later supplement these with the use of convention-based communication. Indeed, children must be capable of participating in, and communicating in, mutually understood *forms of life* before they can acquire communicative conventions at all. A similar analysis holds for the evolution of uniquely human communication.

PICTURING LOGIC: WITTGENSTEIN EARLY AND LATE

Charles Travis

London, UK

Logic, Frege tells us, answers the question, ‘How must I think to reach the goal truth?’—though only at “The most general level of what holds for all areas of thought”. (1897: 139) The ‘general’ here is standardly read, literally, as placing laws of logic among the most general thoughts—made general by quantifying away from any particular content. Early Wittgenstein, as James Conant tells us, took issue with one particular bit of Frege's conception: the idea that logic is a science (an idea Conant's Wittgenstein took Frege to share with his psychologist opponents). (Conant 1991: 141) For Investigations Wittgenstein, I will argue, this change in Frege's conception amounted to a mere tweak. Both Frege and his Tractarian self “predicat[ed] of

the thing what lies in the method of representing it.” Thus Frege's view of concepts and objects; thus, too, the Tractatus conception of logical form. This talk will expand on what not reading ‘the method of representing’ into the thing represented might mean.

DAVIDSON AND THE WITTGENSTEINIANS ON REASONS AND CAUSES OF ACTION

Paolo Tripodi

Turin, Italy

The paper reassesses the role of Donald Davidson's 1963 seminal essay “Actions, reasons, and causes” in the history of analytic philosophy. According to the standard story, Davidson successfully rejected the Wittgensteinian-inspired (and then successful) slogan that reasons are not causes of action. According to a revisionist account, the success of causalism and the decline of a Wittgensteinian view are to be explained by a shift in meta-philosophical assumptions rather than by considering the outcome of first-order debates in the philosophy of action. This paper challenges an assumption shared by both the standard and the revisionist account, namely, the idea that in 1963 Davidson really put forward an anti-Wittgensteinian, causalist view of action-explanation. Rather, the paper emphasizes that, beyond terminological differences, the disagreement between Davidson and the Wittgensteinians is less fundamental than it has often been supposed to be. The paper also discusses the relation between terminological biases, first-order debates in the philosophy of action and the shift in meta-philosophical assumptions in the history of analytic philosophy.

WITTGENSTEIN AND THE STUDY OF LOCAL GRAMMARS

Aleksandar Trklja

Birmingham, UK

In this paper I propose a local grammar approach to language studies by discussing the relations between Wittgenstein's theory of meaning, the British contextualism and Zellig Harris' work on distributionalism. What is common for these three theories is that the context plays a crucial role for the study of meaning. The local grammars that I propose provide a description of meaning of linguistic units by explicating the contexts in which they occur.

MIND EMBEDDED OR EXTENDED? THE TENSION IN THE THEORY OF THE SITUATED MIND

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The Situated Mind is a new direction in the philosophy of mind. Sometimes it is perceived as a revolution in the field or even a paradigm change. Philosophers working on this new perspective are trying to create a unified and fruitful interdisciplinary project which is aimed at shedding a new light on the problems of cognition. Even if possible this task cannot be easy. The Situated Mind is composed of at least three descriptions which could hardly be thought to present unified picture of the mind: the Embodied Mind, the Extended Mind and the Embedded Mind. They reveal the tension within the project which weakens its integrity. In the paper I will point out the solution to this tension which could be found in a broad form of the Embedded Mind supported by Extended Functionalism. This position should not, however, be confused with the Extended Mind.

Eventually, I agree with Rupert and Rowlands that the Mind Embedded is enough and the Mind Extended is going too far.

LOST IN TRANSCRIPTION: LANGUAGE BETWEEN SPEAKING AND WRITING

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The aim of this paper is to substantiate the thesis that contemporary linguistic philosophy has not been consistent enough in researching the relations between language, speech and writing. Speech and writing are two distinct ways of representing knowledge, they also encourage a different organisation of the cognitive processes. The problems of the relationship between written and spoken word are of particular concern to philosophy in the light of recent studies conducted under the theory of literacy. Finally the paper pose the question about the sources of philosophy's indifference towards the problem of writing and literacy.

BILATERALISM AND THE ACQUISITION CHALLENGE

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Bilateralism defends classical logic against Michael Dummett's challenge which stems from considerations about the acquisition of language. The defence is based on an advantageous application over intuitionism. Ian Rumfitt argues that bilateral classical logic yields a better understanding of historical discourse than intuitionism. This advantage motivates the key element of bilateralism, an independent rejection. In this paper, it is shown that this advantage turns out to be illusory.

EXPERIENCE AND THOUGHT IN WITTGENSTEIN AND DEWEY

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It is shown how Dewey's and Wittgenstein's philosophy, through their differences, are able to shed light on one another. This requires a common problem, a shared point of departure. This common point can be found in the philosophical problem of "experience" and its relation to logic and language. On the basis of this commonality, I reconstruct a general temporal logic of thinking which can be found in both Dewey and Wittgenstein. Both, Wittgenstein and Dewey, are concerned with the problem how logic and experience can be *binding* for us, for our actions, for our judgments, for our thinking; and both authors, I claim, resort to a temporal logic of being *prompted* to act and to reflect, in order to account for this binding force. To put it differently: Dewey's and Wittgenstein's philosophy can be seen as a joint, but distinct inquiry into the conditions which allow to transform parts of experience into an *object* of thought at all, and vice versa. This allows a non-anthropological and non-transcendental reading of the logical role of the body, its "training" and its "primitive reactions" in Wittgenstein.

A RYLEAN INTELLECTUALISM: ABANDONING THE DUALISM OF THEORY AND PRACTICE

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I make three related claims concerning the recent debate over knowing how. The first is that it is largely terminological. The second is that Gilbert Ryle's reductio arguments against the 'Intellectualist' thesis that knowing how is reducible to propositional knowledge frame that thesis within a dualism of theory and practice, or cognition and action; they reveal the incoherence of dualistic accounts of knowledge in general, not the incoherence of Intellectualism. The third is that Intellectualism can do without the dualism of action and cognition.

THE UNITY OF LOGIC AND POLITICS IN WITTGENSTEIN'S CRITICISM OF MODERN CIVILISATION: SOME ASPECTS

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Wittgenstein was in many ways an apolitical thinker. Some scholars have suggested on the basis of their readings of scattered individuals remarks by Wittgenstein on his times that he was politically conservative. Others have suggested that lessons for our political thinking can be drawn from individual elements of his philosophy. But with few exceptions discussion of Wittgenstein's work has failed to address the political dimension that lies, inextricably, as one aspect, at the core of his philosophical contribution. If we wish to understand Wittgenstein's philosophy fully the task to unearth its relevance for our understanding of politics lies, therefore, mostly before us. Here a small contribution to this end is offered by looking at Socrates (2), at the idea that economics is an exact science (3) and at some remarks in the pivotal mid-sections of the first part of Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations (4). There is a closing remark (5).

CHANGING LANGUAGE, CHANGING LEBENSFORMEN: POLITICS AND EDUCATION IN WITTGENSTEIN'S LATER WORK

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Wittgenstein's conceptual linkage between language games (*Sprachspiele*) and forms of life (*Lebensformen*) has long fascinated scholars of his later works. But how, and under what circumstances, do language games change? And what notion of agency results from our being embedded within ever-changing language games and their attendant forms of life? These questions have been under-theorized, and investigating Wittgenstein's remarks on this subject reveals that novel grammatical structures, as well as the appearance of new words and old words in new configurations, do shape the forms of life we live. How we learn, adapt to or come to understand such changes then provides a model for living amongst one another and formulating our political interactions. This essay excavates key passages that reveal the way in which language games change and how Wittgenstein's central use of teaching and learning examples helps us come to terms with such changes.

DAS (SELBST-)BEWUSSTSEIN UND SEINE GRENZEN. BAKER, NIDA-RÜMELIN UND DER FÄHIGKEITSBEGRIFF

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Zugänge zu Personen bzw. Subjekten von Erfahrung – also zu selbstbewussten bzw. bewussten Wesen –, die auf deren Erste-Person Perspektive bzw., im Fall von Subjekten, auf deren subjektive Perspektive abstellen, appellieren an die Intuition, dass das Fortbestehen dieser Perspektive, und nicht etwa die Erinnerung, für die Identität von Personen bzw. Subjekten ausschlaggebend ist. Dieser Intuition steht jedoch die Erfahrung entgegen, dass die Erste-Person Perspektive bzw. die subjektive Perspektive nicht durchgehend aktualisiert, also lückenhaft ist. Anhand der Theorien Lynne Rudder Bakers und Martine Nida-Rümelins zeige ich, dass diese Lücken eine Schwierigkeit für erstpersionelle bzw. subjektive Zugänge zur Identität von Personen bzw. Subjekten darstellen. Insbesondere der Rekurs auf den Fähigkeitsbegriff zur Überbrückung von Lücken im Selbstbewusstsein bzw. Bewusstsein erweist sich als Problem. Denn innerhalb des erstpersionellen bzw. subjektiven Rahmens, den Baker und Nida-Rümelin sich selbst stecken, scheint kein geeigneter Träger für diese Fähigkeit zur Verfügung zu stehen.

WITTGENSTEIN'S ENACTIVISM

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In this paper, I argue that Wittgenstein can be read as a pioneer of enactivism. Despite obvious affinities between Wittgenstein's views and enactivism, there are three objections according to which Wittgenstein could not have been an enactivist. First, Wittgenstein has mainly been concerned with language, but many enactivists take language to be outside of the reach of their theory. Second, enactivists invent a new cognitive scientific terminology, which can be taken to clash with Wittgenstein's emphasis on not interfering with the actual use of language. And third, enactivism is a theory consisting of theses with an explanatory intent, which seems to run counter to Wittgenstein's method(s) of getting rid of theories, theses and explanations in philosophy. I argue that these objections can be met from a Wittgensteinian point of view. The resulting view throws new light both on Wittgenstein's thought and on enactivism.

ERKENNTNIS DURCH ERINNERUNG? MNEMONIK-MASCHINEN DER FRÜHEN NEUZEIT

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Als Methode zur Memorierung umfangreicher Texte bzw. komplexer Sachverhalte wurde die *Ars memorativa*, unter der Bezeichnung *memoria*, bereits in der Antike zu einem Teilgebiet der Rhetorik. Neben *inventio*, *dispositio*, *elocutio* und *pronuntiatio* (hat sie dort die Funktion, dem Redner zu ermöglichen, sich einen Text oder Sachverhalt möglichst genau einzuprägen. Um einen Text zu memorieren, empfehlen lateinische Rhetoriker sich im Geiste vertraute Orte, *loci*, vorzustellen und diese Orte im Geiste mit ausgefallenen Bildern zu besetzen, die für das zu Memorierende stehen, um den so entstandenen Weg dann in Gedanken jederzeit abschreiten zu können, wenn man sich an etwas bestimmtes erinnern möchte.

Spätestens zu Beginn der Frühen Neuzeit differenziert sich die Literatur zur *Memoria* in zwei formal wie inhaltlich eigenständige Traditionen, die sich mit Wolfgang Neuber und Jörg Berns terminologisch als „mnemotechnische“ und „mnemonische“ Linie fassen lassen. (Berns 1993) Während sich die im engeren Sinne mnemotechnischen Abhandlungen, in der rhetorischen Tradition des *Memoria*-verständnisses stehend, lediglich als heuristische Anleitungen zur Memorierung von Texten und Sachverhalten verstanden, versuchten die Vertreter der sog. Mnemonik die Kunst des Gedächtnisses zu einer Methode der universellen und übersinnlichen Erkenntnis, einer *scientia universalis*, auszubauen.

DOES THOUGHT HAPPEN IN THE BRAIN?

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What is the nature of thought? Is thought linguistic and some kind of silent speech? Or is it pre-linguistic and some kind of association of ideas and images in the mind? Does it happen in the brain? I will focus on the last question, but also say something about the other two. I will present a simple thought experiment to show that thought must somehow happen in the brain. But then I will soften the impression this might give by pointing out what is needed to read those thoughts. Simply put, ontologically, thought is in the brain, epistemologically, it is not.

A NOTE ON PART II OF REMARKS ON FRAZER'S "THE GOLDEN BOUGH"

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In light of some text-critical observations on MS 143 (Part II of *Remarks on Frazer's "The Golden Bough"*) it is suggested in this paper that the thirteen loose sheets of MS 143 should be divided into two parts, which can be called "the frame" and "the central section", and that the latter can be viewed as belonging to Wittgenstein's late remarks on the philosophy of psychology.

MATHEMATICS AS MODIFYING CONCEPTS WITTGENSTEIN'S PICTURE OF A MATHEMATICS WITHOUT PROPOSITIONS

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In numerous passages in the Nachlass, Wittgenstein describes mathematical proofs as modifying or creating concepts. Crispin Wright and Felix Mühlhölzer develop a dilemma out of this idea: Since Wittgenstein does not allow for objective and normative rules governing the correct use of a concept, it seems impossible to conceive of a proof changing it.

I will argue that in carrying out a proof the mathematician is introduced into a new use of a concept directly without any reference to the proven proposition. Wittgenstein's emphasis on proofs as modifying concepts can thus be interpreted as consequence of his bigger project to argue for a picture of mathematics, as consisting mainly in proofs and techniques rather than propositions.

THE OTHER EXPLANATORY GAP

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Is human action just mere physical goings on? In this paper, I argue that the answer is 'yes,' in ontological terms, but 'no,' in epistemological terms. In much the same way that some philosophers of consciousness have argued that there is an *explanatory gap* when it comes to understanding qualitative states in strict physical terms, I argue that there is a similar explanatory gap when it comes to a physicalist rendering reasons and actions. Originally coined to capture the epistemic darkness we confront in our attempt to understand phenomenal experiences in purely physical terms, the idea has yet to be explored in the area of intentional states. I draw upon the work Donald Davidson and his intimations about the normativity of intentionality and its role in supporting psychophysical anomalism – the claim that there are no laws bridging our intentional states with states of our brain.

RETENTION VERSUS STORAGE: AN AGENTIVE APPROACH TO MEMORY SYSTEMS

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Cognitive science and artificial intelligence seek to reveal the underlying architecture of the brain and/or intelligence in order to develop certain models for simulating its faculties. Yet, it attempts to achieve this by employing terms that are comprehensively borrowed from the computer-based terminology. That is to say, the representative tools (computer-based terminology) used for simulation and modeling are represented as the real structure of the target system (brain/intelligence) itself. In this paper, we claim that it is not enough to explain the function of memory in an agentive system by using the metaphor of *storage*, since *storing information* is a computer-based terminology that is not completely proper for understanding the agentive aspects of memory. We will give the description of the role of memory in cognition and analysis of memory in machine intelligence. We will explain five features of machine memory which are necessary for developing an agentive manner in machine intelligence.

THE QUESTION OF THE ESSENCE OF LANGUAGE: AN INFERENTIALIST READING OF RHEES' CRITIQUE OF WITTGENSTEIN

Tomasz Zarębski

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The paper discusses Rush Rhees' critique of Wittgenstein, concerning the question of the essence of language. While Wittgenstein, in *Philosophical Investigations*, keeps on insisting that there is no such thing as the essence of language (*PI*, § 65), Rhees, in "Wittgenstein's Builders", argues for the opposite: that there has to be something in language to be called its essence, and sees this crucial element in "discourse", "dialogue" or "conversation". The present analysis reveals these aspects of Rhees' reflections to be parallel to Robert B. Brandom's more recent inferentialist project. Accordingly, such semantic stances as essentialism, propositionalism, holism and inferentialism – characteristic of Brandom's conception – are also ascribed to that of Rhees', along with the claim that the core of language constitutes the inferentialist "game of giving and asking for reasons".

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