

Philosophie der Informationsgesellschaft Philosophy of the Information Society

Abstracts

30. Internationales Wittgenstein Symposium
5. – 11. August 2007 Kirchberg am Wechsel

30th International Wittgenstein Symposium
August 5 – 11, 2007 Kirchberg am Wechsel

Distributors

Die Österreichische Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft
The Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society

Markt 63, A-2880 Kirchberg am Wechsel Österreich/Austria



Gedruckt mit Unterstützung der Abteilung Kultur und Wissenschaft des Amtes der NÖ
Landesregierung

Herausgeber: Herbert Hrachovec, Alois Pichler, Joseph Wang

Visuelle Gestaltung: Sascha Windholz

Druck: Eigner-Druck, 3040 Neulengbach

THE SEMANTIC WEB IN A PHILOSOPHICAL PERSPECTIVE

Terje Aaberge, Sogndal, Norway

The semantic web is a proposal to make a more efficient web. By endowing the computer 'language' with a semantic structure defined by ontologies extracted from natural language, one hopes to facilitate the communication between human operators and computers and between computers. An ontology is a set of definitions that relate the terms and predicates of the vocabulary of the description language for a domain. It imposes a semantic structure that fix the meaning of terms and predicates that are polysemic in natural language and it serves as a basis for making inferences. Abstracted from the domain it limits the possible interpretations of the vocabulary. The extraction of ontologies from the semantic of a description language leans on Wittgenstein's metaphysics and picture theory from *Tractatus* and language games from *Investigations*.

THE BALLOON EFFECT. EIGHT PROBLEMS RELATED TO PHILOSOPHY TYRANNIZED BY INFORMATION

Krzysztof Abriszewski, Torun, Poland

I would like to start with an obvious thesis: the inflation of information, which itself is a part of the information society, is not neutral for the philosophical practice. The situation can be described with the metaphor of an expanding balloon. Mark a spot on the surface of the balloon, and then pump it up. The spot will turn into a bigger stain or a set of spots. Similarly, take a classical philosopher, and add more and more her/his critics. While adding texts, instead of having one set of ideas (related to one person), you will have several (related to several interpretations of the person) widely commented. Using the balloon model, I focus on eight problem areas: 1. Situations of the inflation of texts; 2. The balloon effect: when to stop reading? or what are the conditions of the decent methodological capitulation?; 3. Bits and pieces of professionalism or should we forget the dreams of the united body knowledge?; 4. Organizational structure of philosophy increases the balloon effect; 5. Inflation of the information – defensive and offensive reactions. You will multiply problems, if you choose a defensive adaptation. Then instead of the enhanced flow, the result will be the distorted flow or even blocked; 6. Dysfunctional adaptation leads to the shrinking of the ambitions and the study areas of philosophy; 7. The balloon effect and the information overflow increase the cost of moving from one language game to another; 8. The ultimate consequence of this is that philosophy and humanities in general, may be removed to the cultural margins.

'AS WE MAY BE DOING PHILOSOPHY': THE PARADIGM OF 'INFORMATIONALISM' - A NEW RÉGIME FOR PHILOSOPHY?

Daniel Apollon, Bergen, Norway

Philosophy, seen as an activity, has in the course of history involved all available means of human linguistic expression. While Plato was highly critical of writing as constituting the best "technology of the mind", diverse forms of written expression by means of texts have been the regime of expression under which philosophy has thrived. While oral communication (speech) has been viewed as "natural language", written language and notational systems have departed gradually from "naturalness" and specialized into a variety of tools, some of them (e.g., formal languages, logic and algebraic notation) moving light-years away from what is understood as "fluent speech".

This paper assumes that philosophy and the philosopher have been living under a variety of regimes. Some of these regimes are rather abstract and affect the core of philosophical activity. Other regimes predominantly affect the way of expressing and carrying out a philosophical activity. In any case, philosophers have used a limited set of text-bound intellectual technologies.

When Vanevar Bush published his visionary paper "As we may think" in 1945, he outlined an information and communication technology which would serve the purpose of amplifying the intellectual capacity of mankind by means of a highly interconnected network called memex. Now, in 2007, the hypertextuality of the Web and new emerging "semantic tools" (e.g., "ontologies") offer philosophers such practical tools. And, as humanity moves from the Gutenberg age into a fully networked information culture, philosophy follows. The pervasive spread of globalized, networked information and communication technologies and cultures re-actuates the issue of the specificity of philosophy in culture and society. Will the paradigm of "informationalism" impose a new regime on philosophy?

WOVON MAN NICHT SPRECHEN KANN, DARÜBER HAT FREUD NICHT GESCHWIEGEN

José María Ariso, Madrid, Spanien

Drury sagte einmal, dass Wittgensteins Werk eine Warnung mit ethischem Charakter gegen die intellektuelle Haltung des typischen westlichen Wissenschaftler bilde. In diesem Beitrag werde ich beschreiben, worin besagte Warnung besteht und wie die zitierte Warnung uns helfen kann Wittgensteins Kritik an Freud und seinem Werk besser zu verstehen.

A DATABASE FOR A PROTOTRACTATUS STRUCTURAL ANALYSIS AND THE HYPERTEXT VERSION OF WITTGENSTEIN'S TRACTATUS

Luciano Bazzocchi, Pisa, Italy

In the preface to the second edition of the Prototractatus, McGuinness expresses hope for "an electronic version which will facilitate the comparison of the various stages [of the work], as well as permitting a number of other analyses both of this and of the Tractatus itself". By recording Prototractatus propositions in a database, it is indeed possible to rebuild the evolution of the work point by point into its three main structures: a) the chronological succession of composition; b) the sequential reading by propositions' numerical order; c) the organization into comment levels according to the recursive decimals architecture. This third structural perspective clearly stems from the strategy assumed in writing the Prototractatus notebook. In fact, Wittgenstein first builds up the cardinal propositions. Next, he completes first level comments and adds pages of comment to them. Finally, he inserts the sequences of comments to detail comments according to a pattern that is very close to the disposition which can be properly obtained from hierarchic hypertext pages. So a reading by level views, induced by the hypertextual version of the Tractatus, is what most closely corresponds to the composition method and to the parallel lines of thought originally developed by Wittgenstein himself.

ON BUTTERFLY'S FEELERS: A PERSPICUOUS REPRESENTATION OF WITTGENSTEIN'S TRACTATUS

Luciano Bazzocchi, Pisa, Italy

In the only two places where Wittgenstein touches upon the decimal numbers of TRACTATUS propositions, he claims that only those can transform his incomprehensible book into a perspicuous representation. We can now show how this is possible if we interpret them as specifics for a hypertextual implementation.

By surfing on the top-down structure of the Tractatus hypertext, we see (we feel) the logical form of Wittgenstein's masterpiece, that is, the form of the reality it represents. What pictures and reality then have in common is revealed by a charade hidden inside Tractatus propositions – and the differences between two levels of generalization can be seen playing the game 'spot the difference'.

Can a picture, in virtue of the connection of its elements, really touch (as butterfly's feelers) reality? And when we turn up towards the main page, do we really withdraw these feelers? Hypertext exploration has neither a starting nor an end point; although it does have a barycentre, a "pulsing heart" (McGuinness) in the middle: a point of balance (for instance: there is a rule – the rule is not here). You visit the hypertext – like a city, "from north to south, from east to west, from Euston to the Thames, from Piccadilly to Marble Arch. You have to cover all the ways many times - every time within a different route. At end you will know London like one who is born in London" (Wittgenstein, about his teaching method). The journey can afford us pleasure, even if we suspend it; there is no need to run towards an exit, nor towards, for instance,

proposition seven. Visiting a town (like understanding) is not a sequential commitment - it has no fixed direction. Perhaps Wittgenstein's ladder, level by level, does not lead us to "what is higher", but rather, like Escher's ladders, to the basic level to which all the others must be reduced: to what can be said, i.e., to the world.

When we observe the hypertext page with the right mental disposition and we understand how everything lies in its right logical place, all of this naturally emerges with ever growing clarity and evidence.

RESPONSIVITÄT IM CYBERSPACE? ÜBER DAS PROBLEM DER VER-ANTWORT-TUNG IN VIRTUELLEN KOMMUNIKATIONSPROZESSEN

Barbara Becker, Paderborn, Deutschland

Die konkrete, face-to-face Kommunikation gleicht einem responsiven Geschehen, dem zufolge man jenseits aller bewussten Intentionen immer auch re-agiert auf die implizit wie explizit geäußerten Auf- und Anforderungen des jeweiligen Gegenüber.

Diese Form von Responsivität ist wesentlich bedingt durch die leiblich-sinnliche Anwesenheit der Kommunikationspartner, da über Blick, Gestik, Körperhaltung und Stimme neben der expliziten Äußerung immer noch andere Bedeutungsebenen zum Schwingen gebracht werden, welche die Absichten der jeweils Redenden immer schon beeinflussen und lenken.

In der Be-Antwortung dieser impliziten Ansprüche des Gegenüber kann sich eine Form von Ver-Antwort-ung für die kommunikative Situation wie auch für die andere Person entfalten, die wesentlich ist für das Gelingen und Fortbestehen kommunikativer Prozesse.

Es stellt sich nun die Frage, ob die Absenz einer leiblich fundierten Form von Responsivität eine mögliche Erklärung (neben anderen) für die häufig beobachtbaren Kommunikationsabbrüche im virtuellen Raum sind, da sich hier das Problem der Verantwortung nicht in dem Maße entwickelt wie in der Face-to-Face-Kommunikation.

Zu fragen wäre dann, wie sich eine solche Form der Verantwortung auch in der Netzkommunikation entfalten kann und inwieweit die Entwicklung bestimmter Technologien (Avatare, ECAs, Webcams..) hier hilfreich sein könnte.

LANGUAGE GAMES OF LITERATURE

Ondrej Beran, Prague, Czech Republic

Language games are defined by implicit rules that can be made explicit. Literature seems not to have definite rules. Even so it has its default context and default forms. The problem about literature is its systematically subversive behavior with respect to its explicit rules, and that it cannot be understood straightforwardly as "coping with". From those reasons there is a large plurality of literary language games, that goes paradoxically still more complicated and diversified by the describing activity of the theory of literature. The paper tries to show that literature surely consists of language games, but of a strange kind: they

are "second-order" games permeating through non-literary games (they cannot be definitely distinguished from the latter); and their rules are genuinely implicit – by making them explicit the concept "literature" becomes only more confused.

MEANING AS USE IN THE DIGITAL TURN

Anat Biletzki, Tel Aviv, Israel

Theories of meaning have travelled far in the 20th century with two principal developments taking place currently: formal-mathematical advances of the semantic-syntactic treatments and a postmodern elaboration of the pragmatic ones. This article will submit that neither can address in satisfactory manner the digital turn, which is, fundamentally, a conceptual revolution. In other words, neither can truly teach us the "meaning" of terms, concepts, and ideas now extant in digital culture. The only way to make sense of this revolution is by harnessing a "meaning as use" theory (with this conscription of "theory" being admittedly un-Wittgensteinian).

Furthermore, although it is indeed unfeasible to formulate a bona fide "theory" of meaning here, as elsewhere, we can take Wittgensteinian steps in describing novel cultural-linguistic circumstances and situations by turning to the digital use of terms and concepts. The applicability of "meaning as use" in the digital context will be presented, then, as the best theory of meaning, perhaps the only one, that can address both the promise and the vagaries of digitization.

RISK AND TECHNOSCIENCE IN THE INFORMATION SOCIETY

Ewa Binczyk, Torun, Poland

The paper discusses selected functions of science and technology in the informational, global society. I present a specific understanding of humanity as a Do-It-Yourself project, materially rooted in invented objects and appliances. I conceive the information society as a final stage of materially rooted processes of human coordination. I also define technoscience as a practical domain for controlling and predicting. I argue, that as an innovative core of global society, technoscience intensifies and accelerates the processes of globalization, but it also produces unpredictable side effects and risk.

To achieve my goals I use selected theses from such research areas as science and technology studies, empirical case studies of controversies and catastrophes, Ulrich Beck's conception of the risk society, and the actor-network theory.

FRANZ BRENTANOS PHILOSOPHISCHES WERK IM DIGITALEN ZEITALTER

Thomas Binder, Graz, Österreich

Bei Franz Brentano (1838-1917) handelt es sich unbestritten um einen der wirkungsmächtigsten Philosophen des 19. und 20. Jahrhunderts. Ganz im Gegensatz zu dieser Bedeutung ist es um die Zugänglichkeit seines originalen Werkes, vor allem seines Nachlasses, schlecht bestellt. Um diese unbefriedigende Situation zu beseitigen, sind seit einiger Zeit Bemühungen im Gange, Brentanos Nachlaß nach dem Vorbild der *Bergen Electronic Edition* des Nachlasses Ludwig Wittgensteins in einer digitalen Edition zu publizieren. Der vorliegende Beitrag versucht, die Vorteile einer digitalen Brentano-Edition darzustellen, und den aktuellen Stand der Editionsarbeiten zusammenzufassen

PHILOSOPHIE DES DIGITALISIERENS: VON DER KÜNSTLICHEN INTELLIGENZ ZUM WISSENSMANAGEMENT – KANN EINE MASCHINE DENKEN?

Rainer Born, Linz, Österreich

Schon Herbert Simon hat 1956 als der Begriff „Künstliche Intelligenz“ aus der Taufe gehoben wurde, in seinem Kontext darauf verwiesen, dass die ökonomischen Akteure auf der Basis der Annahme einer universelle Rationalität die auf die Rechte der Fähigkeiten aufgesetzt wird, Schwierigkeiten im Handlungsbereich bekommen, und hat daher den Begriff einer „Bounded Rationality“ eingeführt. De facto geht es dabei um die Grenzen des Digitalisierens die schon im Projekt „Künstliche Intelligenz“ angelegt sind und letztendlich zu folgender parodistischen Konzeption von Wissensmanagement geführt haben (wobei letzteres aus den Forschungen zu den Cognitive Sciences und der künstlichen Intelligenz hervorgegangen ist und in die Praxis der Business Administration umgesetzt wurde).

Die parodistische Ausgangslage für Wissensmanagement

1. „Suche nach Computerprogrammen, mit deren Hilfe die Ergebnisse der teuren Experten durch Laien oder Hilfsarbeiter reproduziert werden können“ – was dabei übersehen wird, sind drei wesentliche Aspekte, nämlich:

- i) das man von einer gemeinsamen Grunderfahrung der Laien ausgehen kann, und
- ii) das man dabei einen empirisch identifizierbaren (cf. Cognitive Sciences) universellen common sense voraussetzt und dem ganzen
- iii) ein mehr oder minder statisches Wissenskonzept zugrundeliegt

De facto übersieht man ein wesentliches Problem, das interessanterweise in der Praxis bzw. im angewandten Wissensmanagement durch die Hintertür eines als vollständig angenommenen Wissenschaftssystems wieder hereinkommt: Die Bedeutung von Reflexion und Empathie. Im folgenden werde ich mit Hilfe einer "Wissens-, Erfahrungs-, Beurteilungs-Schere, die sich zwischen den Rollen" von Laien- und Expertenwissen auftut auf der Basis eines "modelltheoretischen Ansatzes" verdeutlichen, erläutern und argumentieren. Blindtext / Dummy Text

Daraus ergibt sich ein interessantes speziell wissenschaftsphilosophisches Problem. Einerseits könnte es eine Aufgabe der Philosophie sein durch Bedeutungsanalyse die Anwendungsgrenzen unserer Begriffsbildungen klar zu machen (die benutzten Vereinfachungen in einem gewissen Sinn für das Verständnis rückgängig zu machen) andererseits sollte man sich aber auch klar machen, dass innerhalb einer wissenschaftlichen Einzeldisziplin durch Verfeinerung des epistemischen Auflösungsvermögens neue Problemlösungseinsichten möglich werden. In letzteren Fall geht es darum, dass wissenschaftliche Ergebnisse die mit Begriffsbildung zustande gekommen sind, die im Alltag keine Entsprechung besitzen, für den Alltagsgebrauch neu interpretiert und gedeutet werden müssen. Dies gilt insbesondere für die Benutzung aller Formen von Digitalisierung, da die Alltagsrezeption wesentlich als Benutzerphilosophie den Umgang mit entsprechenden Technologien bestimmt, mitunter sogar in insofern unzulässiger Weise als Anwendungsergebnisse mit den vorhandenen Grundwerten einer Gesellschaft inkompatibel sein können.

Im Bereich der Anwendung von Künstlicher Intelligenz, Cognitive Science und Wissensmanagement ist dies besonders eklatant, da wir sehr oft Modell und Wirklichkeit gleichsetzen und aufgrund von Rechenmodellen und Berechnungen ohne Berücksichtigungen von Interpretationen zu Handlungsempfehlungen kommen, die keineswegs akzeptabel sind. Ein eklatantes Beispiel dafür sind die Diskussionen im Umfeld des Gefangenendilemmas, das einerseits erfunden wurde um die Idee über Spieltheorie "zu illustrieren, nun aber dazu benutzt wird unser Handlungsrepertoire einzuschränken und zu lernen uns so zu verhalten, dass z.B. "Gemeinwohl" kein Wert mehr ist und man abgerichtet wird, sich entsprechend einer egoistischen Theorie zu verhalten (wodurch das eigene Verhalten vorhersagbar wird).

PHILOSOPHY, SPOKEN WORD, WRITTEN TEXT AND BEYOND

Vaclav Brezina, Pardubice, Czech Republic

The article considers three forms of philosophical discourse – spoken word, written text and hypertext. It discusses briefly the objections by Plato as well as Wittgenstein's remark in the Preface of *Philosophical Investigations* about the obstacle in presenting his ideas by means of the linear text. The appropriateness of the traditional linear text for works of philosophy is then put into question and the possibility of employing new technologies, in particular hypertext, is discussed. Furthermore, hypertext as a theoretical concept is considered with respect to Wittgenstein's *Investigations*.

FROM HYPERNIETZSCHE TO DISCOVERY: DIGITAL SEMANTIC CORPORA FOR VIRTUAL RESEARCH IN PHILOSOPHY

Katja Brunkhorst, Munich, Germany / Paolo D'Iorio, Paris, France

Discovery has a twofold aim: 1) to enrich with markup and group together a significant amount of philosophical content in a federation of interoperable web sites (Hyper-Federation); 2) to set up a peer-to-peer (p2p) network of desktop client applications that allows the generation of new knowledge by applying and testing different conceptual grids to the Hyper-Federation contents (Discovery).

The Hyper-Federation will function as data provider, like a digital library or archive, for the Discovery applications that will enable them to perform sophisticated queries, apply inference rules and, above all, semantically enrich the data collected from the web sites. The Hyper-Federation will apply peer-review models currently in use by traditional academic publishing.

The p2p network of Discovery applications will lie over and extend the Hyper-Federation, enriching its content with non-reviewed information. In order to further enrich their content and their amount of semantically structured metadata, the results of the research and computation performed on each client application can, at user will, be submitted (through peer-review) for publication on the Hyper-Federation sites.

Both the software applications for creating the Hyper-Federation and the Discovery application will be based on the extension and adaptation of already existing Open Source applications, primarily Hyper and Dbin.

An organizational infrastructure will be established to sustain the project after the end of the EU founding period by attracting other organizations to join and support the initiative. For this reason, workshop and training courses will be organized during the course of the project to involve not only project partners, but the scholarly community in general and various stakeholders.

METAMATHEMATICS AND INFORMATION THEORY

Gregory Chaitin, Yorktown Heights, New York, USA

I'll review the history of metamathematics, including the ideas of David Hilbert, Kurt Gödel, Alan Turing, and Emile Borel, leading to my own work on incompleteness, randomness, algorithmic information and complexity, that can be traced back to Leibniz's 1686 *Discours de métaphysique*.

PRIVILEGED ACCESS TO INFORMATION: DRETSKE'S ACCOUNTS OF SELF- KNOWLEDGE

Kai-Yuan Cheng, Chia-Yi, Taiwan

Fred Dretske (1981, 1988) is noted for his vigorous project of naturalizing the mind. In his representational theory, a mental state is characterized as a physical state of a person, which has a certain function of carrying information about aspects of the environment, to which the person is causally related. So construed, a mental state is an objective item in the world, which shall be accessible to both its possessor and external observers in a similar way. This, however, seem to conflict with our observation that we have a privileged and immediate access to our own mental states, an access which no other people share. Dretske (1995, 1999, 2000) has taken up the challenge to solve this daunting problem by offering some ingenious and illuminating accounts of introspection. This paper aims to discuss how, and whether, those accounts work, and to the extent that they do not, whether they can be amended.

BINDING TIME: HAROLD INNIS AND THE BALANCE OF NEW MEDIA

Chris Chesher, Sydney, Australia

The emergence of blogs, web video, social software, wikipedia and other new media has seen shifting relationships to time. These new web genres continue to rely on the computer's traditional command roles: transmitting messages, calculating and performing decisions. However, they also make enhanced use of operations of memory: recording images and texts, hosting conversations, making connections and holding archives.

For Harold Innis the ways the dominant media of an era relate to time and space help define a civilisation. Space-binding media (such as papyrus, or electronic communication) facilitate command and control over territory, supporting empire-building. Time-binding media (such as stone, and spoken communication), on the other hand, operate to maintain cultural continuity, and tend towards more stately priestly structures.

The computer has become the dominant medium of the current era. From its original diagram, it put command and memory onto the same circuit. However, as Innis feared, the implementation was always out of balance. Command functions were always cheaper and more effective than memory or storage. More recently, though, it could be argued that more sophisticated time-binding features are better supporting uses of sound, image and text drawn from archives and cultural networks. This paper explores the value and limitations of Innis for understanding of the current generation of Internet media.

OUR KNOWLEDGE OF MARKETS FOR KNOWLEDGE

Gerhard Clemenz, Vienna, Austria

It is commonplace that advanced economies are knowledge (based) economies, meaning that knowledge is a major factor for the creation of economic benefits. The importance of knowledge for economic development was emphasized a long time ago by leading "Austrian" economists like Joseph Schumpeter and Friedrich Hayek. Both contemporaries of Wittgenstein claimed that the superiority of a capitalist economy as compared to its alternatives stems from its efficiency with respect to the creation, processing and utilization of knowledge. But knowledge, however defined, is quite different in many respects from most other goods. Markets are fairly efficient when it comes to the allocation of conventional goods, but various difficulties and paradoxes arise when they are supposed to trade knowledge and provide incentives for its creation. We shall consider some of them and discuss whether alternative institutional setups after all may not be as bad as some Austrian economists maintained.

[TBA]

James Conant, Chicago, Illinois, USA

To be announced.

MARKT ODER AGORA? VIRTUELLE GEMEINSCHAFTEN UND ÖFFENTLICHKEIT IM INTERNET

Wolfgang Coy, Berlin, Deutschland

Das moderne Internet beginnt mit der Öffnung zur kommerziellen Nutzung in der Mitte der neunziger Jahre. Seitdem hat sich die Nutzung des Netzes radikal erweitert: Von einem akademischen Milieu zu einem Versuchsfeld für neue Marketing- und Verkaufsmethoden. Werbefinanzierte Suchmaschinen wie Google sind Ausdruck des "neuen" Internetmarketings - ebenso wie Spam. eBay, iTunes Store, Expedia und Amazon wurden die Leuchttürme erfolgreicher Geschäftstätigkeit. Daneben entstehen, der Kommerzialisierung zum Trotz, virtuelle Gemeinschaften wie Wikipedia, MySpace, Orkut, Flickr, YouTube oder die Communities der Netzspiele. Sind dies nur Gruppen mit zufälligerweise gemeinsamen Interessen oder entsteht hier eine neue Öffentlichkeit? Wird das Internet zur globalen Shopping Mall oder zur weltweiten virtuellen Agora?

READING WITTGENSTEIN: TEXTS, CONTEXTS, AND HYPERTEXTS

Istvan Danka, Leeds, United Kingdom

In this paper I will argue that there are close interrelations among some recent technical issues occurred by the appearance of the Bergen Electronic Edition of Wittgenstein's Nachlass, constructivism in text interpretation, and a use theory of meaning attributed to Wittgenstein. An overcome of printed media in text analysis practically demonstrates that there is no unique essence of words or texts independent of the contexts in which they occurred. It is often claimed that by reading hypertexts some kind of 'coherence' or 'essence' of the text disappears. I will argue that if it were so then such coherence would never exist. It is not an effect of a deficiency of hypertexts, but of a false understanding of printed texts that such essence were supposed. I will show that there is at least one alternative, nevertheless legitimate, method of reading, a method done by the technique of searching keywords.

PHILOSOPHY AND COMPUTATIONAL ONTOLOGIES

Stefano David / Cesare Rocchi, Ancona, Italy

The Discovery Project (Digital Semantic Corpora for Virtual Research in philosophy, (Discovery 2006)) aims to set up a network of peer-to-peer clients called Philosource, which will ease the enrichment of existent corpora of philosophers and the addition of new contributions by scholars. Discovery is based on experiences coming from the development and use of the HyperNietzsche platform (HyperNietzsche).

Computational ontologies are a mean for the organization of information in the Semantic Web (Herman, Ivan 2001), (SemanticWeb). Their use allows robust and reliable access to the stored data and fast data retrieval.

In the context of Discovery, two types of ontology will be used: a *Scholarship Ontology* (Barbera et al. 2007) and many domain ontologies. The former is the ontology that contains all relevant concepts that all ontologies share (types of documents, authors), whereas the latter describe the domain of every Hyper, and may introduce concepts relevant only to that Hyper.

WITTGENSTEIN'S TOOTHACHE AND NIETZSCHE'S UMBRELLA. PHILOSOPHICAL WRITING AND READING AFTER THE HYPERMEDIAL TURN

Jos de Mul, Rotterdam, The Netherlands

1.

In the last decade 'media philosophy' (Medienphilosophie) has entered the philosophical arena. According to one of its leading proponents, Reinhard Margreiter, this development not only, and not even in the first place, refers to the exploration of yet another ontological domain, but rather designates a fundamental transformation of

philosophy itself, which is characterized by a turn towards (the descent and history of) the mediatic foundations of philosophy. As such media philosophy becomes a kind of contemporary 'prima philosophia'.

Evidently, 'media philosophy' is not a completely new phenomenon. Already in Plato's Phaedrus and Seventh Letter we find fundamental reflections on the impact of writing on oral dialogue. However, in the tradition of Western philosophy these reflections remained relatively scarce and marginal for a long time. Starting with Kant's Copernican revolution and Hegel's philosophy of mediation, mediatic self-reflection increasingly has become a crucial concern for philosophy. In the linguistic turn, both in its hermeneutical and analytical forms, the attention shifted from the a priori forms of the mind to the medium of language. Inspired by the emergence and impact of new media such as radio, film, television and the computer, and by the work of otherwise diverse thinkers as Cassirer, Langer, McLuhan, Goodman and Derrida, in the recent 'mediatic turn' the mediatic self-reflection has been extended to (the symbolic and material dimension of) all cultural media of experience.

Especially the recent developments in hypermedia, which enable new interactive and multimedial ways of writing and reading, challenge philosophy as we know it, both practically and theoretically.

2.

Let me elucidate this with reference to the unpublished works of Nietzsche and Wittgenstein. The philological and philosophical interpretation of the Nachlass of these philosophers confront scholars with severe problems. For many years both philosophers tried in vain to give their philosophical thoughts expression in a 'definitive book'. Their philosophical legacy consists of thousands of pages, not only with fragments of the intended work, but also with dozens of different plans and schemes for their definitive ordering.

It has been argued by Herbert Hrachovec and others, that traditional (critical) editions on paper are hardly fit to represent these kinds of work in progress. The publication of the Nachlass of Nietzsche and Wittgenstein on CD-ROM (respectively the electronic version of Colli and Montinari's *Kritische Studienausgabe* [1994], and the *The Bergen Electronic Edition* [2000]) not only simply extends the established tool-set of textual scholarship, but also opens up new philological and philosophical perspectives. Especially the advanced search templates of the digitized version of Wittgenstein's Nachlass offer opportunities that no collection of printed volumes can present, such as any synopsis of any terms at arbitrary dates.

However, as Hrachovec adds, how impressive this might be, for politico-commercial reasons the possibilities for 'semantic data-mining' remain restricted, as the user cannot touch the indexing mechanism nor modify any of the underlying data. We have to wait for – or actively promote – an 'open source' movement that will disclose the computational deep structures of Nietzsche's and Wittgenstein's Nachlass.

3.

How will this open source movement affect the praxis of philosophy beyond the realm of philological research? In order to answer this question we should start with a media-philosophical interpretation of the Nachlass of Nietzsche and Wittgenstein. Although psychological reasons may have played a role in their inability to write their 'definitive book', both thinkers also had philosophical – though not necessary fully conscious – reasons for their reluctance

(and in the case of Nietzsche finally an abandoning of this 'metaphysical ambition' as such). How divergent their philosophical explorations may be, both Nietzsche and Wittgenstein start from a fundamental and explicit critique of Plato's essentialism. Representatives of the Toronto School such as Havelock and Ong have argued that the essentialism that characterizes Plato's doctrine of Ideas reflects the transformation from oral to written discourse. The syntax of writing creates the illusion that all words designate abstract objects. Nietzsche's and Wittgenstein's attempts to overcome Platonism forced them to go beyond the medium of the written language and the printed book.

Nyíry has argued that Wittgenstein's Nachlass and his inability to write his 'definitive book' reflects the emergence of secondary orality in the first part of the twentieth-century. The dialogical, aphoristic and fragmentary form of Wittgenstein's legacy aims at an Umdrehung of the course monological and linear philosophy went since Plato(nism). Philosophical problems are the consequence of the essentialist fixation that characterizes written and (even more) printed language, and the solution of these problems has to be found in a return to an oral, inherently contextualized way of philosophizing.

Though Nyíry throws a fascinating light on the mediatic foundation of Wittgenstein's philosophy, just like Ong he seems to be a victim of a Hegelian dialectics according to which secondary orality is conceived of entirely in terms of a synthesis of oral and written media. For that reason he is not able to conceptualize the attempts of Wittgenstein (and Nietzsche) to achieve a Herausdrehung des Platonismus. These attempts are being reflected in the proto-hypermedial form of their Nachlass. Their appeal to non-linguistic media such as music, film, pictures and diagrams, and even more so their continuous re-ordering of their 'database' of aphorisms and fragments, disclose – more or less willingly – a hypermedial discourse that more adequately reflects the never-ending flux and changeability of the world and of the modes of describing and evoking world. Aim of the lecture will be to further investigate some of the possibilities and problems that are connected with this envisioned hyper-philosophy.

PHILOSOPHY AT THE CROSSROADS. IS IT POSSIBLE TO LOVE WISDOM IN THE INFORMATION AGE?

Aleksandra Maria Derra, Torun, Poland

The article takes the form of a thought experiment with a lot of assumptions which are taken for granted. The author assumes that we are able to describe what the information age is and that we live in the information society (which many see as debatable). She enumerates and describes a number of important features which characterize the information age, and she assumes that they can be actually detected from our everyday reality. She reflects upon the role which philosophy can play in the information age, considering many doubts about the chance for traditionally understood philosophy to find its vital place in contemporary culture.

THE METAPHYSICS OF INFORMATION

Fred Dretske, Durham, North Carolina, USA

In the paper I will be asking what information is, why it is so important (we spend huge amounts of money on its collection and distribution), and what (in its nature) accounts for this importance.

Everybody seems to agree that information is important. Maybe even necessary. Nonetheless, there isn't much agreement about what it is. Engineers, computer scientists, educators, librarians, newscasters, the CIA and FBI, and, yes, even your neighborhood busybody traffic in information — they spend billions of dollars on its collection, storage, and retrieval — but there is little consensus about the nature of this commodity.

To merit all this attention - an attention amounting, at times, to obsession — information must be at least three things: (1) It must be a semantic (intentional) entity; it must, that is, be about something; (2) it must, furthermore, be true; there is no false information; and (3) it must be transferable. These three properties define the nature of this metaphysical beast.

SUBSTANCE AND PHENOMENOLOGY IN TRACTATUS

Dan Dusa, Paris, France

In this work we will attempt to properly interpret the so-called "substance argument" whose form is transcendental.

In the second part, we will interpret another important proposition from Tractatus about substance which will lead us to the following problem: how can be possible to have a phenomenology in Wittgenstein's Tractatus.

„ALLES, WAS DER FALL WIRD“: WITTGENSTEIN UND DIE INFORMATISCHE WENDE IN DER PHYSIK

Harald Edelbauer, Hinterbrühl, Österreich

Der Begriff des ‚logischen Atomismus‘ erfährt seit einiger Zeit eine Renaissance im Rahmen der informationstheoretisch geprägten Quantenphysik. Das legt einen Vergleich der neuen Version mit dem ‚Original‘ (Russell/Wittgenstein) nahe. Es zeigt sich, dass die Grundannahmen der sogenannten ‚Urhypothese‘ – entwickelt durch C.F. v. Weizsäcker - nur sehr bedingt mit der Ontologie des Tractatus kommensurabel sind.

UTILIZING EXPERIENCES FROM KNOWLEDGEBAY FOR DIGITAL WITTGENSTEIN SCHOLARSHIP

Christian Eric Erbacher, Regensburg, Germany

Based on experiences from the internet project Knowledgebay, usage of new Information and Communication Technologies (ICT) to Wittgenstein scholarship is sketched. Two examples are addressed: Digital Documentation of lectures for teaching and Ontology Development for research. Aspects that might limit the successful implementation of ICT are considered in the third part of the paper.

HOW COULD HE TRY TO TRY TO WHISTLE IT?

Lemaire Francis Eric, Nancy, France

The aim of this paper is to introduce to a problem for the comprehension of the *Tractatus*. I will briefly present three facts. Then, from these facts, I will formulate the problem; and finally, we will briefly expose three ways of dealing with the problem. I will begin to explicit the way I want to follow to solve the problem. The three facts are the followings: 1) The *Tractatus* is an attempt to construct and apply a method of analysis of ordinary language in order to draw the limit between sensical and nonsensical propositions and to pass over silence what is nonsensical: the central point of this project is the distinction between showing and saying. 2) The analysis of ordinary language does not work and cannot work. 3) Even though the analysis of ordinary language is impossible, Wittgenstein applies the concept of nonsense to different areas such as mathematics, ethic, aesthetic, natural sciences, religion, and philosophy.

EAST-WEST PERSPECTIVES ON PRIVACY, ETHICAL PLURALISM AND GLOBAL INFORMATION ETHICS

Charles Ess, Springfield, Missouri, USA

Information and Communication Technologies (ICTs) are both primary drivers and facilitating technologies of globalization – and thereby, of exponentially expanding possibilities of cross-cultural encounters. As is well known, however, such encounters – especially when the discussion of potentially global ethical norms, such as those required for a global Information and Computer Ethics (ICE) is underway – always run the risk of devolving into more destructive rather than emancipatory events: first of all, as naïve ethnocentrism too easily issue in imperialisms that remake “the Other” in one’s own image, i.e., by eliminating the irreducible differences in norms and practices that define distinctive cultures. At the same time, however, these imperialisms may inspire a relativistic, especially postmodernist turn to the sheerly local, on the view that there are no meaningful commonalities or resonances to be shared beyond the boundaries of the local. Fruitful and effective cross-cultural communication – especially as focused on the issues of a global ICE – must thus steer between the two Manichean polarities of ethnocentric

imperialism and fragmenting relativism. This difficulty is not new with ICTs and ICE – but is complicated by the increasingly well-established fact that ICTs, most especially the Internet, embed and foster the cultural norms and communicative preferences of their Western roots. An emerging ICE, i.e., an ethics devoted precisely to the normative issues evoked by and surrounding ICTs – if it wants to avoid both overt and covert ethnocentric imperialism (the latter in the shape of endorsing ICTs that in turn foster specific cultural norms and practices), must hence be critically aware of how ICTs function in these ways, and what peoples and cultures may do to offset these embedded practices and norms as they take up ICTs for use within a given local setting.

In my remarks, I will first provide an overview of how current research on the cultural dimensions of ICTs contribute to a required critical self-awareness of our own norms, values, and practices as these are embedded in ICTs – specifically with regard to those norms and values (e.g., anonymity) that are pertinent to the dual concerns of avoiding ethnocentric imperialism and developing a global ICE. I will then turn to current discussion of practical issues in an emerging ICE – first of all, conceptions of privacy and efforts at data privacy protection in both Western and Eastern contexts. Using these examples from praxis, I will then highlight a series of possible guidelines and approaches to the sorts of cross-cultural dialogues required for an ICE that establishes middle grounds between imperialism and relativism: in addition to critical self-reflection, these would include, e.g., procedural and formalistic approaches to local definitions and understandings of central norms (such as “emancipation,” as developed in the theoretical work of Bernd Carsten Stahl and reinforced in Deborah Wheeler’s documentation of the emancipatory effects of ICTs for women in the Middle-East; Luciano Floridi’s notion of an information ontology that allows for diverse interpretations and applications across different cultures, and others – all from a forthcoming special issue of *Ethics and Information Technology*).

Finally, I will highlight a number of recent theoretical developments in especially East-West dialogues regarding ICE that may serve as promising bridges between cultures that will thereby sustain an ICE that avoids imperialism and relativism. These include, for example, Soraj Hongladarom’s synthesis of Thai Buddhism and Western virtue ethics in his work on positive protection of information privacy, as well as several other examples drawn from our forthcoming anthology, *Information Technology Ethics: Cultural Perspectives* (Idea Publishing, 2007).

Along the way, and as I will highlight by way of conclusion, I will argue that many of these specific issues and theoretical guidelines, approaches, and bridges across cultures can be understood in terms of an ethical pluralism, one that seeks precisely to establish a middle ground between ethnocentric imperialism and fragmenting relativism by understanding shared norms and values as allowing for diverse interpretations / applications / and understandings – specifically, as mediated through phronesis, ethical judgment – that thereby reflects and preserves the distinctive norms and values defining specific cultures. This ethical pluralism – including what comparative philosopher Rolf Elberfeld has described as a “resonance-ethics” [Resonanz-Ethik] – is at work not only in Western ethical traditions, beginning with Plato and Aristotle, but further in, e.g., Islamic, Confucian, and Buddhist traditions. Both at the levels of meta-theory and praxis (e.g., with regard to the issue of privacy), then, such ethical pluralism thus recommends itself as an important component of an emerging ICE.

A VIEW ON THE ICONIC TURN FROM A SEMIOTIC PERSPECTIVE

August Fenk, Klagenfurt, Austria

The “iconic” or “pictorial turn” pulled along by the “digital turn” was sometimes considered rather a re-turn to preliterate societies. But, actually, the respective picture material is embedded in a mix of materials of diverse sense-modalities and symbolic modalities. From a cognitive perspective such materials may be viewed as those modules of an almost inexhaustible “external memory system” that now can be retrieved, linked and extended by its users. Some facets become apparent in a semiotic analysis of these modules: They deprive us from many “indexical” cues that might otherwise allow to directly assign them to concrete agents and intentions, places and points of time. And if the term iconicity is reserved for cases of similarity established by a subject's simulating (picturing, imitating, modelling ...) activities (Fenk 1997), all “automatic recordings”, including the digital format, are non-iconic. Paradoxically, they are at best iconic in cases of artificial reworks or forgeries.

SANS PAPIER. OR: HOW CHANGE OUR DOCUMENTS (AND SOCIAL IDENTITY) IN THE DIGITAL AGE?

Maurizio Ferraris, Turin, Italy

In 2006, all the newspaper published a document, proving that Gunter Grass was soldier of Waffen-SS. A sort of purloined letter in the sense of Poe, or, so to speak, a Leave of Grass. But this kind of use of documents will be increasingly powerful and widespread when the paper disappears, and traces, records and inscriptions of every sort appear in the internet age, and can be found by Google. How can we manage documents in a world characterized by the explosion of writing?

The problems related to privacy, constantly increasing in advanced societies, are usually interpreted in the light of the recurrent image of a Big Brother, that is, a big watching eye, according to the model of Bentham's Panopticon. On one hand, it's surely true that things like infrared viewers are nowadays widespread as well as cameras that constantly survey every aspect of our lives, in banks, stations, supermarkets, offices and private buildings. On the other hand, however, the power of this big eye would be useless without a registration, which is exactly what transforms a vision in a document. No doubt, the recent debates about phone interceptions are just the tip of an iceberg: the question we are facing here is an important one for democracy, and a complete grasp of the category of *documentality* (the social inscription of our life in the digital age) is required in order to get a satisfactory answer to it.

A SUBJECTIVIST INTERPRETATION OF RELEVANT INFORMATION

Luciano Floridi, Oxford, United Kingdom / Bari, Italy

One of the complaints frequently vented about current theories of information is that they are utterly hopeless when it comes to establish the actual relevance of some specific piece of information. Most of the times, most of us are interested in knowing not so much whether something is an instance of information, but rather how much that something is relevant for our purposes.

Strictly speaking the complaint seems unfair. For no theory of information, from the purely syntactical to the most strongly semantic, is meant to cast any light on the phenomenon of relevance. Critics, however, have at least a sort of normative point. For they protest that such theories should care more about the relevance of what they model as information. If they do not, this is their problem and a reasonable explanation of why they can be largely disregarded when it comes to one's informative needs in real life. Starting from this general perspective, in this talk, I will

a) introduce the general debate on informational relevancy in a variety of context, from search engines and information retrieval to online advertising, from juridical procedures to everyday information processes, from medial diagnosis to scientific experiments;

b) argue that a general theory of relevant information may be provided by a counterfactual and metatheoretical analysis of the degree of relevance of (some information) i for an agent a as a function of the accuracy of i understood as an answer to a question q , given the probability that q might be asked by a . This analysis will uncover some intricate issues; and finally

c) show that a subjectivist interpretation of relevance as indicated in (b) can satisfactorily account for all the main applications and interpretations of the concept of relevant information that may be encountered in contexts such as those listed in (a).

WITTGENSTEIN AND TURING: READING, READING MACHINES, AND THE DIGITAL AGE

Juliet Floyd, Boston, Massachusetts, USA

The paper discusses the different sorts of reading skills that are, and are not, being inculcated in students of philosophy these days, and the problems this confronts us with in attempting to counsel them on what it is most important to learn in philosophy. I shall be talking about Wittgenstein's relation to Turing in order to investigate this topic.

I may touch on the tendency of institutions and individuals to resist the importance of judgment and context in the analysis of data, texts, web interfaces, and so on. And I shall also include a few words about how the Oxford CD Rom of Wittgenstein's correspondence and Nachlass has helped me in my research on Wittgenstein's attitude toward Goedel's and Turing's work.

ON ROSES, PI, AND UNDERSTANDING

Craig Fox, California, Pennsylvania, USA

The §§500s of the *Philosophical Investigations* are stylistically and thematically rich. In this paper I focus on two sections in particular, and I show their relation to questions about understanding, mathematical understanding, behaviorism, and meaning. Wittgenstein highlights important facts about when we're said to understand something, and he applies this to a mathematical case.

ANNIHILATION DER ZEIT IN DER INFORMATIONSGESELLSCHAFT?

Georg Friedrich, Graz, Österreich

Es soll erörtert werden inwieweit die in Diskussionen, Aufsätzen und anderen Beiträgen zum Informationszeitalter und zur Spätmoderne vorkommenden Diagnosen über Beschleunigung und Verzögerung der Zeit, über den Stillstands der Zeit, über das Verschwinden der Zukunft, etc. eine ontologische Grundlage und Rechtfertigung haben. Ich möchte zur Beantwortung dieser Frage einige Beurteilungskriterien nennen und näher betrachten, die mir dazu geeignet erscheinen, nämlich einerseits eine Entscheidung zu treffen und andererseits auch festzustellen was das Phänomen ist, das man Annihilation der Zeit nennen könnte. Mit diesem Begriff möchte ich gesammelt auf all diejenigen Phänomene Bezug nehmen, die in undifferenzierter Weise als Veränderungen der Zeit bzw. der Struktur der Zeit in der Spätmoderne identifiziert werden können. Meiner Einschätzung nach ergibt sich nach der Betrachtung der Kriterien jedoch, dass es im ontologischen Sinn weder gerechtfertigt noch sinnvoll ist von Annihilation der Zeit zu sprechen.

PHILOSOPHY RESOURCES AT THE UNIVERSITY OF VIENNA

Günther Friesinger / Herbert Hrachovec / Stefan Köstenbauer, Vienna, Austria

A research team on "Epistemology and Theory of Digital Media" at the Department of Philosophy, Vienna University (<http://foo.phl.univie.ac.at/fb03/>), has been developing a number of Web Resources to assist teaching and humanistic scholarship. There is an audio archive including streaming and podcasts (<http://audiothek.philo.at/>), a collection of open archive texts in philosophy (<http://sammelpunkt.philo.at/>) and a Wiki installation available to students and staff alike (<http://timaios.philo.at/wiki>). A portal lists innovative approaches to teaching at the faculty of "Philosophie und Bildungswissenschaft" (<http://innovation.philo.at/>) and students are encouraged to use the Web to present their MA and PhD work. Several eLearning platforms (Ilias, Moodle, ATutor) have been installed to encourage comparison and counterbalance the hierarchical approach favored by the University administration. The presentation will offer a guided tour through the material and comment upon the prospects of digitally enhanced philosophy.

GRAMMAR AND SILENCE

Newton Garver, Buffalo, New York, USA

Silence was heralded, if that is not too noisy a word, at the end of Wittgenstein's *Tractatus*, and Wittgenstein himself then retreated from the philosophical scene, acting out the silence that he advocated. But the silence was neither total nor everlasting. He returned to philosophical discussion in 1928, and subsequently in both his doctrine and his practice he allowed grammar (making grammatical remarks) to replace silence.

I will argue that the change is not so great as it might seem, since the Tractarian silence applies only to substantive truth-claims and a grammarian is still debarred from making those.

FLOSSOPHY: FREE/LIBRE/OPEN SOURCE SOFTWARE AND THE PRINCIPLES OF FREE KNOWLEDGE SHARING

Rishab Aiyer Ghosh, Maastricht, The Netherlands

Free software, also called Libre or Open source software, is considered by many to be a novelty and the open source movement either a quirky hobby or a paradigm shift in industry. Yet the collaborative creation of knowledge has gone on for as long as humans have been able to communicate. Ghosh looks at the collaborative model of creativity -- with examples ranging from collective ownership in indigenous societies to free software, academic science, and the human genome project -- and finds it an alternative to proprietary frameworks for creativity based on strong intellectual property rights.

Intellectual property rights, Ghosh argues, were ostensibly developed to increase creativity; but today, "IPR" has become a rigid maximalist dogma and policy decisions that treat knowledge and art as if they were physical forms of property actually threaten to decrease creativity, limit public access to creativity, and discourage collaborative creativity. Free software reminds us of another philosophy to knowledge creation, which has in fact been the predominant model throughout human history, and is now being rediscovered in diverse fields.

INTERNET AND THE FLOW OF KNOWLEDGE: WHICH ETHICAL CHALLENGES WILL WE FACE?

Niels Gottschalk-Mazouz, Stuttgart, Germany

The classic philosophical definition of knowledge does not address important features of the kind of knowledge that is central in so-called knowledge societies, or so I will argue. I will therefore propose a different characterisation of such knowledge by combining and interpreting typical features of knowledge that have been expressed in a range of proposals to redefine knowledge from the perspective of sociology, economics, psychology & information science. On this basis, I will then discuss the question: which kind of knowledge is provided through the internet? I will characterise it as representative and consisting of chunks of "knowledge candidates", because it has to be

recognised as knowledge on an individual basis as institutional recognition mechanisms are mostly absent.

I will then discuss how this might change with Web2.0, i.e. socially generated knowledge, and with other recent or planned innovations, like the Semantic Web or Ubiquitous Computing. With respect to the flow of knowledge and to the types of knowledge that constitute this flow, I will argue that these innovations might interact in a way that intensifies the propagation of candidates of what is traditionally referred to as know-how, but in this case embodied in machines. If this prospect is plausible, then further political and ethical struggles should focus more on the control over the actual functioning of such machines than on legal issues: It will be on what you can (or cannot) do, not on what you are allowed to do. I will briefly sketch the main challenges within these struggles.

OPEN SOURCE PHILOSOPHY

Stefan Gradmann, Hamburg, Germany

Both constituents of the term 'Open Access' are of equal and vital importance for innovative scholarship to work effectively in a networked digital setting. 'Access' in such a context implies much more than just being able to freely read scholarly sources: the freedom to process and reaggregate such sources must also be part of such a setting (while fully respecting source authenticity and integrity). 'Open', as well, has at least three distinct connotations here: (1) absence of economic and legal barriers for access on the WWW, (2) availability of scholarly sources in open, transparent and non proprietary formats, (3) the processing methods to be used for processing sources should themselves be implemented as open source software.

The presentation will explore all three aspects of 'openness' but will put particular stress on the issue of open document formats and models as well as on the reasons for open source based approaches being appropriate for effective scholarly work in the e-humanities. Economic considerations as well as the need to retain control of processing methods are considered in this context together with the implicate responsibilities such a strategy creates for an open source based community of scholarship in philosophy.

MEDIEN & BILDUNG

Marek Graszewicz / Dominik Lewiński, Wrocław, Polen

Die vorliegende Rede betrifft die gegenseitigen Verhältnisse zwischen zwei funktionalen Kommunikationssystemen. Theoretische Perspektive, die wir annehmen, ist ein operationeller Konstruktivismus. Wir werden uns nur zum polnischen Bildungssystem und zum polnischen Mediensystem äußern, obwohl wir davon überzeugt sind, dass die von uns beschriebenen Kommunikationsprozesse sich auch auf die anderen nationalen Bildungssysteme beziehen. Verhältnisse zwischen Medien und Bildung werden von uns im Rahmen der Hypothese der funktionalen Äquivalenz konzeptualisiert. Wir haben nämlich mit den zeitlich zusammenfallenden Prozessen zu tun: mit der steigenden Dynamik des Mediensystems und mit der sich verringernenden Dynamik des Bildungssystems.

Es kommt sowohl in den Medien als auch in der Schule zu einer Wirklichkeitskonstruktion, deshalb nehmen diese zwei Systeme an dem System der Kommunikationssozialisierung teil. Man kann eine gut begründete Hypothese aufstellen, dass in den gegenwärtigen Gesellschaften die Schule durch die Medien ersetzt werden kann. Das, was in den Sozialisierungsprozessen von der Schule erreicht wird, lässt sich auch mit Hilfe von Medien erreichen. Wir sollten uns von den Bemühungen der Schule, Systemumgebung durch eine Verlängerung der Bildungszeit auszubreiten, nicht täuschen lassen. Diese Bemühungen sind keine Expansionsausdrücke (Ausdrücke von Expansion), sondern ein sich mit der Strukturwandlung äußerndes Versuchen, auf den Rückgang der sozialen Relevanz der Schule als eines Ortes der Erkenntnis einer konstruierten Wirklichkeit und der Sozialisierung, zu reagieren. Die Schule hat aufgrund der Rechtskraft und der Geldkraft einen ständigen Zugang zur Systemumgebung, da es eine allgemeine Schulpflicht gibt.

INTERNET AS A MEDIUM

Maurycy Adam Graszewicz, Wrocław, Poland

The analysis of internet as a medium itself is based on the constructivist theory of communication. Specificity of Internet as a medium includes among others such concepts as cyberspace or virtual reality and finally not fully understood influence on a social system. Also from the system point of view the Internet as well as other mass media is a subsystem and a superstructure for natural communication not aimed at naively understood information disseminating but it is a platform and a system "plot" for establishing and passing communication offers. In this paper I briefly try to describe specific nature of new ways of communication offered by Internet and to answer the question: does the Internet build societies?

ON THE VERY IDEA OF AN INFORMATION SOCIETY

Hajo Greif, Graz, Austria

In this essay, a notion of the "information society" is proposed that is based on naturalist theories of information (Dretske, Millikan). On the premises that information of all kinds is an objective affair, and that all kinds of information are continuous with natural information, and on the observation that, as organisms evolve into more complex forms with more complex relations to their environments, the environmental conditions relevant to their persistence increasingly include information and information-related artefacts with which and upon which to act, it is argued that an information society is a society in which technologically processed information is the main topic and resource of social action and interaction.

LANGUAGE GAMES AND SERIOUS MATTERS: CULTURAL PLURALISM, RELATIVISM AND RITUALS IN THE MEDIA

Ora Gruengard, Ramat-Gan, Israel

Wittgenstein's claims with regard to the variety of "language-games" and the differences among them are not claims about the plurality of cultures, but rather about the plurality of "forms of life" within the culture that he shared with his audience, and the similarity of the latter, in that respect, to other cultures. That approach is relevant to the criticism of "language games". An analysis of the difference that Wittgenstein himself made between "language games", "grammatical jokes" and "mythologies" enables a criticism of the current "grammatical grotesques" in the media, internet and the cultural-relativist rituals that are currently in vogue.

ORNAMENTALITY: A NEW PUZZLE FOR THE NEW MEDIA

Eran Guter, Emek Yezreel, Israel

Ornamentality is pervasive in the new media and it is related to their essential characteristics: dispersal, hypertextuality, interactivity, digitality and virtuality. I utilize Kendall Walton's theory of ornamentality in order to construe a puzzle pertaining to the new media: the ornamental erosion of information. I argue that insofar as we use the new media as conduits of real life, the excessive density of ornamental devices prevalent in certain new media environments, forces us to conduct our inquiries under conditions of neustic uncertainty, that is, uncertainty concerning the kind of relationship we, the users, have to the propositional content mediated. I suggest that this puzzle calls upon us to consider what would be a viable logic of virtual discovery.

WELTKOMMUNIKATION UND WORLD BRAIN

Frank Hartmann, Erfurt, Deutschland

Zu den herausragenden mentalen Effekten der bereits Mitte des 19. Jahrhunderts einsetzenden Globalisierung zählt die Tatsache, dass Unwahrscheinlichkeiten wie die Telekommunikation den in Termini des Transports bestimmten Raum neu definieren. Das Netz der Telegraphenkommunikation wird an jenen Punkten geknüpft, die in merkantiler Hinsicht am interessantesten sind. An solchen Knotenpunkten hängen auch heute noch die Datenströme der modernen Lebensform, an ihnen wurde verkehrs- und nachrichtentechnisch »eine Welt geknüpft und zusammengezogen, die es vorher nicht gegeben hatte.« (Karl Schlögel)

Um welche Infrastruktur handelte es sich dabei? Diese Frage wurde überraschenderweise auch philosophisch gestellt. Die neuen Technologien konnten nicht mehr in der Begrifflichkeit der Werkzeug-Technik gefaßt werden. So taucht im frühen Mediendiskurs – avant la lettre – die Idee der Organprojektion auf, und eine neue Philosophie der Technik widmet sich den kognitiven Implikationen der neueren Entwicklungen, deren Tenor bereits erstaunlich

dem des Theorie-Begleitdiskurses zum Internet gleicht. Mit Ernst Kapp untersucht der Vortrag den exzentrischen Vertreter einer neuen Philosophie der Technik, deren Motive auf Medieneffekte gerichtet waren, wie sie in der akademischen Philosophie bis vor kurzem noch systematisch unterschlagen wurden.

Lit.: Frank Hartmann: Globale Medienkultur. Technik, Geschichte, Theorien. Wien 2006

PLAYING JUST, JUST CAUSE: THE INTERNET AS ACE IN THE LANGUAGE GAME OF REGIME CHANGE

Cynthia Haynes, Clemson, South Carolina, USA

On April 11, 2003, just weeks after the U.S. invasion of Iraq, the military announced it had created a deck of playing cards for the troops to identify the most-wanted members of Saddam Hussein's government (Wikipedia). Within hours of the announcement, some enterprising individuals discovered images of the cards on a Defense Department server and began producing them for sale on eBay. This phenomenon serves as a 'relay' in a series of moves emanating from the following nexus: Wittgenstein, Lyotard, 'language games,' internet, regime change, computer games, and 'just gaming.'

In On Certainty, Wittgenstein writes: "Certainty is as it were a tone of voice in which one declares how things are, but one does not infer from the tone of voice that one is justified" (6e). Codenamed Operation Just Cause, the U.S. invasion of Panama, initiated by President George H.W. Bush, set the tone for the next President Bush to invade Iraq, each bent on regime change as part of their so-called 'liberation theology.' Wittgenstein understood, according to Jean-François Lyotard (in his Just Gaming), "that doing justice in a field of language games consists of resisting the pretensions of certain language games to provide the rules for other games, to become metalanguages. Thus in each language game we must try to judge without importing criteria from other games. . . . [the language game] demands an indeterminate judgment, without criteria, on a case-by-case basis" (Readings 107). The aim of this lecture is to situate the dissemination of 'just cause' logic in the language game of 'playing just' and to then locate the dissemination of such logic within information politics, whereby the practice of regime change (often fueled by a campaign of disinformation, such as the Iraq playing cards) is enabled by the internet.

NICHTSEIN UND GRENZE BEI WITTGENSTEIN

Włodzimierz Heflik, Krakau, Polen

Dieser Vortrag hat es zum Ziel, eine Analyse und einen Vergleich der Nichtseins-Konzeptionen bei Kant und Wittgenstein unter Berücksichtigung des Streits zwischen Platon und Parmenides durchzuführen. In der kantischen Philosophie wurden die Begriffe des Nichtseins und der Grenze in der subjektiven Perspektive dargestellt, die von dem endlichen menschlichen Intellekt bestimmt wird. Am Anfang wird hier auf die von Kant in der Kritik der reinen Vernunft dargestellten „Tafel der Einteilung des Begriffs von Nichts“ ausführlich eingegangen. Besonders interessant

erscheint in dieser Hinsicht der Begriff des Nichtseins als transzendentaler Gegenstand, der die Grenze der Erfahrung bedeutet. Wittgenstein führt dagegen seine transzendentalen Untersuchungen des Nichtseins mit Berücksichtigung der prinzipiellen Rolle der Sprache und Logik an, was man hier, W. Stegmüller zufolge, als „eine Transformation der Transzendental-Philosophie“ nennen kann. Dadurch kann die Problematik des Nichtseins im (1) ontischen, (2) logischen und (3) semantischen Aspekt dargestellt werden. Im ersten Aspekt wird Nichtsein als leerer Ort im logischen Raum behandelt, im zweiten als Negation mit Wirkungs-Charakter. Im dritten Aspekt besteht das Nichtsein in dem Mangel einer objektiven Referenz des Ausdrucks und gilt als Widerspruch oder Unsinn.

LEBENSFORM, REFERENCE, AND THE LANGUAGE OF AVATARS

Michael Heim, Long Beach, California, USA

The Internet has expanded the communications environment. We now expect graphics, animation, or hypertext references in our communications. These active features express a dimension of our language form that revives questions of reference, identity, and substantiality. One synecdoche to encapsulate these issues is the graphic avatar. A consideration of the avatar can focus the issues for further discussion and reflection.

SYNERGETIC INFORMATION SOCIETY: FROM ANALOGUE TO DIGITAL MIND

Marek Hetmanski, Lublin, Poland

The paper presents the model of the synergetic effects that occur in the information society. It starts with a distinction between information: (1) as a content of messages and (2) a measure of an individual's or group's ability and willingness to make decisions or solve some problems. Furthermore, there is an analysis of particular mechanisms and places in the infostructure of information societies (so-called open systems) where information increases locally in spite of the global information overload or dispersion. Synergetics is presented as the model of important local and non-linear mechanisms, strengthening as well as intensifying information (increasing negentropy), that are achievable in spite of global information overload and dispersion. These occur in such information society organizations and institutions as the internet, mass communication, multimedia (hyper-text) culture etc., however, many of them display highly entropic effects. In order to avoid the side-effects and achieve the synergetic improvement of the information society, individual (or group) cognitive abilities must be supported not only by the technology but many institutions as well.

REASONABLE AND FACTIVE ENTITLEMENTS

Jih-Ching Ho, Taipei, Taiwan

One major concern in Wittgenstein's *On Certainty* is the notion of "factive states," the mental states whose existence implies the obtaining of relevant facts. Factive states have often been considered in contrast with "appearances," the basic cognitive states insinuated by the well-known "argument from illusion." The aim of this paper is to elucidate the normative aspects of both factive states and appearances. I will make use of an analogy from practical reason to show that, in regard of epistemological entitlement, factive states have explanatory priority over appearance.

MEDIENPHILOSOPHIE UND BILDUNGSPHILOSOPHIE – SCHNITTSTELLENERKUNDUNGEN

Theo Hug, Innsbruck, Österreich

Anders als das Verhältnis von Bildungsphilosophie und Bildungsforschung ist jenes von Medien- und Bildungsphilosophie bislang weitgehend ein Desiderat geblieben. Das ist insofern erstaunlich, als in den letzten Jahren sowohl in der Medienphilosophie als auch in der Bildungsphilosophie der optionale Bereichscharakter der Medien in Frage gestellt worden ist. Dies kommt einerseits in der Rede von der „medialen Wende“ zum Ausdruck, die auf einer meta-theoretischen Ebene eine Alternative und Ergänzung der etablierten Paradigmen meint und die sich in Analogie zu bekannten Fokussierungen auf Sprache (linguistic turn), Kognition (cognitive turn), Zeichen (semiotic turn) oder Bilder (pictorial turn, iconic turn) durch eine Konzentration auf Medien, Medialität und Medialisierung auszeichnet. Auf einer empirischen Ebene wird die Bedeutung der Medien für Prozesse der Kommunikation, des Wissensaufbaus und der Wirklichkeitskonstruktion hervorgehoben. Der Ausdruck „Medialisierung der Lebenswelten“ beinhaltet gewissermaßen beide Aspekte: Die erfahrbare Alltagswelt und Beobachtungen der „Mediendurchdringung“ sowie die Unhintergebarkeit medialisierter Welten und deren Funktion als Ausgangspunkte für unsere Erkenntnisbestrebungen.

Andererseits werden in der Bildungsphilosophie Fragen nach der Bedeutung der Medien in Bildungsprozessen und nach dem Stellenwert von Medienbildung zunehmend relevant.

Ausgehend von der Rekonstruktion unterschiedlicher Versionen und Konzeptionen der „medialen Wende“ werden im Vortrag einige Schnittstellen neuerer bildungs- und medienphilosophischer Diskursstränge erkundet.

TEXT TECHNOLOGY AND PHILOSOPHY

Claus Huitfeldt, Bergen, Norway

It is a commonly held view that our concept of text is shaped at least in part by technologies involved in creating, distributing, storing and presenting documents. It is also commonly recognized that for many purposes it is important to be able to distinguish between the representation of documents and the interpretation of texts. But it has proved hard to agree on specific or precise accounts of exactly how and to what extent technology takes part in the shaping of our concept of text, what to make of the implicit distinction between documents and texts, and how to understand the relationship between representation and interpretation.

In this paper, it will be claimed that recent developments in text technology may be brought to bear on these issues in ways which may help us provide new answers to seemingly old questions.

FROM NETOCRACY TO NETWORK-SHAPED THINKING

Philip Jones, Brasilia, Brazil

In their book "Netocracy" (Bard 2002) Alexander Bard and Jan Söderqvist look forward to a post-capitalist economic system where the ruling class is composed of those whose primary activity is the manipulation and trading of "links" (understood as both social connections and access to information sources) rather than the buying and selling of property. This attempt to work out the consequences of a genuine link-based economy distinguishes their work from similar theories of the information society.

In this paper, I explain some of the netocratic theory and attempt to follow a lead indicated by the authors which claims that the concept of "knowledge" itself will change under netocracy. I argue that knowledge is becoming increasingly "network shaped" in that position of participants within the network is becoming a significant consideration while the netocrat's need to maintain the connections begins to outweigh considerations of the value of individual beliefs.

DIE HELSINKI-EDITION DER PHILOSOPHISCHEN UNTERSUCHUNGEN

Peter Keicher, Karlsruhe, Deutschland

Die von Georg Henrik von Wright und Heikki Nyman herausgegebene *Helsinki-Edition* erschien 2001 in neuer Bearbeitung von Joachim Schulte als *Kritisch-Genetische Edition der Philosophischen Untersuchungen* im Frankfurter Suhrkamp-Verlag. Die ursprüngliche *Helsinki-Edition* wurde nicht veröffentlicht, sondern von den „Herausgebern“ nur wenigen Bibliotheken und Forschungseinrichtungen zur Verfügung gestellt. Um dem Leser einen Vergleich mit der veröffentlichten *Kritisch-Genetischen Edition* zu ermöglichen, werden in diesem Beitrag die fünf Teile der *Helsinki-Edition* mit Inhaltsangaben der Einzelbände aufgeführt. Bei der Beschreibung werden vor allem die terminologischen Kennzeichnungen der Typoskripte berücksichtigt.

WITTGENSTEIN AND 'THE DIGITAL CONDITION'

Peter Keicher, Karlsruhe, Germany

In diesem Beitrag sollen Lyotards Hauptthesen und Bezugnahmen auf Wittgenstein in "La Condition Postmoderne" um zusätzliche Aspekte der Philosophie Wittgensteins ergänzt und im Hinblick auf zeitgenössische Informationstechnologien neu interpretiert werden.

IS THERE A SECOND MORAL LIFE?

Peter P. Kirschenmann, Amsterdam, The Netherlands

Computer technology and software have made possible exciting virtual worlds like Second Life (SL). In SL, one can have sex with animals or minors. Is that just disgusting or morally objectionable? There are many other kinds of misdemeanors and offences which seem to be tolerated more than in our first world (FW). Commentators have said that in SL "moral norms are significantly reduced". I examine this view, mainly in a comparative way, under the headings of fantasies, games and hurt feelings, anonymity, SL community standards, and commercialism. I conclude that, with a few exceptions, one cannot say our FW norms themselves are relaxed in SL. Appraisal, moral or otherwise, of activities in SL, of course, is complicated by their variegated relationships to the users, degrees of emotional involvement, and other peculiar kinds of relations to FW.

UNDERSTANDING KNOWLEDGE SOCIETY

Endre Kiss, Budapest, Hungary

When making a theory of knowledge society, really definitive science-sociological (wissenssoziologisch) problems are not of a principal, but of a pragmatic kind. These follow mainly from the holistic nature of the issue, which nature is not reductive or one-dimensional holism, but holism and a kind of unity which steps forward from an integration of the infinite richness and complexity of 'reality', history, present, economy, society. As the theory of knowledge society is a positive theory, this theory – even as a theory – is principally not allowed to overwrite the validity (Gültigkeit) of any actual function, or of any real-causal series. Yet its goal is a comprehensive, holistic theory-making, which also has a valid (gültig) objective and causal reference to the actual operation of these functions, 'actors', and causal series always leading to one whole causality.

TOWARDS FUTURE DIGITAL SCHOLARSHIP

Dieter Köhler, Karlsruhe, Germany

Analytic philosophy has often been characterized as treating philosophical problems as problems of adequate or inadequate language use. However, such analysis -- even in Ordinary Language Philosophy -- is typically based

on idealized conceptual schemes that have been divested of how the complexity of natural language usage is conveyed by media. In contrast, I argue that we must not neglect the influence media has on the way we deal with philosophical issues. If considering philosophical problems as language problems is a fruitful strategy, then dealing with them may involve not only developing better conceptual systems, but also better means of communication, discussion and description. In other words: Our means of communication and their contents are to some degree interdependent.

In this respect, recent innovations in net-based digital communication pose a challenge, to philosophy in particular and the humanities in general: They must not be passive consumers of new technologies, but instead participate more actively in developing applications that match their scholarly research agendas. One of the most important implications of this line of thought is the need within humanities institutions to establish additional sections dedicated to information technologies.

OLD PATTERNS, NEW BEWITCHMENTS

Zsuzsanna Kondor, Budapest, Hungary

Recent inventions in communications technology have given rise to several changes in the framework of everyday activities. These changes herald an imminent transformation in the institutional framework, too. In the present paper, I'd like to focus on the conceptual background of some obstacles which slow this transformation down. M-learning, a recent and growing research field, provides a good example of the decisive influence of old patterns while at the same time it emphasizes the possibilities opened up by new communications technology. This perspective offers a good opportunity to connect philosophical considerations, especially Wittgenstein's, to practical issues, and it also facilitates seeing Wittgenstein's efforts as a criticism of these hindering patterns. Some of Wittgenstein's more opaque objections can today be better understood in the light of recent cognitive science.

FORMS OF LIFE AS FORMS OF CULTURE

Kristijan Krkač / Josip Lukin, Zagreb, Croatia

In this paper the authors discuss Wittgenstein's form/s of life as forms of culture. In the first part they summarize and explicate major directions in the current investigation regarding the topic, and in the second part they explicate and defend forms of life as forms of culture or so called cultural account of forms of life. This position is compatible with weaker language game accounts, but incompatible with pure biological and behavioral accounts. In conclusion, the authors discuss the possibility of ontology of culture as ontology of forms of life.

MEDIENPHILOSOPHIE ALS ETHISCHES PROJEKT? VILÉM FLUSSERS WITTGENSTEIN

Matthias Kroß, Potsdam, Deutschland

Der Medienphilosoph Vilém Flusser (1920–1991) gilt als einer der wichtigsten und meistdiskutierten Begründer der heutigen Medienphilosophie. Bekannt ist Flusser in wissenschaftlichen Kreisen vor allem für sein holistisches Konzept der Medienevolution und seine Theorie einer null-dimensionalen „telematischen Gesellschaft“ des „Posthistoire“. Weniger bekannt ist der große Anteil Wittgensteins an der Ausarbeitung dieser Philosophie. Dies dürfte vor allem daran an dem Umstand liegen, dass der tschechische Staatsbürger Flusser 1938 emigrieren musste und wesentliche Bestandteile seines Ansatzes in Brasilien, wo er vom Beginn der vierziger Jahre bis Ende der sechziger Jahre lebte, und d.h. in portugiesischer Sprache formulierte. Wittgensteins Denken spielt namentlich in dem bis heute nicht auf deutsch zugänglichen *Língua e Realidad* (1963, 2004) eine herausragende Rolle.

Im Vortrag soll der prägende Einfluss Wittgensteins auf Flusser am Beispiel einiger seiner Hauptschriften, aber auch unter Berücksichtigung einiger bisher praktisch unbeachtet gebliebener, wenn auch höchst bedeutsamer kleinerer Schriften herausgearbeitet werden. Das Material gibt Anlass zu der These, dass Flusser Wittgenstein programmatisch „gegen den Strich“ liest, um ihn vor allem als Medienethiker fruchtbar zu machen. Diese Lesweise, so die These des Vortrags, vermag, auch wenn sie zu einem nicht unerheblichen Teil in einem „misreading“ Wittgensteins besteht, durchaus zur Bewahrung von dessen Legat und zu dessen Aktualität in der philosophischen Diskussion beizutragen.

WITTGENSTEIN REGISTRIEREN

Wilhelm Krüger, Bergen, Norwegen

In dieser Arbeit soll zur Diskussion gestellt werden, ob es vor dem Hintergrund der Recherchemöglichkeiten, die die "Bergen Electronic Edition" (BEE) für den Wittgensteinschen Nachlass zur Verfügung stellt, sinnvoll ist, eine Art inhaltsbezogenes Sachregister zur weiteren Erschließung und Vernetzung der Wittgensteinschen Texte zu erstellen. Nach einigen einführenden Bemerkungen über Register werden dazu die Suchmöglichkeiten erläutert, die bereits heute innerhalb der BEE bestehen, und hernach auf eine im Rahmen des Discoveryprojektes am Wittgenstein Archiv der Universität Bergen geplante Erweiterung dieses Werkzeuges eingegangen.

WITTGENSTEIN'S PROGRAMME OF A NEW LOGIC

Timm Lampert, Pittsburgh, USA

The young Wittgenstein called his conception of logic "New Logic" and opposed it to the "Old Logic", i.e. Frege's and Russell's systems of logic. In this paper the basic objects of Wittgenstein's conception of a New Logic are outlined in contrast to classical logic. The detailed elaboration of Wittgenstein's conception depends on the realization of his ab-notation for first order logic.

THE EROSION OF CERTAINTY

Silvia Lanzetta, Sydney, Australia

This paper gives an account of the eroding action operated by Wittgenstein on the concept of 'certainty'. Wittgenstein's difficulties in totally refusing Moore's 'common-sense' certainty and in leaving the Tractarian reminiscences behind engender ambiguities in his discourse. Yet, all the dichotomies that seem to stem from Wittgenstein's opposition between scientific certainty and certainty as unquestionable sureness will prove, in the end, only apparent. The certainty of *Über Gewissheit* is polymorph, and the title that Wittgenstein's executors gave to the collection of his last notes is ineluctably poly-sense.

CLOUDS, CONVERSATIONS, ENONCÉS. SKYWRITING AND TEXTING IN THE EMERGING READ/WRITE WEB.

Martin Lindner, Vienna, Austria

Since Stephen Harnad has coined the term "skywriting" in 1990 for the new experiences and practices of writing (and reading) brought on by e-mail and mailing lists, a lot of fundamental changes have transformed the experience of writing (and reading) on networked computers. Still the Web can be conceived as a "docuverse" (Ted Nelson, Hartmut Winkler), because in the first place it still is, and will be, made of letters and words on two-dimensional screens. All kinds of "multimedia" in the World Wide Web are embedded in unprecedented quantities of written text. And it seems that this is not an evolutionary disadvantage like one would have guessed in the era of audiovisual media.

Indeed, in the "Web 2.0" context, photos, audio and video clips have lately themselves adopted some characteristics of "textuality", being arranged in loose and easily re-arrangeable syntagmatic and paradigmatic structures, heavily "tagged" with metadata, like on Flickr, YouTube or Slideshare.

At the same time, the written texts further continue to be affected by the impact of "Secondary Orality" Walter Ong had analyzed for the media environment of the late 20th century, but in new and different ways. In blogs, in SMS, and in "microblogging" applications like Jaiku and Twitter, text becomes volatile, in fact going beyond the mere adaption of "oral" characteristics, but creating new forms that cannot anymore be described and analyzed in the traditional dichotomy of literacy/orality.

In the Web 2.0 environment, text seems to become, in a quite natural way, all the things that Barthes and Foucault had conjured in their notoriously elitist writings. The death of the author, the anonymous murmur, the cloud-like, dynamic structure of knowledge, the paradoxical characteristics of the "enoncé" (Foucault's notion of a 'statement-event') ... all these can be found as fundaments of the "Web 2.0", which has also been called the Read/Write Web.

How far, and how deep, these structural similarities go remains to be discussed.

WITTGENSTEIN AND LOGICAL ANALYSIS

Montgomery Link, Boston, Massachusetts, USA

The early Wittgenstein is widely held to be a logical atomist. Sometimes this view is distinguished from the view that the early Wittgenstein was a logicist. Since the minimal case for logicism is that elementary arithmetic is part of logic, I point out that a logical atomist will agree to the view that Wittgenstein is a minimal case logicist. I then argue that Wittgenstein is not a logicist, even in the minimal case.

A DIGITAL TURN IN PHILOSOPHY AND WITTGENSTEIN ABOUT "IS"

Vladimir Olegovich Lobovikov, Yekaterinburg, Russia

Wittgenstein's remarks about the set of logically different meanings of the word-homonym "is" are very important for adequate understanding a process starting with the philosophy of the digital turn and resulting in a digital turn in philosophy. By the digital turn in philosophy I mean the turn to digital philosophizing. What does the term "digital philosophizing" mean? Below I attempt to clarify the meaning of this term and to show its necessary connection with Wittgenstein's considerations about "is". Initially the turn to digital philosophizing appeared in logic. It resulted in the computer culture of our days. Now this culture is going to make the sphere of digital philosophizing more wide: not reduced to logic only. It is relevant to talk about a digital formal ethics, a digital metaphysics, etc. Wittgenstein was one of those analytical philosophers who worked in this prospective direction.

LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN AND LUDWIK FLECK ON THE RÔLE OF POPULAR SCIENCE

Winfried Löffler, Innsbruck, Austria

To the present day, writing popular science texts has an ambiguous reputation. On the one hand, a wide audience and a high number of sold copies is sometimes an object of admiration and even envy, on the other hand, popularizing science is still viewed as somewhat unserious or even despicable by many authors (Wittgenstein in *Culture and Value*, by the way, was clearly among these despisers). Frequent among both positions, however, is an

underrating of the function of pop science: the origin of pop science is often seen as a unidirectional process from "hard science" down to its popular, journalistic dilutions, and pop science seems to have no other function than a sort of innocent infotainment for the laymen. The current debates e.g. around neuroscience and freedom or a round the impact of genome research my remind us of a different picture: not only what a wide audience, but also what scientists of other disciplines, science politicians etc. take for granted and consider worth of financial supply, rests to a good deal on the impression from pop science.

Presumably the first author who took these mechanisms in focus was the epidemiologist and philosopher of science Ludwik Fleck (1897-1961), one of the authors mentioned by Thomas Kuhn in the preface to his *Structure of Scientific Revolutions* and presumably his most important source of ideas on "paradigms" and "normal science". According to Fleck, e.g. the impression of a scientific world-picture with its robustness, clarity and simplicity emerges only in pop science, where all the methodologic caveats and constraints of "research-article science" have disappeared. In my paper, I will trace Fleck's ideas on that issue from his early articles via his 1935 book *Genesis and Development of a Scientific Fact* to his later works. As an introduction - and partly as a contrast to Fleck - I will try to bring Wittgenstein's occasional remarks on popular science into a coherent picture.

WIKIWEBS FÜR KOMMUNIKATIONSPROZESSE

**Michael Luger / Andrea Adelsburg / Daniel Kuby /
Daniel Schmid, Wien, Österreich**

Durch Erfahrungen im Einsatz von Wikiwebs für philosophische Projektarbeiten ergab sich Bedarf nach Dokumentation, Reflexion und Weiterentwicklung von angesammeltem Know-how zu ihrer Strukturierung und Organisation. Damit soll u.a. dem unreflektierten Übernehmen von Strukturen und Konzepten anderer Software oder Wiki-Verwendungsweisen bzw. Einsatz-situationen entgegengewirkt werden. Im Speziellen sind Strategien, die sich im Rahmen der Wikipedia bewährt haben, nur bedingt für im Gegensatz dazu mehr kommunikationsorientierte Projektarbeiten geeignet. Um solche Verwendungsweisen besser unterstützen zu können, wurden Wikiwebs technisch erweitert. Damit stehen einige Strukturierungsfeatures, wie sie z.T. in anderer Web-Software (z.B. in Forensystemen) vorhanden sind, auch in Wikiwebs zur Verfügung. Um die strukturelle Flexibilität von Wikiwebs zu erhalten, wurden die Erweiterungen so realisiert, dass sie diese Strukturen ermöglichen statt sie vorzugeben. Die Resultate sollten über philosophische Projektarbeit hinaus für ähnlich strukturierte Anwendungssituationen brauchbar sein. Dieses Paper versucht einen Überblick über die Zwischenergebnisse dieser Versuche zu geben.

PSYCHOANALYSE DER GRAMMATISCHEN MIßDEUTUNGEN: ÜBER DIE BEZIEHUNG LUDWIG WITTGENSTEINS ZUM WERK SIGMUND FREUDS

Stefan Majetschak, Kassel, Deutschland

Wittgensteins Verhältnis zum Werk Sigmund Freuds, das sich in Bemerkungen niederschlägt, die zwischen bewundernder Aufnahme und heftiger Ablehnung Freudscher Gedanken changieren, läßt sich nur als ambivalent bezeichnen. Seine kritische Sicht auf Freud ist in der Forschung bereits häufiger ein Gegenstand der Untersuchung gewesen. Weit weniger beachtet wurde jedoch, inwiefern Wittgenstein durchaus auch in positiver Weise an Freud anknüpfen zu können meinte. Wie der Vortrag herauszuarbeiten versucht wird, besteht Wittgensteins positive Anknüpfung an Freud mindestens während der dreißiger Jahre darin, daß er sein Verständnis von philosophischer Therapie geradezu am Modell einiger behandlungstechnischer Grundideen der Psychoanalyse orientierte. Der Vortrag, der nachzuweisen sich bemüht, in welchen Hinsichten dies der Fall ist, gelangt dabei zu dem abschließenden Befund, daß Freuds Psychoanalyse in der mittleren Periode insbesondere methodologische Überlegungen Wittgensteins inspirierte.

FAREWELL TO THE RESOLUTE READING OF THE *TRACTATUS*?

Tuomas William Manninen, Iowa City, Iowa, USA

"A main cause of philosophical disease – a one-sided diet: one nourishes one's thinking with only one kind of example". Sadly, this quote from *Philosophical Investigations* aptly characterizes the state of the *Tractatus*-interpretations. Despite Wittgenstein's acknowledging his debt to Frege's and Russell's works, virtually all the attempts of explicating the relationship between Frege, Russell, and Wittgenstein are partisan. Either Frege is exalted as the main source for the ideas in the *Tractatus* and Russell is marginalized, or vice versa. Two recent interpretations, one, Landini's, focusing on Russell and the other, Conant's, on Frege shed new light on the *Tractatus*, yet they, too, remain partisan. However, textual evidence supports the adoption of bipartisan approach, acknowledging both Frege's and Russell's influence (even if to a different extent). I will delineate a bipartisan interpretation of the *Tractatus*, and conclude by showing how these bipartisan considerations provide a decisive argument against the resolute reading.

GÜNTHER ANDERS UND DER ICONIC TURN

Reinhard Margreiter, Berlin, Deutschland

Von der primären Oralität abgesehen, ist das Bildmedium historisch das älteste Medium, älter als alle Ton- und Schriftmedien. Doch die Rede vom Iconic Turn (oder Pictorial Turn) bezieht sich auf die im 19. (Fotografie, Film) und 20. Jahrhundert (Ton- und Farbfilm, Fernsehen, Video und Computer) erfolgende „Wiederkehr der Bilder“ und die damit einher gehende, von den Medien der sekundären

Oralität unterstützte Verdrängung der alten Leitmedien Schrift und Buchdruck. Frühe Medientheoretiker wie Benjamin, Neurath oder Flusser, aber auch neuere Autoren wie Hartmann, Wiesing oder Engell verweisen in erster Linie auf die Vorteile des Bildmediums. Bilder, heißt es, sagen mehr als Worte und seien weitaus verständlicher – weil anschaulicher, unmittelbarer, konkreter und sinnenfälliger – als Texte. Einer solch bildoptimistischen Interpretation steht – wobei man sich primär auf das Medium Fernsehen bezieht – eine bildpessimistische Interpretation gegenüber, vertreten etwa durch Anders oder Postman. Diese begreifen den Iconic Turn nahezu ausschließlich als Informations- und Kommunikationsdefizit, als kulturellen Niedergang, Anti-Aufklärung, Massenverdummung und Unterminierung der Demokratie.

Der gegenständliche Vortrag skizziert diesen mediengeschichtlichen Kontext und geht dann näher auf die Position von Anders ein, der in den 1950-er Jahren mit seinem Werk „Die Antiquiertheit des Menschen“ nicht nur eine – dem „Kulturindustrie“-Verdikt Adornos sehr ähnliche – ideologiekritische Soziologie des Fernsehens, sondern vor allem auch eine mediale „Erkenntnistheorie“ des Fernsehens erarbeitet hat. Medien, in diesem Fall das Fernsehen, werden als ein kognitiv-emotionales – wenngleich historisch kontingentes – Apriori behandelt. Die Frage lautet: Wie wird „TV-förmig“ wahrgenommen, welche Inhalte werden dabei selektiert und kombiniert? Auf welche Weise wird „TV-förmig“ gedacht und gewertet? Die TV-bestimmte Welt produziere, behauptet Anders, den systemkonformen Konsumidioten, den weltentfremdeten „Masseneremiten“. Sie befördere eine allgemeine „Verbiederung“, d.h. eine passive Haltung und Infantilisierung des Denkens. Die Welt werde „ontologisch zweideutig“ und eindimensional, sie werde zum „Phantom“ und zur „Matrize“, d.h. zu einer Bühne schon vorgefertigter Denk- und Handlungsmuster.

Heute, nach einem halben Jahrhundert, können wir erneut die Frage nach der sachlichen Angemessenheit und nach der Aktualität einer solchen Analyse stellen. Anders' radikale Denunzierung des Bildprinzips im Allgemeinen und des Fernsehens im Besonderen kann auch gegenwärtig noch viele gute Argumente für sich verbuchen, sie lässt sich aber dennoch kritisch hinterfragen. Vor allem angesichts der zwischenzeitlich erfolgten technischen Weiterentwicklung des Mediums (besonders der Verschränkung von TV und Internet) und angesichts der veränderten Nutzungsmöglichkeiten und Nutzungsgewohnheiten ist eine differenziertere Betrachtung zu fordern, die im Hinblick auf Leistungen und Defizite des Mediums TV eine seriöse Plus-Minus-Rechnung aufstellt.

BRIDGING THE GAP BETWEEN TEXT AND PRACTICES OF KNOWLEDGE: MULTIPLE PATHS OPEN LANDSCAPES

Cristina Marras / Giorgio Fotia, Rome, Italy

The building of knowledge is not a linear and cumulative progression of data and theories but is rather a critical and dialectical collection and use of instruments, models, behaviors, decisional processes, and operative conducts. Independently of the specific "grammar" of each field and discipline, the complexity of that scenario requires adequate tools, categories and models capable to sustain such an inter-relation. Most recently, new signals emerged

about new "landscapes" that shape the process of knowledge building. Landscapes, trees, space, light, and sea are metaphors traditionally used for representing knowledge and knowledge organization. In our paper we deal in particular with coastal and marine landscapes. What we call "aquatic metaphors" seems to be the most appropriate in structuring and representing this new scenario, the multiple approaches and tools for transferring and organize knowledge, the composite criteria for identifying need and opportunities, the ways engaged in processes of cognition distribution and, in particular, the presence of multiple paths that compose an unexpected relation of (open) tools and practices.

Specifically, the paper addresses some critical issues, including what is needed to reduce the gap between the current concept of "open community" and the set of principles and practices that promote access to texts (e.g. open source), how to manage with "boundaryobjects" in cooperative processes, and how to deal with the "environments" implicated in "cognition distribution".

We are interested here in describing the emergence of such a novel "marine landscape" and its (open and fluid) boundaries and in explaining the interplay of different

approaches and tools for knowledge building. With reference to a specific practical example, such that the creation and the building of European communities of scientists and philosophers and hyper-platforms, we will discuss the concept of cooperation, open community, and open archives and we will try to indicate some critical paths for the development of new sustainable scenarios within the above framework.

WITTGENSTEIN ON THE MEANING OF LIFE: FROM THEORY TO THERAPY

Michael Maurer, Vienna, Austria

My contribution attempts to elucidate the relevance of the question of the *meaning of life* for the development of Wittgenstein's (philosophical) *style of thinking*. The author suggests that the intellectual and ethical query which shaped the life of Ludwig Wittgenstein can also be found on a deeper level in his philosophical considerations regarding linguistic and logical issues. This *internal relationship*, which has remained neglected within classical analytical approaches, allows for a deeper understanding of the *ethical demand* James Conant takes to be the strategic point of view of Wittgenstein's philosophical activity.

(RE)-CONSTRUCTING THE SEMANTIC ARCHITECTURE OF THE "VERMISCHTE BEMERKUNGEN"

Kerstin Mayr, Innsbruck, Austria

In the context of a cooperative project ("Culture and Value Revisited") between the Brenner Archives at the University of Innsbruck (FIBA) and the Wittgenstein Archives at the University of Bergen (WAB), a computer supported qualitative analysis of Wittgensteins "Vermischte Bemerkungen" / "Culture and Value" is being carried out. This is done with GABEK (Ganzheitliche Bewältigung von

Komplexität, Holistic Processing of Complexity), a method based on the theory of linguistic Gestalten (Zelger 1999) and its computer implementation WinRelan. With GABEK the essential aim is to obtain a holistic, integrated view of individual aspects of Wittgenstein's remarks in Culture and Value (1994 Suhrkamp edition).

The GABEK method for qualitatively analysing data allows a hierarchically structured presentation of a highly complex text and its network layers. The main objective of this analysis is to clarify and highlight content-related (semantic) interdependencies and intervening variables - hypotheses on inter-dependencies can be generated in a further step.

Development of a rule-based network of data leads to the generation of

- conceptual fields
- causal interrelations of items (keywords), conceptual fields and topics
- semantic inter-dependencies and networks

the analysis and identification of which are needed to generate both deeper knowledge and understanding about the semantic structures of the Wittgenstein text.

This knowledge expresses itself in the unique character of its organisation and structure and could help build the basis for further in-depth exploration and analysis concerning specific topics related to "Culture and Value". Consistent with the core objectives of the analysis of the German text version ("Vermischte Bemerkungen"), an encoding of the 1st and 2nd English edition ("Culture and Value") will be done for the purpose of comparison and exploration in terms of textual semantic similarity and deviation.

These findings will provide the basis for further investigations concerning such questions as:

- What kind of text is this?
- Is the secret code in Wittgenstein's remarks of any significance?
- Is there a Wittgensteinian philosophy of culture found in the patterns and networks identified?

LOGIC OF FINITENESS: INTELLECTUAL SYSTEMS IN THE INFORMATION ERA: 2. LIMITS TO DIVERSITY, EXACTNESS, AND ECONOMY

Lidia A. Mazhul / Vladimir M. Petrov, Moscow, Russia

Three principal behavioral tendencies deduced in the framework of the 'information approach,' permit to come to bounds of evolutionary trajectories inherent in some systems. The theoretical conclusions obtained, are illustrated with materials of language (both its semantic structure and phonetic one), apparatus for detecting primary signals (both visual and acoustic), psychophysical facilities of the information processing, religion, and different kinds of art and literature. Deductive classification is built for possible conditions of systems' functioning and their evolutionary trajectories, some of them being 'endless' and some having predestined ends. In many cases approaching to these ends is becoming very fast in

the information era, because of growing 'genuine informational' requirements to such systems.

In the previous paper, proceeding from the 'principle of the information maximum,' three principal tendencies were deduced, inherent both in the functioning and evolution of any complex system. Now we shall retrace the consequences of each tendency to clear up whether they can come to certain limits of the evolutionary trajectories.

PHILOSOPHICAL RESEARCH: INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL QUESTIONS

Cameron McEwen, Charlottesville, Virginia, USA

The great question facing contemporary philosophy is: how will its future relate to its past? This is a perennial question in philosophy, but it is posed especially today when technological developments are transforming the ways in which philosophy preserves its textual tradition and the ways in which work with that tradition is performed. More importantly, this question is posed to philosophy through ongoing (indeed accelerating) political and sociological changes (themselves partly caused by technological developments) which threaten internal and external stability unless ways are found to continue and to enhance traditional values.

The paper will address the issue of Open Source philosophy from this angle and try to show that the Open Source ideology has serious drawbacks.

RUSSELL, WITTGENSTEIN, AND THE PROJECT FOR "ANALYTIC PHILOSOPHY"

Nikolay Milkov, Paderborn, Germany

In the last three decades many books (see, for example, Clark 1975, McGuinness 1988, Monk 1996) were published that broadened our knowledge of the relationship between Russell and Wittgenstein in 1911-12. Unfortunately, the documents that these books present remained less investigated. In this paper we are going to see that this is also the case in regard to the history of the introduction of what was later called "analytic philosophy". Despite the fact that Russell and Wittgenstein shackled hands in their antipathy towards the philosophy old-style, for example, that of Bergson, everyone of the two philosophers had his own conception of the New Philosophy. For Russell, it meant "examined philosophy", or philosophy advanced through "scientific restraint and balance", and resulted in series of logically correctly constructed theories. For Wittgenstein, it resulted in syncoated, short logico- philosophical "discoveries". In the years to come, the two conceptions of "rigorous philosophy", embraced by Russell and Wittgenstein often came in conflict.

INTERNET: SOME COLLATERAL EFFECTS

Fábio Jesus Miranda, Goiânia, Brazil

Since the last decades of the twentieth century, the world has been in a process of radical change. The constant technological innovations assimilated into our lives generate impacts on our existence and the meaning we assign to it. Historically, as new technologies are introduced, changes occur in social structure and penetrate the private life of individuals causing important changes at the most subjective level. In this brief exposition, we have tried to show evidence based on observation that in spite of its positive potential the interaction with new technology can bring collateral effects such as: stress, isolation, depression, physical problems, etc.. Internet collateral effects, stress, depression, isolation

WITTGENSTEIN VERSUS MAUTHNER: TWO CRITIQUES OF LANGUAGE, TWO MYSTICISMS

Elena Nájera, Alicante, Spain

In the *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* Ludwig Wittgenstein positions his philosophical project against the critique of language developed by Fritz Mauthner. Both authors are interested in indicating the limits of words, and they also agree that silence offers the only possibility of going beyond those limits. The present paper seeks to analyse the two approaches in order to indicate their point of contact and, above all, their different motivations. The fact is that Mauthner denounces the epistemological incompetence of language and its gregarious construction and advises a silent, nominalist scepticism. Wittgenstein reacts to this approach, alleging the logical capacity of language to reflect the facts of the world, although this incapacitates it for expressing value. Thus the *Tractatus* opens up a mystical path with a *religious* inclination that contrasts with the confessed *atheism* of Mauthner's mysticism.

WILL THE OPEN ACCESS MOVEMENT BE SUCCESSFUL?

Michael Nentwich, Vienna, Austria

No doubt that from the point of view of scholars around the world, Open Access seems to be the obvious solution to the evident problems of scholarly publishing in the present age of commodification. Access to the academic literature would be universally available and hence not restricted to those lucky enough to belong to wealthy institutions that are able to afford all the subscriptions necessary. Furthermore, many believe that only if we have a fully digital, openly accessible archive of the relevant literature, enhanced with overlay functions such as commenting, reviewing and intelligent quality filtering, we will be able to overcome restrictions of the present, paper-based scholarly communication system.

Many initiatives have been launched (e.g. the Berlin Declaration), some funding agencies have already reacted by adopting Open Access policies (notably the British Wellcome Trust, but also the German DFG or the Austrian

FWF), new journal models are being tested to prove that Open Access is a viable economic model (e.g. BioMedCentral), Open Access self-archiving servers flourish around the world (not least in philosophy) and even high politics has reacted (most recently the European Commission). But still, after a decade or so of initiatives, testing and promoting only a tiny fraction of the available scientific literature is Open Access. It is growing, no doubt, but we are a long way from universal open access.

So, will the Open Access movement be successful? Or, put differently, can it be successful? What are the chances that the incumbents - the big commercial (as well as the not-for-profit, associational) publishing industry - will give way to a de-commodified future? Is there a middle-ground where all the players and interests could meet? This paper will contribute to this open debate by analysing recent trends and weighting the arguments put forward in this heated debate.

THE EPISTEMOLOGY OF "TEXT" MEANING: THE CONTEXT IS THE PROOF-CONDITIONS UPON WHICH WE PROVE THE TRUTH OF OUR INTERPRETATION OF THE TEXT

Dan Neshet, Haifa, Israel

The Oxford Dictionary defines Text as "the original words of author" and Context as "parts that precede or follow a passage and fix its meaning; ambient conditions." If we explicate text as any cognitive sign operation and context as the conditions on which we interpret the meaning of the text, then a text without context has no meaning. Common knowledge is that we fix meanings by interpretation, but how may we explicate the interpretation of text in context? I will discuss some major problems of text and context in theories of interpretation and how to overcome the predicaments of "hermeneutic universalism" and "hermeneutic contextualism" which involve either indefinite series of interpretations or interpretive vicious circle since there are no external grounds that would warrant the validity of interpretation. According to pragmaticist epistemology, every cognitive operation involves interpretation, and the question is if we can interpret the meaning of the text without being entangled in the paradoxes of phenomenological hermeneutics. I suggest that the criterion of the true interpretation of meanings is the proof-conditions of the text which are its specific truth-conditions, the mental and social conditions of the speaker, scientist, or the artist creating the artwork, and the proof method, namely the procedure to prove or quasi-prove the true interpretation of the text upon its truth-conditions.

FILOSOFIA.FI – THE FINNISH WEB PORTAL FOR PHILOSOPHY

Yrsa Neuman / Tuukka Tomperi, Turku, Finland

The Finnish national philosophy portal provides the Finnish philosophically interested community with information on current events and provides tools for philosophical work in the form of discussion forums and dictionaries. At the

same time, it serves as a window to the history of philosophy in Finland.

The Finnish Society for European Philosophy (not to be confused with the Philosophical Society of Finland) and the Finnish philosophical magazine *niin & näin* began an effort to produce the first comprehensive national web portal for philosophy in Finland in 2005. The goal has been to create a common forum for all kinds of practices, studies and pursuits in philosophy, for amateurs and professionals alike. One year after the first steps had been taken, the department of philosophy at the Swedish-language university Åbo Akademi joined in and the scope of the portal was extended to include a fair share of material in Swedish as well. (Finland is bilingual by constitution and extensive philosophical work has been done in Swedish in Finland throughout history.)

The portal www.filosofia.fi will be opened to the public in the summer of 2007.

Filosofia.fi has five main objectives: (1) to be an up-to-date forum of current philosophical activities in Finland, (2) to enhance and enliven communication and exchange of information within the philosophical community(ies) of Finland, (3) to form a general starting point and web node for all Finnish- (or Swedish-) speaking internet-users interested in philosophy, (4) to collect, digitize, and archive important Finnish philosophical material (text, audio, video, photography), (5) to offer an introduction to the history of Finnish philosophy (including materials in Latin, Swedish, Finnish, English and other languages) to both domestic and foreign audiences.

The main structural elements of the portal are: calendar of philosophical events, newsletter-weblog, philosophical weblog, discussion forum, collection of weblinks, eLibrary of classical works of philosophy, internet encyclopaedia Logos (in Finnish), introductory and archival section of the history of Finnish philosophy (which consists of a chronicle and a timeline of Finnish philosophy, a gallery of philosophers, bibliographies, archives of texts (both digitized historical texts and modern scholarly articles on the history of Finnish philosophy), interviews, photographs etc.), Swedish-language main page and section (materials in Swedish, Swedish-language discussion forum, Swedish-language dictionary of philosophy, historical material in Swedish etc.), English-language introductory page.

In the workshop we will present this recently published portal and discuss the process of its making, the significance of the project for Finnish philosophy, and its connection to the OS (open source) and FOS (free online scholarship) ideologies.

UNNATURAL NONSENSE? ON THE EXPECTANCY OF CONSISTENCY IN THE *TRACTATUS*

Yrsa Neuman, Turku, Finland

In the TLP, Wittgenstein writes as if he did accept talk about both substantial and "plain" nonsense. Sense and nonsense, I take it, is internally connected to the Satz – a Satz has sense, otherwise it is not a Satz. Now Wittgenstein is not consistent in wording when it comes to this either, but talks as if there were also unsinnige Sätze (nonsensical propositions). The fact that there are inconsistencies poses problems to both resolute and metaphysical readers (i.e. austere and traditional readers),

and the way out, I claim, is connected to the realisation that many representatives for both readings implicitly impose a less credible view on Wittgenstein as a person and that it is unclear when one is warranted to ascribe a deliberate and conception of nonsense to Wittgenstein. The starting point for my discussion is Cora Diamond's "What nonsense might be" from *The Realistic Spirit* (1991).

VERDÄCHTIGE BILDER UND TÖNE (WITTGENSTEIN 1946–1951)

Katalin Neumer, Budapest, Ungarn

Nach einer der gängigen Positionen der heutigen Wittgenstein-Forschung habe Wittgenstein die Bedeutsamkeit der Visualität erkannt und in seiner Argumentationsweise die Bilder eine gewichtige Rolle spielen lassen. Auf der anderen Seite wird auch allgemein behauptet, daß Wittgenstein der stimmhaften Seite der Sprache eine große Bedeutung zugeschrieben habe, woraus man u.a. auf seine Neigung zu den oralen Kulturen zu schließen pflegt. Was das erstere betrifft, erscheint die Bildhaftigkeit schon in Wittgensteins expliziten Äußerungen vielmehr als janusköpfig: „Das falsche Bild verwirrt, das richtige Bild hilft.“ (MS 173: 4r) Diesen Zusammenhang werde ich auf der Grundlage textnaher Analysen von einigen Stellen aus Wittgensteins letzten Jahren weiter entwickeln, wobei ich ebenfalls eine Doppeldeutigkeit der Stimmhaftigkeit nachweisen möchte.

Darüber hinaus werde ich zeigen, daß Bilder und Töne in manchen Kontexten – insbesondere im Kontext des Aspektsehens und -wechsels, des Bedeutungserlebnisses und der sekundären Bedeutung, i.e. im Zusammenhang mit für die Jahre 1946–1951 charakteristischen Begriffen – miteinander in (öfters synesthetische) Verbindung gesetzt werden und mit Wittgensteins eigenem Ausdruck „verdächtig“ erscheinen. Dadurch werden Töne von ihrem Thron gestoßen und verwandeln sich in verführerischen Sirenen gesang.

INFORMATION AS A STRUCTURE, STRUCTURE AS INFORMATION. POWER RELATION AND DYNAMICS OF NETWORKS.

Andrzej W. Nowak, Poznań, Poland

In my paper I want to examine a problem of relation between the notion of 'information' and the notion of 'structure'. My main thesis will be that the very distinction between these two notions can be abolished – in the perspective I want to adopt they can be understood as synonyms. To describe this perspective I will use a term 'network ontology'. I will present two traditions in which the notion of network is used: Actor Network Theory (Bruno Latour and others) and network theory (Duncan Watts and Laszlo-Albert Barabasi).

First, I will present Actor Network Theory (ANT) as a proposition of "flat ontology" (rhizome-ontology). I will show that ANT recognizes Parmenides' claim that: *thought and being are the same* – it explains how material/structural and semiotic/symbolic/informational networks come together to act as a whole.

Next, I will examine Duncan Watts' contribution to network theory and Albert-László Barabási's scale free network theory. I will show that these authors' understanding of the notion of 'network' differs – at first sight – from Bruno Latour's use of this term. My aim will be to compare these two different uses of the notion of "network". On the one hand, this comparison will help us appreciate philosophical depth of ANT. On the other hand, it will enable us to grasp the dynamics of network ontology (Watts, Barabasi).

It may seem that 'actants' (in ANT) should be treated as counterparts of 'nodes' in network theory. However, I will claim that the counterpart of ANT 'actants' (actors) are in fact the whole networks (also including nodes) in Barabasi/Watts. If we accept this claim, we will be able to compare both theories. It will become clear that the network structure described in network theory is also "flat" (like in ANT), but it is more complicated. It is because network theory describes not only quantity relations but also quality relations in the network structure. This creates a good starting point for describing power relations and inequality in networks.

In network theory the growth of networks, their internal dynamics and adding new elements are regulated by 'power laws' (so called Pareto principle or 80/20 rule). 'Power laws' are linked with the functioning of the 'nodes'. The 'nodes' are not equal like 'actants' in rhizome-ontology (ANT). The highest-degree 'nodes' are often called 'hubs' and they play a significant role in the whole network. Network theory shows that knowing the structure of the network and localization of 'hubs' may help us influence the network as a whole.

For the purpose of this paper I will translate the term "hubs" into the ANT term "black boxes". If we describe the process of 'black boxing' as "hub" creation we can describe more precisely hegemony and power relations.

My main theoretical assumption in this paper is to combine "flat" ontology borrowed from ANT and dynamics of networks as described by Barabasi and Watts.

Results:

1. ANT gives us a philosophical, ontological description of networks and Watts and Barabasi give us good descriptions of the network's structure and temporal change.
2. Synthesis of these two theories gives also opportunity to revive dialectical ontology.

ANT has been often criticized as amoral; the perspective adopted in this paper gives opportunity to present ANT as more sensitive to a problem of inequality and power relations.

TOWARDS A PHILOSOPHY OF THE MOBILE INFORMATION SOCIETY

Kristóf Nyíri, Budapest, Hungary

Between 1996 and 1998, Manuel Castells published his famous trilogy *The Information Age*, taking some 1400 pages to reach the conclusion that information and communication technologies were deepening, rather than closing, the gap between the rich and the poor. As he would characteristically put it in his unfathomable left-wing idiom: ICTs were instrumental in supplanting the "space of places" by a "space of flows". In 1999, I put a vicious review of the work onto the web (<http://www.hunfi.hu/nyiri/>

[castells_rev.htm](#)). In the following years I have come to regret the viciousness, but certainly not the critical stance, of the review. And it is with great satisfaction I note that, under the impact of the rise of the mobile phone, Castells himself has by today quite dramatically shifted his position. The book Castells et al., *Mobile Communication and Society*, published in November 2006, fully recognizes the liberating effects of today's dominant ICT, namely mobile telephony.

The phrase "The Mobile Information Society", in usage since 1999 or so, is somewhat misleading. Mobile communications point to a future which offers a wealth of knowledge, not just of information; and promises to re-establish, within the life of modern society, some of the features formerly enjoyed by genuine local communities. "Community" on the one hand, and "society" on the other, clearly differ in their connotations. It was Tönnies who, towards the end of the nineteenth century, crystallized this difference into a conceptual contrast; the striking observation in the recent literature on mobile telephony is that through constant communicative connectedness a kind of turning back to the living, personal interactions of earlier communities is brought about. In 1915, John Dewey had already formulated the thesis that social life is not just maintained by communication, but indeed constituted by it. Dewey's thesis is fully corroborated by contemporary research in evolutionary psychology.

The notion that "information" is somehow inferior to "knowledge", echoed by T. S. Eliot's famous lines from the early 1930s – "Where is the wisdom we have lost in knowledge? Where is the knowledge we have lost in information?" – is not of recent origin. Although the Latin word *informare*, meaning the action of forming matter, such as stone, wood, leather, etc., also took on the senses "to instruct", "to educate", "to form an idea", "informare" in Italian, "informer" in French, and "to inform" in English from the beginning had the connotation of conveying knowledge that is merely particular. To have information amounted to knowing details, possibly unconnected ones. Now knowledge can be usefully regarded as information in context, and it is a standard observation that information sought through mobile phones is, characteristically, location-specific and situation-specific. It seems, then, that mobile communication tends to engender not just information, but information in context: that is, knowledge *per se*.

Worldwide, there were more than 2 billion mobile phone users by the end of 2006. This figure, impressive enough by itself, reflects some fundamental conditions and changes which I will in my talk characterize under the following headings: mobiles becoming the dominant medium; childhood in a new key; and the transformation of the social sciences.

Combining the option of voice calls with text messaging, MMS, as well as e-mail, and on its way to becoming the natural interface through which to conduct shopping, banking, booking flights, and checking in, the mobile phone is obviously turning into the single unique instrument of mediated communication, mediating not just between people, but also between people and institutions, and indeed between people and the world of inanimate objects. Furthermore, the mobile is today emerging as the dominant medium in the sense of that strange singular in the plural, "media" – both as mass media and new media. The age group perhaps most deeply affected by the rise of the mobile is that of children. Ubiquitous communication fulfils a deeply human urge, and children especially suffer if deprived of the possibility of keeping in touch. Also, Dewey's observation that we need schools – artificial educational environments – because the young can no

longer move around in the world of adults and thus learn spontaneously, by now appears to have once more become irrelevant. The medium in which the young play, communicate, and learn, is increasingly identical with the world in which adults communicate, work, do business, and seek entertainment. The mobile is clearly creating an organic learning environment. The mobile phone is not just the most successful machine ever invented, spreading with unheard-of speed; it is also a machine which corresponds to deep, primordial human communicational urges. The phenomenon of the mobile phone constitutes an obvious challenge to philosophy, and indeed to the humanities. Having become the dominant medium, the mobile phone today is no longer merely a particular, or indeed exotic, topic of the social sciences, as it certainly still was in 2001, when mobile studies, including the Hungarian project COMMUNICATIONS IN THE 21ST CENTURY (<http://www.socialscience.t-mobile.hu>) first got underway. Instead, by constituting the very communicational environment of the social scientist, the mobile has actually transformed the social sciences themselves.

COMPUTABILITY OF REALITY AS AN UNFULFILLED DREAM OF CYBER-ONTOLOGISTS

Yukiko Okamoto, Tokyo, Japan

1. Semantic web and cyber-ontology: Constructing a semantic web requires a profoundly contemplated ontology, but not in the traditional sense. In accordance with such ontology, everything in the world could be rewritten by a machine-readable language and reconstructed into various data-bases. But could everything be captured by that language? Very unlikely. Cyber-ontology presupposes objectification of anything capable of being manipulated and thus only manipulable objects are addressed. This would only be possible if we could thoroughly convert our everyday activities of "knowing how" into "knowing that", which is almost unthinkable. Thus data-bases would never overwhelm reality. Cyber-ontologists lose the point.

2. Crisis of disembodiment in VR: The crisis of disembodiment of our real existential being looms large when we are unconsciously deprived of our natural sense of spacio-temporal distance within tele-interactions (online). While being immersed in virtual reality, one could possibly forget knowing how to cope with real things and to concern oneself with the equipmental nexus of everyday life. Every datum is already converted into "knowing that", i.e. objectified as flat knowledge that may only fill such a virtual world.

I will back up these claims with some points from Heidegger's criticism of technology, employing his idea of "equipmental whole" and "Ge-stell". I will also mention the recent trend of ontology-engineering in order to delineate the dark periphery of brilliant cyber-evolution.

ETHICAL TASKS OF MEDIA ADVOCACY IN THE 21ST CENTURY

Giridhari Lal Pandit, Delhi, India

Citing UNESCO's recent finding regarding children, the discussion focuses on the forms of exclusion affecting civil society worldwide and the future generations. With its enormous economic and scientific progress, today's knowledge society excludes moral progress in absence of guiding principles for social change, empowerment, human development, policy planning and prioritizing investment. Sounding very alarming, as this does, it should wake us up to the darkest areas of human condition which must be interrogated by asking: What are its most challenging frontiers? How strategically and innovatively can ethics and the media address the issues of public policy framework for investment in development and education and for empowerment and social change? In this very context, I argue for media advocacy as a philosophy of empowerment.

PHILOSOPHICAL: BROWSE WITTGENSTEIN'S WORLD WITH THE SEMANTIC WEB

Michele Pasin, Milton Keynes, United Kingdom

How could a web navigation enhance or affect a philosophy scholar? Especially within an educational scenario, is the constantly increasing number of philosophical web materials a source of confusion, or an advantage? In our work we have been investigating the requirements and features of the possible navigation mechanisms a philosophy student could benefit from. In particular, in the context of the Semantic Web, we have identified some of the "learning pathways" which can be used for dynamically presenting these materials within a meaningful context.

For example, imagine that from the paragraph 7 of Wittgenstein's Tractatus, by selecting an *interpretative* navigation path, you could easily jump to Max Black's detailed commentary on it. And from there, being interested on Black's interpretation and wanting to gather information on its possible origins, you were able to query the web using a *comparative* navigation path, aimed at highlighting what Wittgenstein and Black had in common. Two main results are returned: both studied at Cambridge, both worked in the philosophy of language area. You decide to focus your attention on Cambridge, click on it, select an *historical* perspective and see that while in Cambridge, in the the 20's, Black had the opportunity to listen to and meet some of the major scholars of the time: Russell, Moore and Ramsey were among them. Now you may want to reorganize these results, according to a *theoretical* perspective. Thus you discover that another link among all these philosophers is their interest in the philosophy of mathematics, and that actually Black's first book was centered on this topic. So you drift away for a moment, select again a *theoretical* navigation, pull up a small map of the important views in philosophy of mathematics in the last century, and see that among them there is also the first philosophy of Wittgenstein. You click on it, select a *textual* navigation and automatically you are taken back to the Tractatus, but this time to paragraph 6.2.

The sort of links that would make possible such navigations are of a slightly different nature than the

famous hyperlink which, together with other things, made the fortune of the web. And if Google does a great job in meaningfully organizing for us the web of hyperlinks, it cannot do much if we wanted to query directly the *web of relations* existing among our world's entities. In order to do so, resources need to be indexed and described not only at the syntactical level (e.g. with respect to their status as an image, a text file or a video), but also at the semantic one, i.e. with respect to their content. The Semantic Web effort, or web of data, brings forward the ambitious vision of creating and maintaining this "semantic layer" of the web, so to allow software agents (e.g. programs like the navigation tool described above) to accomplish various operations which would not be otherwise possible.

In this paper we present PhiloSURFical, a pedagogical application which allows the contextual navigation of a semantically-enhanced version of Wittgenstein's Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. By relying on an ontology created to describe the philosophical domain at various levels of abstraction, users can benefit from multiple perspectives on the text and on related resources. Moreover, users can use the application for storing their own annotations about the Tractatus and possibly contribute to the creation of a network of philosophical resources centered around the text and its author. For the moment, as the availability of free and adequate semantic data on the web is still limited, PhiloSURFical strongly relies on an internal knowledge base, but its architecture wants to be open and extensible so to allow future integration and querying of different repositories, using the appropriate web standards (e.g. RDF, SPARQL, OWL).

Often, with great and inspiring visions, also come great and challenging difficulties. The Semantic Web makes no exception here. During our work with the PhiloSURFical tool we faced many of them, some with an exquisitely philosophical flavour, others of an inherent technical character. Thus, here we also want to discuss some lessons learned during the development of the tool, and hopefully show the reader how, despite the various limitations, the benefits of such an approach make the enterprise worth pursuing.

LOGIC OF FINITENESS: INTELLECTUAL SYSTEMS IN THE INFORMATION ERA: 1. TYPES OF STRUCTURAL CHANGES AND TENDENCIES

Vladimir M. Petrov / Lidia A. Mazhul, Moscow, Russia

When systems show 'endless' evolution and when they come to their end? This problem is considered in the framework of the 'information approach' (the foundations of which are shortly described). The roots of possible structural transformations of any system are divided into two classes, the first class ('actual changes') being caused by concrete current shifts in the system's environmental conditions, the second one (fundamental, long-range trends) responding to the inclination toward 'universal fitness' of the system in the cases of various probable changes in the environment. Both classes are capable of causing limits for the system's development, especially in conditions of contemporary information society. Nevertheless, exactly long-range changes can generate principal limits for the end of the system's trajectory. To analyze this phenomenon, three principal tendencies inherent in the functioning of any system, should be taken into account, which would become the object of further consideration.

MEDIENWISSENSCHAFT, MEDIENTHEORIE ODER MEDIENPHILOSOPHIE?

Claus Pias, Wien, Österreich

Die Beschäftigung mit "Medien" ist -- gemessen an den Laufzeiten anderer universitärer Disziplinen -- eine ausgesprochen junge Erscheinung, die sich jedoch sehr schnell und umfassend zu institutionalisieren vermochte. Für solche Neuerscheinungen gibt es durchaus historische Präzedenzfälle wie Informatik (mit anfangs ungeklärter Zuständigkeit) oder allgemeine Literaturwissenschaft (im Gegensatz zu den traditionellen Nationalphilologien). Unscharf bleiben trotz verschiedener Kanonisierungsunternehmungen jedoch Name, Programm und Gegenstand dessen, was als Medien-Wissenschaft, Medien-Theorie oder Medien-Philosophie summiert wird. Die Sache wird dadurch nicht einfacher, daß sich unter dem Druck drittmittelfähigen Antragsdesigns mittlerweile etliche inkompatible Forschungsansätze unter dem erfolgversprechenden Begriff "Medien" versammeln. Und zuletzt spielt (insbesondere im deutschsprachigen Raum) die Institutionengeschichte mit einer empirisch-sozialwissenschaftlichen Publizistik bzw. einer hermeneutisch-geisteswissenschaftlichen Film- & Fernsehwissenschaft eine erhebliche Rolle.

Vor diesem Hintergrund sollen fünf Thesen vorgestellt und diskutiert werden: 1. Es gibt keine Medien. 2. Medienwissenschaft ist keine Disziplin. 3. Medienwissenschaft ist eine Wissenschaft. 4. Medienwissenschaftler hätten Medienwissenschaft nicht erfinden können. 5. Medienwissenschaft ist nicht gleich Medienwissenschaft.

THE WIKIPEDIA: KNOWLEDGE AS SOCIAL, FALLIBLE, EXTERNALIST AND HOLISTIC

Manuel Pinedo-García / Cristina Borgoni-Gonçalves, Granada, Spain

Knowledge has often been conceived in an individualistic, internalist and intellectualist manner. In this paper we use the example of the Wikipedia and other Internet resources to argue for an alternative, social, fallibilist, externalist and holistic conception. We analyze issues concerning the reliability of publicly constructed bodies of information and extract conclusions for some central debates in epistemology, such as the sceptical challenge, the sources of normative evaluation, the role played by the community and the world in the constitution of knowledge or the intelligibility of a radical mistaken thinker. The paper finishes by offering some connections between these epistemological consequences and ideas found in the philosophy of Socrates, Davidson and Wittgenstein.

RETRIEVING CULTURE FROM LANGUAGE

Marcos Paiva Pinheiro / Jorge Alam Pereira dos Santos, Brasília, Brazil

This paper is part of an effort to present our conception of philosophy as development of conceptual technologies. We shall assess Whorf's ideas about linguistics in order to develop suggestions as to how the ways of thinking in a culture can be inferred from an analysis of linguistic data.

ANALYTISCHE MEDIENTHEORIE? – ÜBERLEGUNGEN ZUM VERHÄLTNISS VON MEDIENTHEORIE UND ANALYTISCHER PHILOSOPHIE

Martin Pleitz, Münster, Deutschland

Obwohl das Verhältnis von Medientheorie und analytischer Philosophie gegenwärtig schwierig ist, ist eine Annäherung wünschenswert. Ich schlage eine Analyse des Begriffs „medientheoretisch“ vor, nach der sich auch einige Theoriestücke der analytischen Philosophie als medientheoretisch einstufen lassen. Daraufhin versuche ich die weitgehende Medienblindheit der analytischen Philosophie zu erklären und weise auf einige Mittel zu ihrer Überwindung hin. Die Skizze einer Theorie der Laut- und Schriftsprache soll plausibel machen, dass es erfolgversprechend ist, medientheoretische analytische Philosophie zu betreiben. Ich sehe meine Thesen als Vorüberlegungen zum Programm einer analytischen Medientheorie.

‘SEEING-AS’ AND FORMS OF LIFE

Regina Queiroz, Lisbon, Portugal

Forms of life are the fundament of normativity of rules. However, just as Wittgenstein distinguishes normal from abnormal rules, if we separate the abnormality of rules from the concept of forms of life, we are thus faced with a language without any reference to a form of life. But in the context of the interpretation of forms of life as the last fact of language that separation is unthinkable. The abnormal rule must also correspond to a form of life.

By analysing the concept of ‘seeing-as’ (Sehen als) we sustain that the experience of ‘seeing-as’ is a possible condition to the comprehension of how an abnormal rule corresponds to a form of life and clarifies how the co-existence of several forms of life are possible.

MEDIEN ZWISCHEN MEDIEN-, WISSENSCHAFTS- UND TECHNIKPFILOSOPHIE

Ulrike Ramming, Stuttgart, Deutschland

Der Vortrag geht auf die aktuelle Diskussion um den Medienbegriff ein. Vorgeschlagen wird ein Verständnis von Medien, das nicht gegenstandsorientiert unter Medien eine Klasse von Informationsträgern versteht, vielmehr wird der Potenzialcharakter von Medien betont. Damit kann das Medienthema an der Schnittstelle von Medien-, Wissenschafts- und Technikphilosophie verortet werden.

THE ONTOLOGICAL STATUS OF THE DIGITAL TEXT: A PLURALIST APPROACH

Allen Renaer, Champaign, Illinois, USA

Often the apparent assumptions of our folk idioms can easily co-exist with putatively more accurate and generalizable alternatives. And fortunately so, since those alternatives are generally contradictory and, historically, irreconcilable. However the metaphysics implicit in the routine discourse of information science is not only theoretically flawed, but is retarding the development of solutions to practical problems in the digital representation and management of cultural objects. Generally it is thought that any effort at a practical revisionary metaphysics will fail in the face of entrenched preferences and historically intractable oppositions.

There is another possibility though: a coordination of alternative conceptualizations that allows varying attitudes towards precisely those issues that historically resist agreement, while at the same time securing an improvement in mutual understanding that supports more effective cooperation. Some aspects of this approach are already implicit in the interest in philosophically neutral ontology "integration", "harmonizing", and the like that one now sees in information science and artificial intelligence, but the completion of this agenda will require recognizing the historical antinomies that have been a permanent feature of this intellectual landscape.

WITTGENSTEIN ON MATHEMATICAL SENSE

Victor Rodych, Lethbridge, Alberta, Canada

On Wittgenstein's unorthodox view of mathematics, only algorithmically decidable concatenations of 'signs' are mathematical propositions and only decided mathematical propositions have mathematical sense ('Sinn').

On the received view, a mathematical conjecture, such as Goldbach's Conjecture (GC), is a genuine mathematical proposition, with a fully determinate sense (meaning), even if (a) GC is independent of all existent mathematical calculi and/or (b) we do not have in hand an applicable and effective decision procedure by which to decide it. GC's sense is, simply: Every even number greater than 2 is the sum of two primes.

This paper aims to (1) show why Wittgenstein adopts this radical position on mathematical propositions and their sense, and (2) consider some objections to Wittgenstein's view and how he does or might respond to them.

WITTGENSTEINS GESAMTNACHLASS IM FOKUS: LEBEN – SCHREIBEN/PHILOSOPHIEREN – WERK

Josef Rothhaupt, München, Deutschland

Es ist keineswegs der Fall, dass derjenige, der WITTGENSTEINS Leben kennt, seine Werke besser interpretieren könnte. Er wird sie nur anders interpretieren. WITTGENSTEIN macht aus, dass bei ihm Leben und Werk untrennbar ineinander verschränkt sind. Es kann aber nicht darum gehen, das Leben durch das Werk und das Werk durch das Leben zu interpretieren. Aus diesem Grund wird für das Folgende eine andere Perspektive gewählt, die Leben und Werk aufeinander bezieht und dabei die Frage immer mit einschließt, wie sich beide wechselseitig erhellen können, nämlich aus der Perspektive des Schreibens. Das Werk wird also nicht auf das Leben bezogen und das Leben nicht auf das Werk, sondern beide werden auf das Schreiben bezogen. Auf diese Weise schlägt das Schreiben als wichtigster Baustein von WITTGENSTEINS Biographie den Brückenschlag zum Geschriebenen, also zum Werk. WITTGENSTEIN legt eine Tautologie frei, nämlich die, dass das Schreiben konstitutives Prinzip des Geschriebenen ist, dass aber dieses Schreiben auch eine existenzielle Dimension besitzt und für ihn zu einem konstitutiven Prinzip seines Lebens geworden ist.

Um die Triade „Leben-Schreiben/Philosophieren-Werk“ bei Wittgenstein adäquat ausloten zu können, sind – so die im Vortrag vertretene, explizierte und anschaulich präsentierte Auffassung – bestimmte Vorbedingungen unabdingbar und mehrere Desiderate zu erfüllen.

1) Wittgensteins Gesamtnachlass ist zusammenzutragen, zu sichten und der scientific community vollständig zugänglich zu machen. Das umfassende Oeuvre ist verschriftlichtes Philosophieren. Wittgensteins Schreiben ist Philosophieren. Neben all dem Manuskripten- und Typoskriptenmaterial sind dem Gesamtnachlass auch der Gesamtbriefwechsel, die Vorlesungsmit- und Vorlesungsnachschriften, Wittgensteins Taschenkalender (1929-1947), sein Fotoalbum und einiges mehr zuzurechnen. – Beispiele können dazu vorgebracht werden.

2) Die „Bergen Electronic Edition“ (Transkription und Faksimilierung) des philosophischen Nachlasses ist Ende des 20. Jhdts. als Forschungsinstrument ein Meilenstein. Damit sie dies auch im 21. Jhdts. bleibt, sind Verbesserungen, Korrekturen und Innovationen notwendig. – Anregungen aus der Praxis lassen sich vorbringen; Desiderate formulieren.

3) Die Wittgensteinsche Nachlass(er)forschung steckt noch in den Kinderschuhen. Umfassende und grundlegende Studien sind dringend notwendig. Der geläufige „standard view“ der Nachlassgenese bedarf kritischer Überprüfung und umfassender Korrektur. Zwei Dimensionen lassen sich im Oeuvre als grundlegend feststellen: Bemerkungskreation einerseits und Bemerkungskombination andererseits. – Hier sind Detailinformationen sinnvoll.

4) Wittgensteins Biographie kann ebenfalls in vielen Punkten detaillierter recherchiert und dokumentiert werden. So fördert etwa die Rekonstruktion von „Wittgensteins Bibliothek“ („Authors Wittgenstein Knew or Read“) neue und wichtige Erkenntnisse zu Tage. – Am Beispiel von Wilhelm Busch kann dies anschaulich demonstriert werden.

5) Auch die Publikations- und Wirkungsgeschichte, die vom Wittgensteinschen Oeuvre ihren Ausgang nahm und nun schon ein halbes Jahrhundert andauert, ist umfassend und kritisch zu sichten. – Exemplarisch ist die Publikation „Vermischte Bemerkungen“ anzuführen. Aber auch (und dies wurde bisher nahezu gänzlich unterlassen) Einfluss und Inspiration von Wittgensteins Biographie und Philosophie auf die Künste ist mehr als aufschlussreich.

Im Original handeln die Sätze des ersten Absatzes nicht von Wittgenstein, vielmehr wurde der Name WITTGENSTEIN eingesetzt, wo ursprünglich der Name KAFKA steht. Das Textexzerpt entstammt nämlich dem ersten Kapitel der Studie des Germanisten und Philosophen Oliver Jahraus "Kafka. Leben, Schreiben, Machtapparate", Stuttgart: Reclam, 2006 (hier: S. 31-37). Um nicht falsch verstanden zu werden: Keinesfalls ist damit eine platte, plumpe Übertragung von Kafka auf Wittgenstein intendiert. Vielmehr wird in heuristischer Absicht bezüglich der Triade „Leben-Schreiben-Werk“ Strukturgleichheit indiziert, Familienähnlichkeit markiert, Wahlverwandschaft konstatiert.

SCEPTICISM AND LATER WITTGENSTEIN

Priyambada Sarkar, Kolkata, India

Wittgenstein's remarks on skepticism in *On Certainty* have eluded its commentators for years. On the one hand Wittgenstein seems to offer a critique of Moore's refutations of skepticism, on the other hand he seems to confer a special status to those very propositions with which Moore combated skepticism. We find Wittgenstein offering arguments against skepticism on the one hand; on the other hand some of his own remarks in *On Certainty* openly embrace relativism, the most troubling form of skepticism in epistemology. Hence the problem is: How to interpret Wittgenstein? Was he a skeptic or a non-skeptic? If we treat him as a skeptic, he obviously faces the charge of being inconsistent in *On Certainty*; if a non-skeptic, certainly those paragraphs with skeptical overtones pose a serious problem for commentators. In this paper an attempt will be made to offer a way out of this dilemma.

MEDIENPHILOSOPHIE: DISKURS ODER DISZIPLIN?

Siegfried J. Schmidt, Münster, Deutschland

Über die wachsende Bedeutsamkeit von Medien in unserer Medienkulturgesellschaft gibt es weder im Wissenschafts- noch im Alltagsdiskurs ernsthaft Dissens. Wie in einer solchen Situation üblich, werden Medien und ihre Bedeutsamkeit zunehmend einer Selbst- wie einer Fremdbeobachtung unterzogen. Die Selbstbeobachtung der Medien führt zu einer zunehmenden Selbstreferenz, aus der ganz praktisch Programm gemacht werden kann. Die Fremdbeobachtung haben einerseits empirisch orientierte Medien- und Kommunikationswissenschaftler, andererseits Philosophen übernommen. Während Medien- und Kommunikationswissenschaften seit langem disziplinär organisiert sind, kann bis heute von einer Medienphilosophie weder im Sinne eines festen Theoriegebäudes noch im Sinne einer etablierten Teildisziplin der Philosophie gesprochen werden. Das Nachdenken über Medienphilosophie verfügt also noch

über erfreuliche Freiräume sowohl hinsichtlich der thematischen Orientierung als auch hinsichtlich wünschenswerter Organisationsstrukturen.

Ein medienphilosophischer Ansatz konzentriert sich darauf, traditionelle philosophische Themen im Lichte der Wirksamkeit von Medien zu reformulieren. Die Liste der behandelten Themen ist sehr lang, sie reicht von Wirklichkeit, Wahrheit, Kultur, Gesellschaft, Erziehung und Politik bis zu Raum, Zeit, Gefühl, Subjekt und Unterhaltung. Das philosophische rethinking konzentriert sich hier darauf, wie sich in der Coevolution von Medien(systemen) und Gesellschaft sowohl die theoretischen Konzepte als auch die alltäglichen Erfahrungen unter dem Einfluss der Medien in der Entwicklung von der Schrift bis zum Internet gewandelt haben. Als Beispiele seien hier nur die tief greifenden Veränderungen der Konzepte wie der Erfahrungen von Raum und Zeit durch das Internet, die Entstehung der Medienpädagogik, das Heraufkommen der Medienkultur oder die Problematisierung aller Wirklichkeitskonzepte und –erfahrungen durch mediale Möglichkeiten der Simulation und Virtualität genannt. Zapping und Infotainment sind heute ebenso ernsthaft zu diskutierende philosophische Themen wie der Wandel der Politik zur medialen Performance.

Ein zweiter medienphilosophischer Ansatz konzentriert sich auf medienspezifische Themen wie Netzkultur, neue Sozialformen im Internet, Globalisierung, Wandel der Körperrelevanz, Wahrnehmungswandel, Spielkulturen oder Digitalisierung der Demokratie, wobei Überschneidungen mit den oben genannten traditionellen Themen unvermeidbar sind.

Diese Kurzcharakterisierung der thematischen Ebene impliziert m. E. auch eine Empfehlung für die Lösung der Organisationsfrage einer Medienphilosophie. Wenn sich die Themen aus argumentierbaren Gründen nicht randscharf voneinander trennen lassen, empfiehlt es sich, Medienphilosophie als notwendig interdisziplinär angelegtes Forschungsprogramm und nicht als traditionelle akademische Disziplin zu organisieren. Die mögliche Themenliste für Projekte in solchen Forschungsprogrammen ist schon heute sehr lang, und sie wird angesichts der rasanten Medienentwicklung von Jahr zu Jahr länger. Dieses Tempo kann keine akademische Disziplin mithalten, sondern, wenn überhaupt, dann nur ein flexibles Forschungsprogramm, in dem von sich aus und nicht von Amts wegen am Thema interessierte Kolleginnen und Kollegen interdisziplinär und aus eigener Medienerfahrung mitarbeiten.

Heute dürfte klar sein, dass eine intensive Fremdbeobachtung der Medien zu den vorrangigsten Aufgaben des Wissenschaftssystems insgesamt gehört; disziplinäre Revieransprüche sind hier atavistisch. Medienpädagogik gilt heute als unumgänglich, will man die Jugend nicht einer Medienlegasthenie ausliefern. Medienethik und Medienkritik aber sind nicht weniger wichtig, will man nicht in der Zapping-Zone verkümmern. Die Globalisierung, die sich bis heute vor allem im ökonomischen Bereich sowie im IT-Bereich vollzieht, wird in dem Augenblick gefährlich, wo wir es versäumen, Kompetenzen als Beobachter 2. Ordnung zu entwickeln. Und dafür braucht es Medienphilosophie, die sich darüber klar ist, dass sie sich nur – in den Medien vollziehen kann, und zwar unter dem klaren Motto „Konstruktion und Kontingenz“.

GLOBALISIERTE PRODUKTION VON (AKADEMISCHEM) WISSEN – EIN WETTBEWERBSSPIEL.

Ursula Schneider, Graz, Österreich

Das Paper behandelt die Charakteristika und Rituale der akademischen Produktion von „Erkenntnis“ unter Bedingungen global standardisierter Vergleiche, eines globalen Wettbewerbs um Ressourcen und Aufmerksamkeit sowie einer kaum noch zu bewältigenden Fülle von Projekten und Texten. Es geht von der These einer industrialisierten Massenproduktion von Wissen aus, für welche empirische Evidenz herangezogen wird: Globalisierung, Digitalisierung, Differenzierung, Dominanz einer Arbeitssprache, „empiric turn“, Evaluierungen und Benchmarks, Zunahme von Betrug, Manipulation und Missbrauch, zunehmende Selbstreferenz. In der Folge werden bewusst einseitig problematische Folgen der ausgewählten empirischen Trends argumentiert. Einerseits zeigen sie sich als Schwerpunktverlagerung von Erkenntnisgewinnung für die Lebenswelt zu selbstreferenziellen Ritualen, andererseits werden sie als Verlust von Innovationsfähigkeit sowie als Produktion von Herrschaftswissen mit hohem Ideologiegehalt kritisierbar: „The general effect is that research becomes ritualized pretence rather than a source of genuine contributions to knowledge“ (Starbuck, 2006, 3).

PHILOSOPHY AS DEVELOPMENT OF CONCEPTUAL TECHNOLOGIES

Murilo Rocha Seabra, Marechal Thaumaturgo, Brazil / Marcos Paiva Pinheiro, Mussoorie, India

In this paper we would like to construe Wittgenstein's later approach to philosophy as resulting from the application of a particular problem-solving technique. By doing so, we hope to catch a glimpse not only of the limits to this approach but also of the ways by which it may be further applied and improved.

THE POSSIBILITY AND LIMITS OF COMMUNICATION: A WITTGENSTEINIAN PERSPECTIVE

Rui Silva, Azores, Portugal

The paper evaluates the significance of Wittgenstein for communication studies. Firstly, I argue that Wittgenstein undermines the classical communication model by rejecting the reification of meaning and the view of language as a mere vehicle of thoughts or meanings. Secondly, I explore, on the basis of Wittgenstein's reflections on rule-following, the significance of his conception of understanding as a practical ability for the study of communication. Thirdly, I address the question concerning the limits of communication. From a Wittgensteinian perspective, the success of communication depends on the commonality of practices. In the absence of shared practices, communicative processes are disrupted. Human communication has therefore real limits, but these limits may be gradually overcome through the adoption of the so-called participant perspective.

RE-DISCOVERING WITTGENSTEIN

Deirdre Christine Page Smith, Bergen, Norway

The Wittgenstein Archives at the University of Bergen (WAB) was established in 1990 with the following goals: producing a machine readable version of Wittgenstein's Nachlass; developing software to assist scholars in locating, viewing and analyzing Nachlass texts; developing registration systems and software to present, work with and analyze original textual sources; and establishing links to international Wittgenstein research and computer programming projects with similar text encoding goals. Both the conception and realization of WAB's participation in DISCOVERY (Digital Semantic Corpora for Virtual Research in Philosophy) fit with the further development of these initial goals. This paper's main objective is to present the advantages of DISCOVERY's semantic approach to texts using examples from Ms. 139a, otherwise known as Wittgenstein's 'Lecture on Ethics'

ETHICS, LANGUAGE AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF WITTGENSTEIN'S THOUGHT IN MS 139A

Deirdre Christine Page Smith, Bergen, Norway

'Lecture on Ethics' was one of Wittgenstein's first tangible products after returning to Cambridge and philosophy in early 1929. The interest it holds for us is thus not only to offer insight into Wittgenstein's views on Ethics, but also into the development of his thought during years spent prioritizing activities other than philosophy. This paper will consider some themes regarding both the development of his thought as well as the relationship between Ethics and language presented in the manuscript version of 'Lecture on Ethics', Ms 139a.

WITTGENSTEIN'S APPROACH TO THE LANGUAGE-REASONING USE OF PROPOSITIONS

Alexandr Sobancev, Yekaterinburg, Russia

The relation of language and reasoning which is of great significance for the problem of propositions' interpretation, concerns the problem of the expression of a thought. We will argue certain points that refer to some lack of understanding of the relation between language and reasoning. In the first section we will offer a way to receive an understanding of the distinction between Wittgenstein's account of sentences and that of propositions in connection to Frege's influence on him. In the second one we will suggest a hypothesis for the use of propositions concerned the reasoning by means of its expression.

STORING, PROCESSING AND TRANSMITTING LINKED CHUNKS OF STRUCTURED TEXT

Sindre Sørensen, Bergen, Norway

Digital information and communication technology has sparked many initiatives to research and reconsider what a text is. But many technical and theoretical obstacles remain to be solved. Texts are by many theoreticians and researchers considered to be neither linear, nor hierarchical. I argue that for example for advanced text editing some of the currently used tools or formats, like HTML, XML and corresponding software could be replaced with new tools that are designed to handle nonlinear texts in more transparent ways. This paper is a sketch of a research and development project that would have as its goal to develop such tools. Specifically, the paper focuses on a sketch of a core tool. Ideally, this tool would safely store and transmit texts, and relationships between texts, in the form of graphs. The tool would handle certification of relationships between text segments as well as multiple editorship and non-hierarchical structures in a native way.

MELVIN'S A.I. DILEMMA: SHOULD ROBOTS WORK ON SUNDAYS?

Ivan Spajić / Josipa Grigić, Zagreb, Croatia

This paper addresses the issue of robotic religiosity by focusing on a particular privilege granted on basis of religiosity: work-free Sundays. The paper is divided into two questions; could artificially intelligent robots develop religiosity and should that be a reason to give them Sundays off. Both questions are answered in forms of short overviews of pro- and counter-arguments. Since answers to the second question greatly depend on the answers to the first one, a cross-relation between arguments on both sides is created, creating a dilemma which authors believe puts in question the purpose of creating A.I. in the first place.

ASSESSING THE IMPACT OF THE DIGITAL TURN ON WITTGENSTEIN SCHOLARSHIP

David Stern, Iowa City, Iowa, USA

The Bergen edition of the Wittgenstein papers was published in 2000. Even by the relatively slow-moving standards of academic publishing, one might well expect that by 2007 we should be able to assess the impact of this "digital turn" on Wittgenstein scholarship. The available evidence suggests that its impact has not, so far, been as large as early reviewers hoped — or feared. While a number of Wittgenstein experts, myself included, regard it an invaluable resource, the vast majority of work on Wittgenstein makes little or no use of the digital turn. With a few notable exceptions — principally editorial work on Wittgenstein's writing, and the study of the composition of his work — writing on Wittgenstein in a possible world where the Bergen edition was never published would be almost indistinguishable from our own.

However, we frequently overestimate the short-term effects of technological changes while underestimating

their longer-term impact. The Bergen “edition” is not a book, but a piece of software, and must be evaluated in those terms. That software was developed in the first half of the 1990s, when Windows 3.1 was the standard operating system and only computer experts knew how to use a web browser. Because the customer base is so small, it is sold at a price that only well-endowed institutions can afford. Nor has it been upgraded, although it has been repackaged as a web-based software package for university libraries, and plans are now underway for a new version that would make use of current software standards. In other words, the market for such technology has, so far, guaranteed it a “niche” role where it is only accessible to relatively few researchers.

As the results of the work of the first generation of users of this software reaches a broader audience, and as the software becomes easier to use, we can expect that the digital turn in Wittgenstein studies, like the web browser in the 1990s, will eventually reach a wider audience themselves.

WHAT DO DIGITAL AND LINGUISTIC TURNS HAVE IN COMMON?

Marcin Trybulec, Lublin, Poland

The paper aims to express the idea that the socio-technological phenomenon referred to as the digital turn creates a conceptual context fulfilling basic notions developed in the intellectual tradition of the linguistic turn. Applying the concept of symbolic form to interpret the idea of media of cognition and communication helps to succeed in expressing its philosophical dimension. The appraisal carried out in the first part indicates that the philosophical studies of the media of communication are indeed a part of the linguistic turn tradition. The second part of the paper demonstrates that the “linguistic turn” in philosophy is an element of a wider rhetoric pattern of thought. The third part of the paper points out several features of the digitized word (hypertext), which are crucial in creating the rhetoric context of thought, suitable for developing the assumptions contained in the linguistic turn.

SRAFFA’S IMPACT ON WITTGENSTEIN

Matthias Unterhuber, Salzburg, Austria

Sraffa was one of two persons whom Wittgenstein explicitly acknowledged in the preface of the *Philosophical Investigations*. However, little is known of Sraffa’s influence on Wittgenstein. On the basis on the yet unpublished letters from Wittgenstein to Sraffa and interviews with Georg Kreisler, the influence of Sraffa on Wittgenstein is investigated.

SANTAYANA AND WITTGENSTEIN ON SCEPTICISM

Luis M. Valdés-Villanueva, Oviedo, Spain

At first sight, the attempt to compare the philosophical positions of George Santayana (1863-1952) and Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889-1951) could be considered as something bold, even extravagant. They belong to so different traditions with so divergent methods, aims, styles and sensibilities that they seem “improbable candidates for comparative study”. Of course, this fact reveals itself in the philosophical literature: in the last 60 years, Santayana’s and Wittgenstein’s scholars seem, as a rule, to have ignored each other. However, all rules have exceptions: in *The Claim of Reason* (1979) Stanley Cavell mentions in passing that Wittgenstein shares with Santayana (and the existentialists) a “knowledge of the depth of contingency” that undermines classical epistemology. More recently (2000) Michael Hodges and John Lachs have published the only book which is focused on the relationship between Wittgenstein’s and Santayana’s thought [Thinking in the Ruins. Wittgenstein and Santayana on Contingency [TR], Vanderbilt University Press]. I think that [TR] is a good book; more than that, I think that it is a very brave book. The comparison between Santayana and Wittgenstein that Hodges and Lachs undertake has undoubtedly a point. Both philosophers share in fact much more than Cavell’s quick remark suggests: similarities between them range from personal biographies to philosophical goals, not to mention their conservatism, their standards of “decency” (Wittgenstein)/ “honesty” (Santayana), or their contempt towards professional philosophers.

My contribution will be centred in Santayana’s and Wittgenstein’s treatment of scepticism. What I intend here is a kind of “elucidatory” exercise; I believe that a critical account of the way in which both philosophers deal with the topic will throw presumably new light upon it. In [TR] there is indeed an exposition of Santayana’s and Wittgenstein’s treatments of scepticism. However, I think that Hodges and Lachs overemphasize the similarities and in most cases they are forgetful of the differences. The result is that the final picture we get from their account turns out to be very flat and the important tensions between both accounts have almost disappeared.

In fact, Wittgenstein’s and Santayana’s strategies regarding scepticism are completely different. Wittgenstein’s purpose is to prevent sceptical arguments to grow from the very beginning, because he thinks that, once sceptical arguments take hold, the last resort left seems to be a dogmatism of various kinds (this is precisely Wittgenstein’s query against Moore’s common sense). On his part, Santayana starts his *Scepticism and Animal Faith* with the commitment to give sceptics the benefit of doubting everything they can: “Let me then push scepticism as far as I logically can, and endeavour to clear my mind of illusion, even at the price of intellectual suicide”. When the sceptic arrives to “the solipsism of the present moment” (by the way, an expression coined by Santayana) and, as expected, he commits “intellectual suicide”, the following step in order to recover the ordinary world is to espouse “animal faith”.

The temptation here is to accuse Santayana ipso facto of flagrant and unacceptable dogmatism; that is presumably what a Wittgenstenian would be ready to do. However, Santayana’s stance is not so simple. Wittgenstein is able to block the sceptical manoeuvre from the very beginning through his use of the conceptual link between certain Moore-like propositions and the corresponding language-games. But Santayana allows the sceptic to continue with

his questioning because he regards the whole process as speculative, and he cannot admit any "sacrifice of truth to utility". He is not prepared to accept that sceptic's arguments could be denied by his ordinary transactions with the world around him. The final result is that Santayana feels himself legitimized to assert: "I am a dogmatist", "complete scepticism is [...] not inconsistent with animal faith", or "my dogmatism and my scepticism are complementary views of the same fact of natural history". For him, an important source of misunderstanding is the impression that scepticism means disbelief. "But disbelief is not sceptical; it is belief in the falseness of a previous assertion". True sceptics merely analyze belief, discovering the risk and the logical uncertainty inherent to it. But they cannot say that "any belief, much less all belief, was wrong".

Santayana's standpoint could allow us to see Wittgenstein's reflections on scepticism under a new light. Wittgenstein, like Santayana, is not prepared for embarking in a hasty dismissal of scepticism given its own unbearability vis à vis our ordinary practices. However, unlike Santayana, he does not feel comfortable with the idea of letting the sceptical argument grow, on account of his link between meaning and practice. Santayana's conception that there is "a wise direction of curiosity upon things" that "cannot be controlled", is "irresponsible" and, therefore, independent of any practice whatsoever, is simply out of question here. This line of thought (some philosophers would term it a "linguistic acrobatics") led Wittgenstein to the discovery of several kinds of propositions that, in a particular sense, are fundamental and certain; it is precisely this fact what guarantees that they are not susceptible of knowledge, doubt or justification. If certainties cannot be justified, that only means that they cannot be known either not-known: as Wittgenstein puts it: the concept of knowledge "gets no purchase here". Presumably, this move paralyzes the sceptic and we are left instead with certainty, a fresh starting point that "lies beyond being justified or unjustified; as it were as something animal". To the question, But are you not a dogmatist in disguise?, Wittgenstein could rightfully answer: "you should remember that certainty is not my safe haven from scepticism; rather, certainty is something 'internal' to our practice of making knowledge claims". Cavell has described Wittgenstein's manoeuvre against the sceptical stance as a way of "removing its theatricality". For once the trick is exposed, the sceptical questions appear as Wittgenstein had depicted them in the *Tractatus*: "as obviously nonsensical, [for] they try to raise doubts where no questions can be asked".

On the contrary, Santayana does not turn up his nose at the prospect of letting grow the sceptical arguments. First of all, his proposal of pushing scepticism as far as one logically can, should not be considered as a kind of academic exercise. It is true that sceptical doubts do not alter the world or the self — they have no practical effect at all — because they proceed only in thought. But he considers, in a kind of Wittgenstenian vein, that the transit through sceptical arguments is a vital process that changes the person who reaches the summit (let's say, the solipsism of the present moment) and behaves as a true sceptic. Such a person should resist the temptation of acting dishonestly, of stating that all belief is wrong, that we cannot know anything. Whereas Wittgenstein is concerned with the possibility of sceptical doubts or questions, Santayana's inquiry on scepticism is concerned with sceptical answers. He is always prepared to brand as dishonest any philosophy that "denies all claims to knowledge and [...] it itself claims to know".

On the other hand, Santayana proudly claims something apparently contradictory: "I am a dogmatist, yet I have

raised my system on a sceptical foundation". How could we cope with that? It has been claimed that Wittgenstein is performing a "delicate balancing act" when he allows basic certainties and, at the same time, he denies them the status of known propositions. It is at least debatable if one can clearly distinguish Wittgenstein's answer to scepticism from scepticism itself. At the end, Santayana, with all his different strategy regarding scepticism, shares with Wittgenstein a similar predicament. He calls himself a dogmatist, where "dogmatist" means that he will not rebel against the "physical necessity" of believing. At the same time, he calls himself a sceptic, and this acknowledgment remains merely the confession that he takes seriously that "faith is faith". He acknowledges that criticism is only "an exercise of reflective fancy", an exercise to which he is not disposed to renounce. However, he admits that "in dwelling on criticism as if it were more than a subjective perspective or play of logical optics, I should be renouncing all serious philosophy", something that he is not prepared to do either. The upshot is again a "delicate balancing act", a compromise between "reflective fancy" and "physical necessity". It is that the defeat of scepticism? Or it is rather its victory?

AGAINST THE IDEA OF A "THIRD" WITTGENSTEIN

Nuno Venturinha, Lisbon, Portugal

In a recently published book, *The Third Wittgenstein*, the editor, Danièle Moyal-Sharrock, writes that it "seeks to correct the traditional bipartite conception of Wittgenstein's thought into his *Tractatus* and *Philosophical Investigations* by focusing on his neglected last masterpiece, *On Certainty*, and works contemporaneous with it". This paper aims to show that such a view is mistaken. It wrongly takes for granted, first of all, that namely *On Certainty* constitutes a work by Wittgenstein. But the idea of a "third" Wittgenstein is also mistaken because it presupposes that the *Investigations*, such as posthumously published in 1953, form another work by Wittgenstein, something which is in need of a re-evaluation. I focus then on some issues concerning the origins of the *Investigations* and try to make clear that the material edited in *On Certainty* or *Last Writings* still belongs to (Part I of) the only book Wittgenstein worked at after the *Tractatus*.

DIE SUBJEKTIVEN WIRKLICHKEITEN EINER WELT

Thomas Wachtendorf, Oldenburg, Deutschland

Wittgenstein verwendet im *Tractatus* die Begriffe *Welt* und *Wirklichkeit*. Es stellt sich die Frage, ob diese Begriffe eine unterschiedliche Bedeutung haben. Eine oft versuchte, rein positivistisch (onto-)logische Antwort auf die Frage nach dem Verhältnis der Begriffserweiterungen ist nicht befriedigend. Auch eine genauere Analyse des *Tractatus* führt nur bedingt zum Ziel: Während einige Passagen eine synonyme Verwendungsweise der Begriffe durch Wittgenstein nahe legen, weisen andere Bemerkungen auf einen unterschiedlichen Gebrauch hin. Allerdings kommen auch Bemerkungen vor, die auf ein ganz besonderes Verhältnis der (verschiedenen) Bedeutungen der beiden Begriffe hinweisen. Diese Passagen sind die philosophisch

interessanten. Danach ist die Welt als logisches Gebilde eine Rekombination der Gegenstände – der Substanz der Welt – und unabhängig vom Subjekt. Die Wirklichkeit ist demgegenüber abhängig vom Subjekt, aber auf die Welt angewiesen. In diesem Spannungsverhältnis erscheint die vermeintlich problematische, beide Begriffe identifizierende Bemerkung “Die gesamte Wirklichkeit ist die Welt” nicht nur als logisch unproblematisch, sondern als zentraler traktarianischer Gedanke, der auf die Stellung des Subjekts zur Welt verweist.

CULTURE AND VALUE REVISITED – DRAFT OF A NEW ELECTRONIC EDITION

Joseph Wang, Innsbruck, Austria

Since the publication of Ludwig Wittgenstein’s *Vermischte Bemerkungen* (VB) in the year of 1977 by Georg Henrik von Wright, VB has always been a source for both inspiration and confusion. On the one hand, some of the remarks illuminate W’s philosophy, but most of them are quite ambiguous and cannot be understood easily. To compensate this difficulty the Forschungsinstitut Brenner Archiv in Innsbruck (FIBA) and the Wittgenstein Archive in Bergen (WAB) now work together on a new electronic editing project of VB. In this paper aims and achievements of the Project “Culture and Value revisited” should be explained.

WITTGENSTEIN AND KANT ON JUDGMENTS OF TASTE: SITUATIONS VERSUS FACULTIES

Christian Helmut Wenzel, Puli, Taiwan

Both Kant and Wittgenstein wrote on judgments of taste, but very differently. Kant offered a whole theory in his *Critique of the Power of Judgment* (1790), whereas Wittgenstein merely gave some private lectures on aesthetics (in 1938). Furthermore their backgrounds were quite different and so were their views of what to make of judgments of taste. Wittgenstein was skeptical about what we generally say about the inner workings of our mind, which is apparent in his comments on Freud and psychology in those lectures. He preferred to focus on external factors, situations and expressions. Kant, on the other hand, freely made use of faculty vocabulary, such as imagination, understanding, power of judgment, intuition, and concepts. His was a transcendental philosophy, not a science. Nevertheless, it is often considered as having a psychological flavor. Does Kant give a theory of the inner workings of our mind? And how would Wittgenstein view Kant’s transcendental philosophy and his theory of taste in particular?

A NOTE ON WITTGENSTEIN AND NIETZSCHE

Peter K. Westergaard, Copenhagen, Denmark

This article points out a number of similarities between the thought of Wittgenstein and that of Nietzsche. These similarities suggest the possibility (i) that Wittgenstein was acquainted with some of Nietzsche’s works, and (ii) that in some fields Wittgenstein was influenced by Nietzsche.

DIFFIDERE AUDE – WAHRHEIT IM INTERNET UND DER KONSENS DER NETZGEMEINSCHAFT

Christian Zelger, Schlanders, Italien

In der Praxis wird das Internet zunehmend zur primären Informationsquelle unserer Gesellschaft. Sowohl in der Wissenschaft, als auch in Schulen und immer häufiger unter Journalisten ist das Internet meist die erste und oft auch einzige Recherchequelle. Umso wichtiger ist eine erkenntnis-theoretische Auseinandersetzung mit dem Medium, seinen Inhalten und den Mechanismen, die die gelieferten Daten als wahre Aussagen präsentieren. Google und Online-Lexika wie die Wikipedia besitzen heute eine De-facto-Monopolstellung in der Informationsbeschaffung und beeinflussen damit das, was von der Gemeinschaft letzten Endes in einem fragwürdigen Konsens als wahr akzeptiert wird.

UTILIZING OWL FOR WITTGENSTEIN’S TRACTATUS

Amélie Zöllner-Weber, Bielefeld, Germany / Alois Pichler, Bergen, Norway

This article presents experience gained from an attempt to develop an ontology for part of Wittgenstein’s *Tractatus*. The term “ontology” is here used as in computer science (Artificial Intelligence). A computer science ontology, similar to a taxonomy, structures information hierarchically and supports semantic retrieval and reasoning. In this article, we outline the mentioned ontology, its development as well as possible applications. Several projects in the field of humanities have already utilized or developed ontologies for different topics. But modelling using ontologies represents just a starting point for more advanced (computational) applications in the humanities. In philosophy, the development and application of ontologies seems still at an early stage. With this article, we wish to help catalyse and develop this process further.

SPONTANEOUS ORDERS IN SOCIAL CAPITAL ARCHITECTURE

Gloria L. Zuniga, Allendale, Michigan, USA

Some view technology as heralding a new era of individualism and moral decadence. The Internet, for example, can be seen as the modern-day Hobbesian state of nature in which life is solitary and interactions with others are often brutish and nasty. It is true that the Internet presents an alternative to direct interactions with people. And it is also true that communication via email and text messaging does not encourage correct use of language and traditional social etiquette. Nonetheless, today's technological advancements encourage more human interaction than any other mode of communication in the history of mankind. Moreover, technology has been an efficient vehicle for the formation of spontaneous orders of information and knowledge.

Spontaneous orders, according to Austrian economist and Nobel laureate Friedrich von Hayek, are the result of human action but not of human design. He advanced this in response to the enterprise of central economic planning. Only by far-reaching decentralization, he argued, it will be possible to make full use of the knowledge and information dispersed among all individuals in society. The socialist experiment did not work because markets do not conform to a designed architecture.

Today's technological advancements confirm Hayek's observation more than ever. The knowledge collaboration that occurs via the Internet is possible because participants enter freely, and the spontaneous nature of their interactions maximizes efficiency by directing resources to their most wanted uses. We are witnessing the emergence of socially defined applications such as MySpace.com and YouTube.com. Free participation and dynamic collaboration have led to new markets of information that could have never been imagined or planned by a single person or central planning board. The remarkable thing is that there is no pecuniary incentive on the part of users for this growing shared intelligence that crosses national boundaries and languages. Rather, the only incentive seems to be the sense of belonging that can be obtained from taking part in the creation of something with other people.

In this paper I will argue that technology-driven social networks are the best means for social capital formation. I will also show how the architecture of the social networks that are emerging in the Internet can be characterized as morally-relevant.

VORTRAGENDE / LECTURER:

Terje Aaberge 3
Krzysztof Abriszewski 3
Daniel Apollon, Bergen 3
José María Ariso 3
Luciano Bazzocchi 4
Luciano Bazzocchi 4
Barbara Becker 4
Ondrej Beran 4
Anat Biletzki 5
Ewa Binczyk 5
Thomas Binder 5
Rainer Born 5
Vaclav Brezina 6
Katja Brunkhorst / Paolo D'orio 6
Gregory Chaitin 6
Kai-Yuan Cheng 7
Chris Chesher 7
Gerhard Clemenz 7
James Conant 7
Wolfgang Coy 7
Stefano David / Cesare Rocchi 8
Jos De Mul 8
Aleksandra Maria Derra 9
Fred Dretske 9
Dan Dusa 9
Harald Edelbauer 9
Christian Eric Erbacher 10
Lemaire Francis Eric 10
Charles Ess 10
August Fenk 11
Maurizio Ferraris 11
Luciano Floridi 11
Juliet Floyd 11
Craig Fox 12
Georg Friedrich 12
Günther Friesinger / Herbert Hrachovec / Stefan Köstenbauer 12
Newton Garver 12
Rishab Aiyer Ghosh 12
Niels Gottschalk-Mazouz 12
Stefan Gradmann 13
Marek Graszewicz / Dominik Lewiński 13
Maurycy Adam Graszewicz 13
Hajo Greif 13
Ora Gruengard 14
Eran Guter 14
Frank Hartmann 14
Cynthia Haynes 14
Włodzimierz Heflik 14
Michael Heim 15
Marek Hetmanski 15
Jih-Ching Ho 15
Theo Hug 15
Claus Huitfeldt 16
Phillip Jones 16
Peter Keicher 16
Peter P. Kirschenmann 16
Endre Kiss, Budapest 16
Dieter Köhler 16
Zsuzsanna Kondor 17
Kristijan Krkač / Josip Lukin 17

Matthias Kroß 17
Wilhelm Krüger 17
Timm Lampert 18
Silvia Lanzetta 18
Martin Lindner 18
Montgomery Link 18
Vladimir Olegovich Lobovikov 18
Winfried Löffler 18
Michael Luger / Andrea Adelsburg / Daniel Kuby / Daniel Schmid 19
Stefan Majetschak 19
Tuomas William Manninen 19
Reinhard Margreiter 19
Cristina Marras / Giorgio Fotia 20
Michael Maurer 20
Kerstin Mayr 20
Lidia A. Mazhul / Vladimir M. Petrov 21
Cameron Mcewen 21
Nikolay Milkov 21
Fábio Jesus Miranda 22
Elena Nájera 22
Michael Nentwich 22
Dan Neshet 22
Yrsa Neuman / Tuukka Tomperi 22
Yrsa Neuman 23
Katalin Neumer 23
Andrzej W. Nowak 23
Kristóf Nyiri 24
Yukiko Okamoto 25
Giridhari Lal Pandit 25
Michele Pasin 25
Vladimir M. Petrov / Lidia A. Mazhul 26
Claus Pias 26
Manuel Pinedo-García / Cristina Borgoni-Gonçalves 26
Marcos Paiva Pinheiro / Jorge Alam Pereira Dos Santos 26
Martin Pleitz 27
Regina Queiroz 27
Ulrike Rammung 27
Allen Renner 27
Victor Rodych 27
Josef Rothhaupt 28
Priyambada Sarkar 28
Siegfried J. Schmidt 28
Ursula Schneider 29
Rui Silva, Azores 29
Deirdre Christine Page Smith 30
Alexandr Sobancev 30
Sindre Sørensen 30
Ivan Spajić / Josipa Grigić 30
David Stern 30
Marcin Trybulec 31
Matthias Unterhuber 31
Luis M. Valdés-Villanueva 31
Nuno Venturinha 32
Thomas Wachtendorf 32
Joseph Wang 33
Christian Helmut Wenzel 33
Peter K. Westergaard 33
Christian Zelger 33
Amélie Zöllner-Weber, Bielefeld, Germany / Alois Pichler 33
Gloria L. Zuniga 34

Leben. Begleiten

Raiffeisen -
eine Wertegemeinschaft
von Menschen
mit Verantwortung
für Menschen.

Mit. Einander



Raiffeisen -
eine gelebte Philosophie,
die den Schutz und die
Förderung des Einzelnen
und seines regionalen
Lebensraumes zum Ziel hat.

**Raiffeisenbank
NÖ-Süd Alpin**

